DISSENT

Of Bombs and Men

Abraham '59—a Nuclear Fantasy — **F. B. AIKEN**

Political Policy or Nuclear War? — **WILLIAM J. NEWMAN**

United States After the Elections

A New Political Atmosphere — **IRVING HOWE**
(With Comments by Stanley Plastrik, Lewis Coser, Norman Mailer, Bernard Rosenberg)

France: an End to Politics — **PAUL RICOEUR**

Doctor Zhivago and Modern Sensibility — **NICOLA CHIAROMONTE**

Force, Justice, Integration: a Debate

Reflections on Little Rock — **HANNAH ARENDT**

Politics and the Realms of Being — **DAVID SPITZ**

Pie in the Sky — **MELVIN TUMIN**

American Institutions

The Professor as Commodity — **LEWIS COSER**

Gorillas . . . and Real He-Men — **MURRAY HAUSKNECHT**

The Cost of Mental Care — **ROSE LAUB COSER**

WINTER 1959 — **75c**

DISSENT

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VOICES OF DISSENT

A 384 page book, available in hard cover and paperback editions, which brings together as a permanent record 35 of the best articles that have appeared in DISSENT during its first five years.

This book represents a major contribution to the re-establishment and reorientation of American democratic radicalism. It provides valuable background reading for those who came to DISSENT *recently and could not get the out-of-print early issues. It should prove extremely useful to all socialist groups, especially those in universities, which need a serious and relevant statement of the case for, and problems of, socialist thought.*

Voices of Dissent, published by Grove Press, opens with a Preface by *Norman Thomas* and an Introductory Note by *Irving Howe,* which place the magazine in the context of both American socialism and the problems of current intellectual life.

DISSENT, issued January 1, 1959, is published quarterly by Dissent Publishing Association, 509 Fifth Avenue, New York 17, N.Y. Subscriptions: $3.00 for one year, $5.00 for two years; $2.50 for students for one year; foreign subscriptions, including Canada, add 50 cents. All payments from foreign countries must be made by U. S. money orders or checks payable in U. S. currency. Single copy: $.75. Bundle orders of three or more copies: 40¢ each. For information on newsstand and store distribution write to: Eastern News Co., 306 West 11th St., New York City.

Copyright 1958 by Dissent Publishing Association. Permission to reprint any article must be obtained from the Publishers. ● Manuscripts will not be returned unless accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope. ● Entered as second-class matter at the post office at New York, New York on April 1, 1954 under the authority of the act of March 3, 1879. ● Volume VI, No. 1, (Whole Number 22).

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There follow 33 other articles. Here you will find Ignazio Silone *explaining "The Choice of Comrades."* Richard Lowenthal *analyzes the post-Stalin situation in Russia.* C. Wright Mills *discusses "Knowledge and Power" as these affect American intellectuals.* Frank Marquart *reports on conditions of life among the Detroit auto workers.*

Here you will find *Norman Mailer's* now-famous article on the Hipsters. And *Irving Howe's* analysis of Adlai Stevenson which appeared in our very first issue. And *Harold Rosenberg* dissecting "Couch Liberalism." And *Lewis Coser* addressing himself to the young: "What Is to be Done?"

There is a remarkable variety in the book—ranging from Stanley Diamond's *critique of the Kibbutz to* David Carper's *portrait of Beck & Hoffa. And* Ben Seligman *on Keynsian economics. And* Czeslaw Milosz *on Picasso's politics. And* Herbert Marcuse *and* Erich Fromm *debating Freudian theory. And* L. D. Reddick *giving a first-hand account of the Montgomery bus boycott. And* Asoka Mehta *on the problems of industrializing Asia.*

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AFTER THE PASTERNAK CASE

It is hard to write about the Pasternak case without an overwhelming sense of disgust.

Disgust with the foul-mouthed Russian autocrats who called this writer a "pig" and a "snake." As one notices in the United States preparations for a new intellectual appeasement of the Russian dictatorship—an appeasement arising from the painful realities of diplomatic defeat but flaunting as its rationale Russian production statistics —it becomes important to ask:

What is the insecurity, the fear, the guilt at the heart of the dictatorship which leads it to suppress *Doctor Zhivago*? what is the nature, the essential quality, of a society that can so humiliate its greatest writer? is this a society which, no matter what its power and potential wealth, can be said to share in any of the values of freedom, let alone the values of socialism?

Disgust with those canting spiritualists who have tried to assimilate Pasternak's complex, unorthodox yet distinctively Russian form of primitive Christianity to the religiosity of the Cold War. In this age everything becomes a merchandise of mass propaganda, everything is corrupted into a slogan. Pasternak's version of Christianity has about as much in common with American popular superstition as the prison-society of Khrushchev with the ideal of socialism.

Disgust with those American Cold Warriors who have seized upon Pasternak's agony to proclaim a crusade for freedom which, all too often, their own recent past denies. If read with honesty, Pasternak's novel cannot be aligned with a dullesian view of Russian society. Though opposed in principle to the Communist ethos, Pasternak still acknowledges what he regards as the historical inevitability, perhaps the historical necessity, of the Russian Revolution. His complicated attitude toward Russia continues in the tradition of many democratic slavophiles among the 19th century Russian intellectuals. His book gives the fretful ideologues of the American Celebration no cause for comfort. It does not speak their language, nor does it share their outlook. Its commanding passion for freedom might have caused the Cold War intellectuals (if shame still existed in this world) to be a little hesitant about embracing him as their own. Might some of them not have troubled to reflect upon the contrast between Pasternak's heroism in writing against a brutal dictatorship and their own failure, under circumstances far less dangerous, to struggle with unambiguous will and forthrightness against the recent depredations of McCarthyism?

Disgust with the new breed of intellectual *real politiker* who do not yet dare write their true opinions but whisper, behind the palms of their hands, that the action of the Russian "authorities" was comprehensible in terms of meeting a challenge to power by a counter-thrust of power.

Such reasoning is detestable because it reduces a great writer's expression in behalf of freedom to a mere cynical incident in the Cold War. It is

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DISSENT

VOLUME VI
NUMBER 1

WINTER 1959

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A QUARTERLY OF SOCIALIST OPINION

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AMERICAN NOTEBOOK Some Brief Comments On the Domestic Scene

Ferment in the Economy

Gabriel Kolko

The economy, like any organism, can absorb only so many minor injuries before the cumulative impact begins to undermine the economic health of the nation. Built-in stabilizers of unemployment compensation, social security, and the like may pull the economy out of its doldrums, as they have in part during the past year, but like many medicines they may only cure the symptoms of more complex maladies which linger on.

Economists have been busy issuing conflicting diagnoses on the present state of the economy. The optimists point to rising industrial production, to rising profits and building plans, and to the stock market; the pessimists to a continuing hard-core of unemployment. Since both arguments are relevant, perhaps what is required is a trial assessment of some of the larger forces causing the present ferment in the economy.

Probably the most important single trend in the economy since 1948 has been the failure of the manufacturing sector to expand output sufficiently to counterbalance rising worker productivity and maintain full employment. Manufacturing output last August was 35 per cent greater than in 1948, but employment of production workers was six per cent lower. Technological innovation accounts for the difference, and although a comparison with 1929 raises dismal and not altogether irrelevant analogies, it is worth noting that from 1919 to 1929 manufacturing output rose 40 per cent while employment fell two per cent. This disparity between production and employment explains the current persistence of heavy unemployment in steel, autos, and many durable goods industries. Given the modest expectations for steel and auto production next year —even optimists expect no more than 75 per cent and 60 per cent, respectively, of capacity to be utilized—heavy unemployment in these fields will continue, if not grow.

EQUALLY DISTURBING for the economic future is the growing gap between national capacity to produce the basic materials upon which the economy is dependent—paper, cement, textiles, petroleum products, and metals—and actual output. In 1951, under the pressure of the Korean crisis, production rose to 94 per cent of capacity in these

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Journal of the Quarter

A Report to Our Friends

As of December 15, we have received in cash and pledges a total of $5,800 for our fund drive. To those who have helped us, we are deeply grateful.

We are now $1,700 short of our goal of $7,500, the sum necessary to insure our survival for the next two years. By current standards, the difference is a ridiculously small sum; but for us it means the possibility of undertaking certain editorial projects, doing necessary promotion and paying foreign contributors (the only ones who do get paid).

The size of the pledges has often been gratifying, but the number *of pledges received thus far is disappointing.*

Another hundred checks or pledges in the mail, and DISSENT *stays alive for the next two years. And surely there are at least that many friends who have not yet been heard from.*

We are extending the drive until January 31.

We are so close to success; help us now to reach it!

THE EDITORS

A New Political Atmosphere in America?

Irving Howe

The article that immediately follows was written as a memorandum for discussion among the editors of DISSENT. *A number of other editors then appended brief comments of disagreement and/or elaboration. We then decided that the discussion might be of interest to our readers, and so present some of the comments (others had to be omitted for reasons of space) without any effort to disguise the informal and tentative character of the discussion.*—ED.

The general consensus that there has been a significant change in political mood, a shift toward liberalism, seems correct. It is, of course, extremely welcome, offering new possibilities for people of our persuasion; though we should take care to make necessary qualifications as to what liberalism means in present-day America.

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1) No single explanation will completely account for the Democratic victory and the defeat of many reactionary candidates. But one formula may help: the image of well-being and assurance that has dominated American society these past ten or fifteen years —an image resulting from conscious fakery on the political summit and somnolent malaise at the base of a mass society—has been shattered. Samuel Lubell has put this accurately:

> One finds a deep uneasiness. This uneasiness has a curious quality. It is not fretting over something that already has happened. Mainly, it reflects an anxiety over impending disaster, a sense that as a nation we are beset by problems which are slipping beyond our control.

Things have gone badly in too many ways for *some* awareness of this fact not to have penetrated the consciousness of millions of people. The past two years have brought repeated shocks in foreign policy, the domestic economy and the *apparently* sudden rise of complicated new problems: urban development, care of the aged, education. Not merely has the administration failed; it has collapsed. This sense of a country being *stranded* may explain the tremendous shift in voting.

But there is more to it. I think people are beginning to see that the liberal stance (that is, the stance of thirty years ago) is the very minimum, if even that, for coping with the country's problems. The moment for a bellicose reactionary foreign policy passed in the late forties; for the preventive warriors it was then or never. As a result, the liberal posture is required simply to gain adequate *attention* in the world arena.

Domestically, too, it becomes clear that pressing problems like education and health can't even be approached as anything but public issues requiring public action.

The election, then, marked the final triumph of the New Deal—though, paradoxically, at a time when liberalism is less equipped than ever before in our century.

2) It was not an unambiguous triumph for liberalism. At no point did either party, or more than a very few candidates, seriously define issues. At no point did the Democrats put forward a principled line of differentiation from their opponents. Most of the liberal victors gave an increasingly "moderate" (i.e., conservative) coloration to their liberalism, anticipating the cue of Adlai Stevenson who, the day after the election, came out with a call for the victors to be "responsible," that is "moderate" (defined above.)

Furthermore, the glad-hand technique of campaigning, at which Nelson Rockefeller proved so skillful, is a technique for systematically avoiding issues—and is becoming a major element in our electoral system. How much more impressive, even noble, does a three hour oration by Daniel Webster seem than this pitiful business of going up to a stranger with a fixed mad smile on one's face and saying, "I'm Joe Blow, elect me dogcatcher." This fake personalization is a technique borrowed from the media of mass culture: you step out of the TV set and into Fulton Fish market, munching blintzes. It may be here to stay; but it's appalling.

3) Despite the fact that the Democratic victory didn't stem from an unambiguous upsurge of liberal senti-

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ment, it does provide the opportunity for another liberal advance in American society, perhaps even of the dimensions of that we had in the thirties.

People are more reflective, more disturbed, than for a long time past. We ought to stop crediting—if we ever have—the nonsense that the American population consists merely of a mass of obedient automatons. Sometimes no doubt it does; sometimes it just seems that way. But it is in the nature of our historical moment that it can't remain so: events strike blow after blow, people are forced to react.

And despite some contradictory evidence (such as the defeat in some localities of bond issues for new schools) there is a growing sentiment for an expansion of those public services that have been so shamefully starved these past two decades. Here will be one opportunity and test for the liberals.

Nor should we be dogmatic about this. There's nothing inherent in the structure of capitalism that prevents the building of more schools—though there *may* be something deeply ingrained in the ethos of our society which prevents the serious raising of educational and cultural standards. Even if this last is true, there remains every reason for pushing ahead on those matters, like new schools, that can be taken care of in the here-and-now.

4) But the liberalism of today is not that of twenty-five years ago. Deficient as it was even then in historical perspective and moral fortitude, American liberalism of the thirties had a good deal of crusading spirit; it surged ahead on the basis of a genuine popular sentiment. Today there is little of such spirit or sentiment—at least of a militant or aggressive kind. Like everything else, even the healthy trends in our political life are streaked with apathy. Partly this is a symptom of our peculiar moment, the fumes of deception from the Eisenhower era still being thick; partly it is due to the fact—and this *is* a fact—that political and economic issues in the fifties don't shape up as dramatically or starkly as they did in the thirties, when first of all there was the need to make sure that millions of people didn't starve.

Like everyone else today, the liberals tend to be uncertain, reflective, doubting—that is, those liberals who think. They too are in a political and intellectual crisis. There has recently appeared in the *New Republic* a discussion among Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Leon Keyserling and John Galbraith about the future of liberalism; it has many interesting—and amusing—parallels to our own discussions about the future of radicalism. This is a healthy sign. We possess no monopoly on either wisdom or humane concern, and to the extent that we can, we ought to try to connect (despite differences in both outlook and vocabulary) their discussions with our own.

5) The decisive political struggles during the next few years will occur in the Democratic party. This may not be the ideal political arena—of course, it's not; we would prefer, no doubt, some American version of the British labor party; but there it is: take it or leave it, a fact.

Through COPE, the trade unions have built up an imposing apparatus that has shown genuine power and serves as a rallying force for the more liberal elements within the Democratic party, as well as a partial (though inadequate) check on the more dema-

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gogic liberal politicians (Senator Humphrey).

Unavoidably, new differentiations will occur. Stevenson exerts a pull toward gentility, respectability, moderation. Lyndon Johnson has already begun his skillful maneuvers to head off the liberal wing of his party, and if past history is any indication, he will have more success than might presently be expected. Many of yesterday's liberal heroes will prove tomorrow's weaklings . . .

But it's not primarily a question of individuals. What is happening inside the Democratic Party today resembles, in a curious way, what happens in the party of a one-party state: a crowded variety of opinions and pressures—distorted, compromised—are competing within it, expressing thereby some of the central conflicts—distorted, compromised—of American society.

6) Wherever there are signs of new life, let us welcome them. In the short run, perhaps, the kind of people we want to reach, because of their renewed hope for immediate political results, may be impatient with our long range socialist perspective—but not, I think, if we indicate the possible constructive relation between the two.

My impression, from traveling a bit, is that the hostility toward any sign of radicalism which one encountered five years ago has begun to evaporate. We have a *modest* opportunity. But it requires a reorientation. Five years ago we felt beleaguered; now there is no reason to. We began by being suspicious of "programs," in the sense of prefabricated ideologies advanced by left-wing sects; we should continue to remain indifferent to these, but let us also realize that when young people today ask about our "program" *they mean something else.* They mean what we would propose for America today —short of socialism, which they often regard with sympathy but not as an immediate option (and in this they are right).

It's a legitimate question, and it is our duty to try to answer it—not by rushing absurdly into print with a "program," but by turning our attention to such matters. Our first five years were devoted to cleaning up a little our own intellectual heritage; let the next five be devoted, in part, to seeing what we can say usefully about American society as it operates today.

Concretely: On which issues do we go along with current liberal proposals, saying Amen? On which do we say more is needed, the liberals are being timid or unimaginative? On which do we feel that their approach breaks down because bed-rock issues, involving fundamental questions of power and the nature of society, are reached?

Even if we seriously raise such questions, without always answering them, we will perform a useful service.

Stanley Plastrik

The consensus may well be that the November elections marked a "significant change" and a "shift toward liberalism," but this interpretation is difficult to swallow. Rather— and here it followed the trend of *all* recent elections in Western democratic countries—the emphasis was on "moderation," a continuing of middle-of-the-road (by our standards, *drifting*) policies. American elections for a long time have not been seriously influenced by issues of foreign policy, nor

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was 1958 an exception. The significant shifts in our politics are basically over domestic issues, and their absence from this election—acknowledged by everyone—precludes attaching too much importance to the Democratic Party's victory.

My view is that there is much truth in the claim that "personality" was decisive in the campaign; and that in more ways than one. One "personality"—the daddy of them all—is waning sharply and the American voter has just about accepted the fact that the Presidency of the land will be occupied for two more years by a chronic "lame duck." There isn't much the voter can do about it, but he can start searching for a replacement: a younger, more vigorous and, if luck holds with us, even more "personable" replacement. Many are the candidates and it would be premature to assume that Rockefeller will be the only one despite his obvious qualifications for this particular role.

More important—and this too seems to operate against the notion of a significant change in the political climate—is their striking resemblance one to the other: paragons of moderation, blandness and lack of passion about any subject or issue. We are still deeply bedded in an "age of conformity" with a turning away from politics, programs and ideology. Alas, this does not hold true for the Communist world nor those areas (Near East, Africa, etc.) where power-driven nationalism moves forward. Given the clear continuation of Russian pressure on the West, the positions of America in the world are bound to continue to deteriorate in the way they are doing now. I insist, however, that this will not bring serious reactions within the country nor give birth to new political trends or hopes. At best, there will be new, desultory discussions within narrow circles.

Where I do largely share Irving Howe's views is his emphasis on the struggle within the Democratic Party, on issues of domestic control of the party, etc. Civil Rights and desegregation; control of Congressional committee chairmanships which disproportionately favor the South; the filibuster etc.—these constitute the matter of American politics. Will a major party realignment take place? It is more than possible. If so, true to past experience in American life, it will be over and around these specifics and not the abstractions of correct foreign policy. But however it may come, may such a realignment come speedily!

Norman Mailer

The heavy vote for Democrats was probably just that, heavy, sopped with anxiety—there's something not altogether alert or attractive about an electorate which gives a landslide to a party whose aims and programs are without definition. When Roosevelt won in 1936, it was a *political* victory—people voted with some notion of what future legislation would be. I wonder if today one voter in ten could tell you of a bill the Democrats *might* pass. I know I couldn't. (But then I didn't vote, so I wouldn't qualify as evidence.)

Actually I think we could take more cheer if the vote had been small for both parties. Then, at least, by implication, Americans would have been saying overtly what they probably feel anyway, which is that nobody who runs anything really knows what he is

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running. But America seems to lack even the guts to look at bad facts. Rather than face the terror of our national void, the country turned itself inside-out for two elections trying to believe that a professional soldier was just the one to take us around the nightmare, even if his most redeeming quality was that he was always on the edge of admitting he didn't know A-hole from appetite. Now, we seem to have had a flip toward the good heart and clear liberal constitution of the Democratic Party, but what will happen if the Democrats do no better? And how can they do better if they do not have the boldness to see that this country is sick, radically sick, its citizens stifling in depression and a collective loss of reality? No, far more likely that the Democrats will continue to do the dirty work of the Right, even as the Republicans, willy-nilly, were obliged to open the Left.

When a nation is devilled by psychological conflicts, and its politicians are without principle, their ambition large, their courage small, their minds too shrewd and their knowledge too narrow, then the sum of the country's political maneuverings is rudderless, each party so fouled by personalities, confusions, apathy and the uncomfortable sense that drifting is dangerous, that the only action each party is free to make is to accomplish the nominal policies of the other. The Republicans are man for man much more reactionary than the Democrats, but it is the Republicans who put an end to the Korean War which the Democrats via Truman got us into, and needlessly; it was the Republicans who most reluctantly managed to stop McCarthy where the Democrats would never have dared; and it is the Republicans who made some half-hearted attempt to bring integration to the Southern schools which is probably more than the Democrats would have dared.

No, the old directions of Left and Right are lost, and we may do better not to try looking for them too quickly. If America is getting a little closer to the time of her apocalypse, it may speed the consciousness of many of us to see that any revolutions and/or liberations of the future will come, if they come, out of no political parties which now exist, and indeed as a movement which may be in its origins hostile to politics itself.

Lewis Coser

One may be thankful in these bleak days for even minor blessings; yet there is no need to succumb to the fallacy of pathetic exaggeration. Do the recent elections really indicate "a shift toward liberalism"? Do they mark "the final triumph of the New Deal"? I doubt it very much. What has happened is that a number of oldtime conservatives, Eastern, Midwestern and Western backwoodsmen, have finally been retired from the political scene. They have been eliminated not because of an upsurge of liberalism, but because people felt, quite correctly, that these men were no longer in a position to cope with the problems of modern mass society. Theirs were styles of politics and ideas which are simply no longer in tune with the demands of the 20th century. But who has replaced them? Liberals? I can find little evidence for this—as a matter of fact, the few genuine liberals who were prepared to run in New York, Connecticut and so on

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were eliminated by Democratic machines before the elections. It is an important index to the quality of political life today that they didn't even get the chance to run. And Jim Burns, a liberal who did run in western Massachusetts, was snowed under.

By and large the winners are men who represent the new style in politics, smooth, personable, efficient, reasonably good administrators. They are the new suburban type, or upper-class people desperately trying to look suburban; they are sales leaders on the supermarket of political opinion. No doubt they will advocate building more schools, better hospitals and so on—and this is all to the good, of course—but how can one compare them to those dedicated men of the early New Deal who were animated by a vision of rebuilding America along more equalitarian and humane lines?

Irving notes the paucity of ideas in the last campaign, but he seems to feel that this is only an incidental aspect. He is wrong. Mindlessness gave the whole campaign its characteristic flavor. Foreign policy and segregation seem to me the most important immediate issues in America. Where is the courageous liberal stand that the new men have taken on these issues? By and large nobody in the recent campaign had the guts to attack Dulles' suicidal course or the madness of our atomic policy; hardly anybody had the guts to press for enforcement of the Supreme Court decision by the federal government with deliberate speed. All profile and no courage. Just wait and see how Lyndon Johnson will handle those few among the new Senators who may have inclinations to really *do* something in these areas.

The election results indicate a long overdue adaptation of our political styles to the realities of mass society. The orgmen take over, the sophisticated experts at mass manipulation, the glad handers. There is indeed much uneasiness and anxiety among Americans today, but so far they seek a solution in buying political tranquilizers. When these fail, there may arise "modest opportunities" for radicalism.

Bernard Rosenberg

I could care less about who won in November, but with some difficulty. In New York we had a choice between Harriman and Rockefeller, as to which the best suggestion was that they should buy the state together and divide it evenly instead of engaging in unseemly rivalry. Even with De Sapio around his neck, Honest Ave might have won if he had used a slogan—whch is durable and may yet be used—: "Don't change millionaires in midstream." Does any sentient human being really care? If so, he is going to be cheated and hurt pretty badly.

No candidate of either party or any persuasion offered the electorate what it needs, perhaps because to do so would have meant certain defeat. This circumstance should not keep socialists from saying what such a candidate would be like. That our ideal political leader hasn't a chance of winning elections is beside the point. American politics has become the art of the impossible.

So, as an impossibilist, I give you my man, one who deserves to hold high political office only if:

1. He recognizes that national sov-

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ereignty is an anachronism. Every political scientist and almost every editorialist in the land would accept that proposition. We had better start living by it, not just because war means extinction, but also because there can be no national solution to certain global problems that are nearly as serious as war. Two-thirds of the world's population need not live on a substandard diet, but without economic planning that banishes all forms of artificial autarchy, a majority of the race will remain in a state of chronic semi-starvation. What this means as the world population explodes is most nightmarishly apparent in China. (Our man will lie awake nights formulating a new China policy, fully aware that Mao has already made a piker of Stalin, that there can always be another turn of the totalitarian screw.)

2. He favors immediate and total desegregation, interpreting "with all deliberate speed" to mean "right now."

His approach is realistic and empirical, for piecemeal desegregation is proving to be a disaster which not only makes a mockery of our moral pretensions but also threatens to tear us apart.

3. He knows that De Gaulle will explode a Hell bomb in the Sahara any moment and he has not forgotten Sakiet or Ike's uncertainty about whether an American commander in the field has authority to unleash nuclear weapons; that it is therefore a matter of the utmost urgency to sit in continuous session with the Soviets till a disarmament agreement is achieved. Let us see what happens to Senator Gore's modest proposal that atomic experiments be conducted underground.

There would have to be plenty of other planks in our ideal platform, but these three will do as a starter. In fact, they elliptically cover the minimal conditions for survival. Nothing less than a major wrench will do. The difference between conservative and liberal opinion has been summed up in a folk saying: that the former opposes all change and the latter favors change—but not now. Radical intransigence was never more appropriate than it is at this point of human history when every issue that engages us is a "bed-rock" issue.

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Gertrude Stein once said that remarks don't make literature. It might now be added that insights, even keen ones, don't constitute a political perspetive. As for the rest, I must forego the temptation (a great one) to reply, since this isn't a debate but the beginning of a discussion in which we hope our readers will now join. But perhaps I should say that my views have not been significantly altered by the dissentient observations of my fellow editors.

I. H.

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FRANCE: AN END TO POLITICS

Paul Ricoeur

Paul Ricoeur, who collaborates in the direction of the French magazine Esprit *and who has previously appeared in our pages, spoke to a* DISSENT *discussion group in New York shortly before the November elections in France. His remarks, revised by him after the election, form the substance of the following article. In our next issue we hope to present other points of view from the French left.*—ED.

Let me go directly to the heart of the matter: *at present, there is no more politics in France.*

No more politics, that is, if we mean by politics a reasonable calculation of the balance of those forces able to maintain some pressure on the state power. We have in France today a strange kind of regime relying upon one man who does not represent politics in the classical democratic sense. And this, for two reasons.

First, because he tries to create a role quite without precedent in modern democracy, the role of the supreme arbiter, the *chef d'etat* who presents himself as above all forces within his country, as a body without weight or gravity. That is De Gaulle's claim: he represents himself, De Gaulle, and in representing himself he represents France as an undefined and undetermined political force.

Second, not only is De Gaulle a man alone, outside of the political game, but more important, he is also trying to create the kind of power that Max Weber called charismatic power: *the politics of inspiration.* But this is no longer really politics as we know it in democratic states; it is a kind of psychology or a politics relying on the magical effects of personal prestige and language. De Gaulle today does not speak for certain historical forces aligned against other forces; nothing could be more inaccurate than to compare him with the American president.

It is the triumph of this "non-partisan" charismatic leadership that explains the curious events of the past six months in France. The first major consequence of this kind of leadership was the referendum De Gaulle organized on the new constitution, a referendum calculated to make certain an almost unanimous response. For this charismatic leader must have behind him an undefined nation which no longer relies upon majority rule but instead conforms to the rituals of unanimity. The law of democracy, however, is ultimately the law of the majority, and

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as soon as we substitute unanimity for majorities we have abandoned democracy. That is why a "no" vote in the referendum had finally no meaning: it was not a genuine referendum but a plebiscite.

Another consequence of De Gaulle's charismatic leadership is a return to the politics of secrecy. During his half year in office De Gaulle has provided no more than obscure hints about his intentions; his major declarations have always contained deliberately contrived double meanings which gave to both sides—leftists and rightists—the feeling that it was the other which was bound to be disappointed by the leader. And De Gaulle's repudiation of the Gaullist movement on the eve of the elections, was of the same political stamp: an effort to declare himself above the battle of mere partisanship, to show in his person the embodiment of France. If, however, the triumphant Gaullist movement should now succeed in making him its prisoner, his pretense to being an arbiter will collapse and he will become a partisan leader.

Finally, and above all, it is this charismatic style of politics which explains many of the features of the new electoral law: the effort to eliminate the Communist Party because it forms a major obstacle to the regime of unanimity; the effort to break the influence of all the parties, at least on a national level, and to pulverize political life so thoroughly that it will be reduced to petty maneuvers in the *circonscriptions* (electoral districts). Perhaps, too, De Gaulle hoped for a balanced parliament, so well balanced between right and left that each side would cancel out the strength of the other and thus together prove impotent before the word of the leader. As we know, however, this misfired and De Gaulle has an assembly weighted toward reaction.

These, then, are the reasons that lead one to conclude that De Gaulle's ascent to power had for its purpose the destruction of politics and competition among the various social forces in the country. And if this analysis is correct, there is little room for political prediction in France, though a great deal of room for betting, gambling and consulting oracles. Perhaps also for surprises.

II

What are the advantages and disadvantages of this new kind of politics—or rather this absence of politics?

Let me suggest two possible advantages that might follow, or might have followed, from the new situation. First, it could become a cure for the political diseases of our country: the liquidation of an embarrassing legacy. The main trouble with the Fourth Republic was neither its cumbersome constitution nor its governmental arrangements. The disease of the Fourth Republic was to be found in the parties and their leaders, particularly in the left-center and right-center parties which alternated in office.

These parties failed because for them politics had been reduced to the manipulation of ideologies and the maneuvering of machines. They had lost all hold on the problems facing the country and had repeatedly substituted slogans of political mythology for concrete analy-

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sis of French society. At election time, for example, the issues raised by the parties were the role of the Church, reaction, revolution, economic planning in the abstract—none of them the real problem facing France in the middle of the twentieth century.

But perhaps even more than the parties it was the men who failed, primarily because of their lack of courage, their failure to say publicly what they were ready to admit privately. *The Fourth Republic died from lying.* And the Socialist Party (SFIO) was the most terrible example of all, with Guy Mollet, its leader, the man who bears the greatest responsibility, since it was he who, as premier, failed to educate public opinion on the problem of Algeria.

The task of the Socialists should have been to explain to the French people that Algerian independence did not necessarily signify the "loss of Algeria," but could open a new era, a healthier relationship with a free people. But by following the crowd instead of leading it, the Socialists helped create a public trauma on the problem of Algeria. They flattered the nationalist passions of those whom one might call the "poor whites" of France; they became the spokesmen for those who trembled at the prospect of Algerian independence out of fear that it might cost them their petty jobs and offices. Relying upon this doomed segment which represents neither the economic nor culture future of Algeria, the Socialists prepared the way for the collapse of the republic.

It was for this reason that we found it so hard to defend the republic during the May Days [the time of crisis shortly before De Gaulle took power when there was a threat of the paratroops staging a coup.—Ed.] It seemed to us an absurd duty to defend *this* regime, *these* people, *these* parties which, at the last moment, had become the only remaining hope of the republic after having themselves helped bring into being the forces that were now threatening it.

The second possible advantage following the shift to De Gaulle was that his kind of charismatic leadership seemed, by now, the only way of solving the Algerian problem. This problem has become for us so enormous, so traumatic that only a nonpolitical force, one not associated with the traditional parties and thereby the embittered divisions of French politics, seems capable of confronting it. Only, it seemed, an unquestioned leader like De Gaulle would have been invulnerable to racist assault had he agreed to Algerian independence. I don't think he will do it; but if he did, people would say: once De Gaulle accepts independence, that is proof there is nothing else to do.

In reality, however, the referendum proved to be a surrender. Now everyone could delegate his courage and his fears to one man. Through the referendum which created Gaullist France the people said: *he* will do what he wants to, we are relieved of responsibility.

The possible liquidation of the excesses of party politics and an imposed solution of the Algerian problem—these could be tremendously important, and to many they seemed to justify support of De Gaulle. The argument for supporting him was strengthened by the fact that

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these factors coincide with a favorable economic situation which largely rules out the danger of fascism in France (Algeria is another matter: there all the conditions for the coarsest variety of fascism exist.)

III

Now the disadvantages. We are, I think, witnessing a subtle perversion of our political life, and perhaps for good—I do not know. The new constitution was made for one man, and it will not, I fear, outlast him. It is clumsy, with two executives: one, the President, who is free of political responsibility and commands the real power; the other, the Premier, who is responsible to the national assembly and has very little power. This complicated structure represents not a choice between the presidential and parliamentary systems, but a monstrous combination. If De Gaulle was right in saying that we had a bad constitution under the Fourth Republic, then we should have taken him seriously and created one that would be more durable and worthy.

De Gaulle's referendum also perverted our political life, because it perverted the very idea of a referendum. A genuine referendum means a consultation of the country when the state power cannot answer questions that must be raised; thus, an appeal is made to the people and their power thereby recognized as supreme. A genuine referendum involves alternatives, and the state accepts the possibility that the decision will be either "yes" or "no." But our referendum was not genuine because only one solution was offered—to have risked a "no" majority would have meant an adventure into a perilous unknown. In a country as badly divided as France the referendum as a governmental device is very important. My fear, therefore, is that we are entering upon a series of *constitutional* rather than merely governmental crises, moving, that is, from crises of cabinets to crises of regimes.

I think, furthermore, that the principal evil of the Fourth Republic—the festering of the parties—has not been cured; it may even have been aggravated. Because the parties were, in a sense, the only remaining bulwark against Algerian fascism, they managed to survive the collapse of the old regime. They are greatly weakened, but in the electoral districts the old machines are still there.

What we need in France is a new kind of party, a labor or socialist party which would have a practical platform for elections and not simply an ideological stance. A practical program which would win from its ideological tendencies agreement on concrete issues, which would be a governmental program for four or five years and would represent a genuine pledge to the electorate rather than being a mere echo of ideologies. In France such a party should include the neo-liberals, the non-Communist Marxists and the left Christians. With this kind of a party we could have a certain responsibility, since it would have to conclude practical agreements on real political issues; and it would also enjoy that inner democracy which has in recent years disappeared from the French Socialist Party. Thus far I see no signs of such a renewal of party life in France.

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But perhaps the most alarming fact about the new situation is that Frenchmen now feel relieved of all political responsibility. Encouraged by the mysticism of the leader, they appear to be satisfied with a kind of irresponsibility that manages to aggravate their basic lack of civil sense. Ordinary life has resumed and we no longer fear the paratroops. Thanks to the General, the country is for the moment happy, thinking it has escaped a major crisis and perhaps a civil war. But De Gaulle helped the country avoid this danger not with its brains and heart but, if I may say so, with its bowels. The country did not stand up to oppose fascism; it absorbed the fascist virus into its system. Perhaps, because issues have not been faced courageously, the result may be that we shall drift back into a version of the Fourth Republic with its squabbling deputies, its local rivalries, its provincial boredom. We feared tragedy and we may end up repeating the stale old comedy.

The tragedy lies elsewhere. It lies in the question: will France be able to give birth to something new in politics? We have already had the great disappointment of 1947, when the Resistance collapsed as a political movement. We are not at all sure that the new crisis to which France is drifting may not become a kind of fixation, a conservative drifting. Everything depends on the solution of the Algerian question and here too, I fear, the new regime is trapped by the same kind of incompatibilities of interest and pressure that the old regime was.

IV

Finally, let me say a word about a certain basic problem involved in this crisis. France has never succeeded in surmounting the dilemma: either representative government or personal power. I begin to wonder whether this specific French crisis isn't the manifestation of a latent crisis in *all* politics. I say that because we have no consistent political philosophy regarding power in a democracy. The difficulty consists in the fact that democracy seems to require a power representing the people, and thus an extreme version of a representative regime would make the central state power into a mere reflective mirror of public opinion and political trends. But a government which simply mirrors the shifts of opinion is impossible; we have experienced that failure in France. Our electoral system under the Fourth Republic, based on proportional representation, seemed the most just system conceivable, yet it prevented any solution of the various political crises. We discovered that a photographic image of a country is not a government and that political power is not merely representation.

Yet if representation is not the root of power, power becomes mere violence. We must therefore discover the dialectical tension between representation and power. In France we see this problem more clearly than elsewhere, since we have had the two dangers in alternating succession. Here, I would suggest, is an enigma of power in modern society. Is France an example of a universal difficulty, or is it merely a political sport, an exception to the well-being of democratic politics?

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ABRAHAM '59—A NUCLEAR FANTASY

F. B. Aiken

JULY 14, 1959

Now that it is all over it is easy to think back and realize that today's events had been well prefigured, even before the Soviet launching of Sputnik I in October of 1957. I remember having read what was at the time a strange-seeming article. It was just at the beginning of 1958. The author was one of that new breed of military "hardware" experts. He understood about nuclear blast effects, logistical problems, missile capabilities, and the paramount struggle between Russia and America to reduce their comparative "lead-times" between the development of a new weapon and its production for tactical use. This was called the Research and Development lead-time war. We had already lost, he said, the "lead-time" war. From then on out, the rest of the Cold War moves and counter-moves would merely be a series of demonstrations of America's inferiority as she was forced to back down in area after area.

Of course, such writing was not even dignified by ridicule, those few short months ago. When other new-model theorists of Cold War strategy claimed to have developed a series of mathematical formulas whereby electronic computers could be used to project the outcome of possible military conflicts, everybody found the notion of war as extrapolations from a series of mathematical formulas impossible to assimilate. The historical reminder that General Lee had "proved" to himself the South was defeated before the Civil War began, failed to alert even those of us relatively close to the President to the implications of new methods of analysis which could definitively "prove" in advance the outcome of a hypothetical conflict.

I remember actually laughing when I read one of those futuristic-seeming projection papers which concluded a series of proofs with the proposal that we immediately dismantle the Strategic Air Command, our only defense against Russia, and try to bargain with them for anything we could get in return! "Sell out SAC now," wrote the author, "while it is still worth something. The Russians have indicated that above all they want to be recognized by the West as a mature culture. We can give them that for comparatively little and in addition trade SAC for a number of stabilizing concessions which then may allow us five years of relative freedom to prepare for a potent reentry into the R and D lead-time war."

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This conclusion, which seemed ludicrous to me at the time, followed from an analysis purporting to prove that the Russians had demonstrated with Sputnik I something like a one-year lead-time drop on us. During that interval, which was estimated to go into effect toward the end of 1958, SAC would have become worthless and we would still be over a year away from operational countervailing ICBMs. Should we merely sit by and idly watch the approaching obsolescence of SAC and our ensuing international helplessness? Or should we not instead bargain SAC when it was still a danger to the Russians, trading them a year of greater security now for a preserved American capability to overreach them at some point in the future? "Paper logic" I remember thinking to myself. It was neat, but really kind of insane. But this was by no means all.

"Our policy of massive retaliation" read the analysis produced by the electronic calculators at the Ranard Military Policy Center, "is so ill-founded as to amount to a potentially catastrophic self-delusion. Break down the massive retaliation policy into a series of war game moves and counter moves. Suppose the Russians devastated the United States with nuclear weapons, literally burning off the country. Should the United States then, with its dying gasp, activate SAC units in other parts of the world to burn off Russia as well? To what end? How would this help us or anyone else? We can hope that this threat will deter them from starting anything, but what if it actually does not deter them? Would we actually carry out our own threatened retaliation? Should we? It is clear that there could be no possible gain in so doing. If that is clear, then the policy itself is devoid of the deterrence feature we attribute to it."

"Suppose alternatively," continued the analysis, "that the Russians did not burn off the entire United States, but only the Eastern seacoast industrial area: the New England-Middle Atlantic area, leaving the rest of the country largely intact physically if not genetically. Should we then retaliate 'massively,' burning off part or all of Russia? What good would *that* do? With the destruction of American industrial capacity the world would be converted instantly into a Russian hegemony, for the Russians would then control all sources for reindustrialization aid. Would the remaining American population be better off by our going through with nuclear devastation? Or would we not be better off by just calling off the entire conflict at that point? What would be the best strategy for minimizing our maximum losses at the second phase which would have been introduced by partial devastation? On any view, massive retaliation cannot be in the American interest and must be abandoned as an unrealistic foundation for American policy."

But who could at that time give credence to such a strangely detached point of view? Not even I, proud though I was of what I had always regarded as a superior cold bloodedness in evaluating political

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forces. All this was to be given a hideously ironic twist before the end of Spring.

Because of the blanket of secrecy which had long clouded security questions from the public it is still not widely understood how matters came to take their tragic turn. The conception with which the Strategic Air Command had been developed was the key to all the happenings of that fateful spring.

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WE HAD ALWAYS understood the dangers of a potential human failure if it should ever become necessary to send another bomber squadron manned by normal American boys on a mission of nuclear genocide. Every danger that they might for some reason become incapable of delivering their bombs on the selected targets had to be foreseen and counteracted or the whole policy of massive retaliation would stand for naught in the showdown it had to envision. For that reason extremely elaborate psychological tests and indoctrination methods had to be devised for selecting and training the crews to man our SAC bombers. The crew members had to be converted into almost the opposite of what we had always conceived of as "normal" American boys. They had to be made capable of fanatic devotion to their superiors, regardless of what spot *in the entire world* they might be ordered to bomb. Absolute and unquestioning obedience, though the order might seem cruel, inhuman, or even "unAmerican" by normal standards, had to be drilled into those crews. In this way they became inured against normal reactions to authority and the typical American feeling that any order should be explained to its executor. Since it was necessary to have crews in the air at all moments ready and able to deliver bombs on enemy targets, an unceasing indoctrination effort had to be a permanent feature of the lives of these dedicated crews, so that each day at the moment they rose into the air with their "pistols cocked" they were in effect demoniac anti-Communist janisaries, straining to unleash a patriotic cataclysm and fulfill the mission for which they had been created. It is necessary to keep in mind this feature of the recent past in order to appreciate the inevitability of the succession of events of the spring of 1959.

It was a pleasant April day—April is about the only civilized month in Washington's climate, and I had felt a pent-up Spring exhilaration all day. I had taken the late lunch hour at the White House mess, for that was the time those closest to the President usually ate. It was wise, I thought, to be seen by them often, and though never more than brief friendly nods were passed my way, it always made my blood run a little faster to be in the presence of these great ones who exuded power and who seemed to hold the destiny of the world in their hands. As White House Russian translator my position was strange. For months on end I was little more than a clerk, translating Russian docu-

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ments or perhaps some of the passages the President might want especially included in a State Department communication to the Russians. However, at very rare intervals all this might change and I would get an emergency call to provide the President with a concurrent translation in a transatlantic telephone communication with Khrushchev. At these times, and for just a few hours afterward, I talked intimately with the mighty ones around the President. I was then of great importance to them, for until the transcriptions were ready I was the only one aside from the President who knew what had taken place.

I had not been back at my desk thirty minutes when the emergency call came through to proceed instantly to the President's office. The urgency of the command and the excitement with which I looked forward to these tasks led me to run down the stairs from my second floor East Wing office to the ground floor and then down the long corridor under the White House proper to the President's office in the West Wing. I remember now that everything seemed entirely normal. The relays of guards were at special alert, as they always are when the President is in the White House, but nothing unusual at any point prepared me for what was to come.

THE PRESIDENT'S secretary met me at the door to his office. "They are waiting below," she said, and led me to an elevator. So this was it. I had heard about the White House bomb shelter and now either a grisly drill was under way or I was going to experience the mixed blessing of finding out whether the President's bomb shelter would serve the purpose for which it was designed.

As the elevator came to a stop its automatic door opened onto a hall like that in any normal office building. I was led past a series of doors to the end of the corridor. The room we entered contained about fifteen men. Some were in clumps around the edges. At the far end the President sat at a desk, surrounded by five others. As I glanced around I recognized most of them as the great ones I had seen often at lunch. I remember that the atmosphere in the room was strangely subdued. It was as if everyone was straining so hard to keep down tension that the strength of their effort became quickly oppressive.

The President looked up as I approached. His face was calm but his eyes dominated everything. I'd always found those eyes disconcerting, but that day they seemed to have been drained of color.

The President's armor-piercing eyes rested on me briefly and then, glancing quickly about the room, he said: "Now I'd like for all the rest of you to leave for a little while."

Quietly the room emptied. Still the President remained silent. Finally he motioned me to a chair: "Sit here please by this extension telephone. I've got a little thinking to do before we get to work. Maybe it would help a little if I run over the situation once more out loud. We've all thought it out as far as we can and everyone comes to the same conclusion. But perhaps one more time would be helpful and

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in any case you should be briefed on what's coming off for otherwise you would almost certainly make a dangerous translation error at the crucial spot."

THERE WAS NOTHING for me to say. The President was obviously talking to himself—perhaps a little anxious to postpone action a while longer.

"The situation is as follows," he began. "Early this morning we received word that one of our SAC squadrons had not returned to its home base from a routine flight. An emergency search failed to turn it up. Finally about two hours after it was first missed the squadron itself opened radio communications with its base. It had waited until it had gotten far enough toward Moscow that our own planes could not intercept it in time to prevent its reaching the target. It then radioed back the code signal for an attack on Moscow.

"We cannot stop it. The staging of these SAC attacks is such that we are relatively certain the Russians have no equipment, either ground to air or air to air, capable of stopping it. We must assume that in just about four hours Moscow will be obliterated because one of our bomber crews decided to take it upon themselves to save the world from the Russian threat.

"What can we do? What would you do? We have spent two hours trying to figure every angle of the situation. We could throw in enough additional SAC units to put all Russia out of commission. What would Russia be likely to do in either case?

"We know that she has bomber groups like our own Strategic Air Command and that she could devastate the United States even if we delivered the full force of an attack throughout Russia. We might think that it would not be in her interest to retaliate, but what would her Communist leaders think? If we leave the bombing of Moscow as it is with this one mutinous squadron the Russians are almost certain to throw everything they have at us. If we levy everything we can against her, there is still a strong likelihood that she will retaliate with everything. As near as we can figure it the odds are not favorable in either case; not enough so as to defend *either* standing pat on this one berserk squadron, or adding everything we've got to it. The danger of our own obliteration is a little less great in one case than the other, but in both cases that danger is real enough that our assured preservation requires a better strategy than either of these two."

IT WAS ABSOLUTELY UNREAL. I sat there quietly and politely listening to the President of the United States discuss the pros and cons of the nuclear obliteration of American and Soviet civilizations. He continued thinking out loud, for the moment oblivious to my presence—

"Now the situation would be somewhat different if it were possible to really convince the Russians that this is an accident. But how

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would you convince them of that? Suppose I were to call Khrushchev via transatlantic telephone and tell him of this accident through you on the extension phone beside you. He could then try to intercept the squadron. We have a strong conviction that this could not succeed.

"How would he react to the warning? Would he take it at face value for a mutinous accident? Even if he did, what difference would this make? Would he not feel required to inflict at least as great a damage on us? What would be a comparable loss for us? New York?

"But would he stop at New York? How could we be certain he would stop with New York, even if we could make him believe it was an error? How could we do that, I ask you?"

With a start I realized that he really was asking me, peering at me intensely, leaning forward taut, now in his desk chair.

"How could we do that, I ask you! How could we convince the Russians that this is an accident and be confident of limiting their retaliation? That is the problem. Is there *any* strategy which will ensure it?"

There were literally no thoughts in my head. I prepared to make some lame response, but before I could it was clear he had forgotten about me again and was racing on with his thoughts.

"Suppose," he mused, "I were to set up a four-way telephone connection. Suppose I were to call Khrushchev, the American Embassy in Moscow and the Soviet Consulate in New York City. The American Embassy in Moscow would be necessary to report to me whether our squadron actually delivered their bombs. We would pray with them at our Moscow Embassy that it would not be their dying report, but it would be necessary for us to have the report in either case.

"With you continuing as translator I would then tell Khrushchev of the accident, describe for him my plan to convince him that it *is* an accident and that there is no reason for retaliatory action on his part.

"He could then retire to the Kremlin bomb shelter or get far enough from Moscow for safety and reopen telephonic communications with my four-way network. Then we would maintain constant contact, hoping that our squadron fails, but at least assured of limiting the mutual devastation—perhaps even providing a sure, though ghastly foundation for future peaceful relationships. . . ."

"But Mr. President!" I had half risen in bewilderment. "This doesn't make sense. You proved just before that we would *not* be sure of convincing him it was an accident, and that we could *not* be certain of limiting the counter attack!"

"Quite so," he replied gently, "because I have not yet told you of the plan we are about to describe to Mr. Khrushchev."

HE LOOKED AT HIS WATCH for a moment and then resumed.

"It is absolutely necessary that you make no mistake in translation, for now, the only place where an error might bring total American-Soviet devastation is in the translation. I must be certain of your

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ability to translate precisely the message I give you. That is why I have taken so much of the little valuable time remaining to go over this thoroughly with you."

"At two hours from now, under my personal order, a second SAC squadron will arrive over New York City. If our report from the American Embassy in Moscow tells us that they have been bombed, the squadron over New York will be immediately directed to devastate that city. Mr. Khrushchev will have instantaneous confirmation from his own Consulate speaking directly to him over our telephone network.

"Nothing short of this could prove to him our sincerity. Nothing short of this could insure our getting out of this mess with a minimum of two cities gone. Only this could convince him he has nothing to lose by waiting to see whether we go through with it because if we were to fail to take out New York ourselves, he could still give the orders for our total devastation.

"If the plan I have described is carried out precisely each country will lose her brightest jewel, but everything else will be saved. However this could not be assured short of our arranging it ourselves, since we caused the initial accident. Do you think you are up to it? If the plan goes according to this schedule, two stations in our telephonic network will drop off dead before we are through."

I looked up. The President's eyes were boring through me, trying to read my every reaction.

"I am ready, Mr. President, whenever you are," I said.

He turned and reached for his telephone.

Introducing Our New Editors:

We are pleased to announce the addition of several editors. Joseph Buttinger, a veteran of the Austrian socialist movement and author of *In the Twilight of Socialism,* and *The Smaller Dragon,* has been a friend of DISSENT from its beginnings; we are pleased that he now joins our board formally. As does Henry Pachter, lecturer and writer, who is well-known to our readers. E. V. Walter, a teacher of political science who has written for us frequently, becomes an editor. So too does Michael Walzer, a young writer whose articles have appeared in recent issues. Also, the distinguished novelist, Richard Wright, has agreed to serve as a Contributing Editor.

And Among New Contributors:

Hannah Arendt is the well-known author of *The Origins of Totalitarianism* which has just appeared in a paperback edition; she has also just published a new book on political theory. . . . David Spitz is a political scientist whose books include *Patterns of Anti-Democratic Thought* and *The Challenge of Power;* he is currently visiting professor of government at Cornell University. . . . Melvin Tumin has recently published *Desegregation,* a study of the racial patterns in a Southern community. . . . Rose Laub Coser is a teacher of sociology who specializes in the problems of hospitals. . . . Nicola Chiaromonte is the well-known critic and writer who at present edits, together with Ignazio Silone, the Italian journal *Tempo Presente.* . . . F. B. Aiken is an industrial consultant and one of the founders of control system analysis.

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POLITICAL POLICY OR NUCLEAR WAR?

William J. Newman

Of all the puzzles which a puzzled Eisenhower-Dulles administration has failed to solve, one of the most important is the proper relationship between military power and foreign policy. It is a difficult problem to grasp, let alone solve, and for once one can have some feeling of sympathy for Mr. Dulles as he broods (we hope) over the question: how do the military facts of our time relate to the political needs of American foreign policy? More exactly, assuming a relationship between military power and foreign policy, what is the effect on our foreign policy of current military ideas? Military power never provides a political solution to political problems. But it may *appear* to do so, and it is therefore important to understand whether or not we are about to be sold another fancy substitute for the unpleasant necessities of politics.

Today military power is with us more than ever, thanks to the popularity of a new military doctrine—the doctrine of limited *nuclear* war. What is the validity of this doctrine? What are its implications for the *political* problems which face American foreign policy?

To put the matter briefly: the doctrine of limited nuclear war makes it possible—*is* making it possible—to avoid the political facts of life by providing a convenient aura of strength. Our "policy-makers" can then use such a doctrine to pretend to themselves and others that American policy problems are solved because we can "prevent" Russia from taking a piece of land anywhere. To put it still more briefly, the doctrine of limited nuclear war is bunk; but, to paraphrase, bunk must not only be revealed but be seen to be revealed.

I

War today, the Pentagon feels, is as vital to the interests of the state as it has ever been. Such is the ironical and unexpected consequence of the nuclear stalemate. Once upon a time, when Harry Truman was in the White House, it seemed that the problem of war had been solved. This belief was an illusion. But so successfully was it foisted on America—especially by the cocky Air Force, an interest group without a peer—that it is still able to delude the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The argument was simple enough. The next war would be an

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all-out war (since all wars are fought for victory); an all-out war now means total annihilation; therefore we are faced with a choice between total annihilation and peace. Presumably, of course, peace will be chosen because war has become "impossible"; i.e., can no longer make the attainment of victory feasible.

The argument comforts, for it promises a peace on earth *without* goodwill towards men; we can have our aggressive instincts and live too. Further it is a policy which is inexpensive in terms of men if not money. History had come to a stop, and that which the utopians had promised if only men would reform could now exist without the trouble of reform.

Even at the time this argument was put forward there were some facts which jarred with this pleasant picture of a Balance of Terror. The question arose, for example, why was it necessary to have a NATO with its large ground armies? To this day no one has yet been able to explain away this particular puzzle—with the result that the Cynical European whose Negative Frame of Mind is so distracting to the Straightforward Brain of a Soldier-Statesman like Eisenhower or Norstad, has been led to the conclusion that armies no longer being necessary in an age of push-button peace, he would no longer provide them. He was told of course, by SHAPE, that NATO was a plate glass. The effect on the European of being told that he was considered by the experts to be a plate glass which was to be broken in order to set off an alarm for the American Strategic Air Force was two-fold; he became even more cynical and he supplied even fewer troops.

Then too the advocates of the Terrorized Peace had to face the inconvenience of the actual history of the world since 1945, a history of continued and frequent wars. Some of these wars were small—Indonesia, Kashmir, Palestine—and mattered only to the deluded inhabitants of the areas (a clear case of technological lag!). Some were larger and had uneasy overtones which led to the thought that with all due regard to the fail-safe techniques of the Air Force and the ratiocinations of Dulles, man might after all choose annihilation. Greece, China, Malaya, Korea, Indo-China and Suez mattered to quite a few and indicated that it was not only the Arabs and the Israelis, for example, who were acting as if they were in a bow-and-arrow era. The fact is: that in an age when technical change and "advance" was supposed to have brought war to an end there has been fighting on a larger scale and more of it and involving more men—dead and alive—than in the supposedly turbulent years which followed World War I.

Obviously as an exercise in scientific thought—as distinct from Air Force politics and atavistic desires for governmental economy—the policy of strategic nuclear deterrence left something to be desired. Wars were continuing; and by 1954 it had to be concluded by even the most dense Secretary of State that war was with us again as a permanent feature of life. But did American power and moral disinterestedness mean that we could simply ignore these small-scale combats. Could

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we allow the children their play, only stepping in with a warning of punishment if they began to get too rough? That theory broke down too. *Our handsome airmen crouched in the belly of a B-52 could not punish; they could only annihilate.*

Further, these wars were often vital to American interests; if America was to be a global power it had to recognize that any slight shift of power in any place on that globe reacted in one way or another on our position. But could we deal with the sources and effects of these wars by diplomacy alone? Leaving aside the question of the quality of American diplomacy, any undergraduate knows that diplomacy cannot be divorced from power. (It should be pointed out, in defense of Mr. Dulles, that he is not an advocate of diplomacy without power, but of power without diplomacy.)

But if the philosophers of the Defense Department, like most philosophers, had not discovered absolute truth, they had discovered partial truth. For it is correct that, with a reasonable amount of reason in Russian policy-makers, the atomic stalemate will prevent an *all-out* war. It is a policy which in the present painful circumstances is essential to pursue; SAC, the self-designated defender of our civilization, is vital to American security and to peace. Sad but true.

II

Today SAC is at a discount. The discovery that Russia may not bite, but simply nibble, has finally been made and the result is that America is ready—or getting ready—to fight wars again. To do that effectively we need a solid doctrine in tune with the realities our minds have created. Have we got it?

III

The answer is in the process of being made today both by the purveyors of doctrine for the public and by the facts of American re-armament. The official answer is limited *nuclear* war.

Is limited nuclear war the right kind of war for which to prepare? The question is of vital importance, not only because of the abstract principle that if one is going to prepare it is always a good thing to prepare for the right kind of war, but because if we do not, if we are suddenly faced with a war we cannot fight, we will be thrown back on SAC and SAC alone. And everyone knows what is at the end of a sack: total darkness. Given extreme dependence on SAC, we will either have to start an all-out war in defense of a local position or we will not be able to fight at all, because our policy will be one of bluff. And we have had enough of that to fill our queasy stomachs for a while. We bluffed, it should be recalled (by us if not by Dulles) over Indo-China, and had to back down.

Should America concentrate on preparations for limited nuclear war? The answer is, No. At the very most it is one possible type of war to prepare for, and probably the least important kind, the kind

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of war that will probably not happen. Further, and more important, to concentrate American efforts on limited nuclear war will do nothing to solve the political problems which are pressing America so hard today. Indeed, it leads to putting these problems to one side.

IV

The case for limited nuclear war was first put publicly by Henry A. Kissinger in *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy.** It should be stated at the outset that both the public and the scholars owe a considerable debt to Mr. Kissinger, not only for his excellent discussion of strategy, but for the way he brings together strategy and foreign policy. One must, however, disagree with one of Mr. Kissinger's main conclusions, his belief that it is limited *nuclear* war which is the necessity for American strategy.

The adoption of a strategy based on limited nuclear war, on the tactical nuclear bomb, has a weakness which is precisely that which Mr. Kissinger ascribes to the policy of strategic atomic deterrence. It is too easy a way out; it allows American Generals and politicians to think that the tactical atomic weapon, like the strategic atomic weapon, is a gimmick which "solves" both the problems of limited war and foreign policy with few men and less money. Would that it were so. But it is not so.

Kissinger's belief that nuclear war can and should be limited war, and, especially, that it is the only feasible type of military policy for America today derives from his keen destruction of the fallacy of reliance on strategical nuclear war. Here is a brief statement of his argument:

> War between nuclear powers has to be planned on the assumption that it is likely to be a nuclear war. Nuclear war should be fought as something less than an all-out war. Limited nuclear war represents our most effective strategy against nuclear powers or against a major power which is capable of substituting manpower for technology.

Recognizing that it will still be necessary to have a strategic atomic force for all-out war (since "it is the fear of thermonuclear devastation which sets the bounds of limited war"), he faces the question of what other kinds of military force are necessary.

Mr. Kissinger thinks that reliance on nuclear tactical limited war is the only solution to America's military problem because:

(1) A decision to rely on conventional forces in a case of local aggression would be a break with the present trend of United States and Western military thought.

* Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (1957); cf. also, R. E. Osgood, *Limited War* (1957); Lt. Gen. James W. Gavin, USA ret. *War and Peace in the Space Age* (1958); Dean Acheson, *Power and Diplomacy* (1958); K. Knorr, *The Crisis in United States Defense* (1957); J. E. King, Jr., "Limited Defense," "Limited Annihilation?," *New Republic,* July 1, 1957, July 15, 1957; Hans J. Morgenthau, "Atomic Force and Foreign Policy," *Commentary,* June, 1957; P. H. Nitze, "Limited Wars or Massive Retaliation," *Reporter,* September 5, 1957.

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(2) The USSR may use limited nuclear weapons, and then we will be thrown into a position where we will have to answer with SAC.

(3) A given armed force cannot be equipped to fight both a limited nuclear war and a conventional war.

(4) Limited nuclear war need not be "as destructive as it appears when we think of it in terms of traditional warfare" (a rather odd sentence, on the whole.)

(5) Limited nuclear war need not expand into unlimited nuclear war "assuming, however, that both sides are eager to avoid all-out war—the prerequisite for *any [sic]* kind of war limitation . . . "

(6) A limited nuclear war is less likely than a conventional war to produce a showdown; "because [in a conventional war] the two sides will be less clear about each other's intentions, the detonation of any nuclear device could then set off an all-out holocaust . . . A war which began as a limited nuclear war would have the advantage that its limitations could have been established . . . well in advance of hostilities."

(7) Limited nuclear war would give the advantage to our technological superiority.

(8) While limited nuclear weapons may not save in manpower, they make it possible for the United States to take advantage of the particular skills and qualities of our population.

In short:

> The purpose of a policy of limited nuclear war is not to provide a substitute for all-out war, but to create a range of options within which the response can be brought into balance with the provocation and where military capability and the will to use it will be in greater harmony than in the stark case when all-out war remains our only response to a challenge.

V

This case for fighting a limited nuclear war is well put. It can, however, be answered, and the argument sustained that while it is necessary to have limited nuclear weapons as well as strategic atomic power, tactical nuclear war is not as likely to occur as is a conventional war of the Korea type, of the Indo-China type, or of the police action type; the emphasis in re-building our armed forces in "peacetime" must therefore be in creating not necessarily a large conscript army, but an army which is able to meet the emergencies most likely to occur. For if we do not we will be open to a nibbling process; and therefore tempted either into eccentric and quixotic actions due to panic or to waiting until we must start a limited nuclear war.

To come to the crux of the question. What is wrong with starting a limited nuclear war? Answer: (a) the distinction between a limited nuclear and an all-out nuclear war may exist in the mind of a scholar, but not on the reality of a battlefield; one can shift easily from one to the other because there is *no* clear cut point as there is between conventional war and limited nuclear war; (b) since tactical nuclear weapons are weapons of the Hiroshima size and even the portable ¼th

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kiloton weapon is the size of the blockbuster of World War II, *a limited nuclear war is in fact a war on the scale of World War II.* In *nuclear* terms such a war may be limited; but no one seriously thinks of it as a limited war in any real sense of limited destruction, a limited field of operations, or a limited amount of men and material being involved. Any effort to portray such a war as limited simply betrays the extent to which big bangs in Nevada can distort a sense of reality.

But let us put aside such unmanly thoughts and meet Mr. Kissinger on his own grounds. It is possible, of course, to conceive of another World War II as a possible type of war today; there would be, presumably, a few persons staggering around at the end of it upholding the banner of civilization. But *in fact* is such a war the most likely kind of war America has to face? *In fact* are we likely to have another World War II? To answer that question it is necessary to look at the possibilities of Russian action and the use by America of limited nuclear weapons in response to Russia in various committed and uncommitted areas of the world today. And such a question is the crucial one, for if there is little possibility of their use in such areas then to prepare for limited nuclear war is to prepare for the wrong kind of war.

A preliminary fact must be noticed. A World War II type of war could only mean the involvement of either Russia or China or both. But the Korean War indicated (and the Quemoy imbroglio, as well as Indo-China) that Russia will not fight eagerly and quickly for China and that China restricts herself in her military aims. Further, it is important to notice that Russia will not fight *at all* unless driven to it. *Russia has not lost a soldier in battle since the end of World War II;* not a Russian soldier has been engaged in battle with either America or any of her allies. (The exception to this statement is, of course, the Russian aviators in the Korean War.) Russia is without any doubt a very aggressive state, one of the most aggressive in history. But Russia won't fight because she is achieving her aims in other ways.

The fact that Russia *will not fight* is of fundamental importance as we take our *tour d'horizon.* For where is a World War III likely to break out? In Europe? Are the Russians going to start a push to the Breton coast? It is possible, of course; anything is possible. But it is not very likely. And why not? Because Europe is protected by SAC. Further, a limited nuclear force would be a far more risky way to threaten Russia in Europe than dependence on SAC. (After all, scorching the earth in France is hardly an effective method of threatening *Russia.*) Also, it would be more expensive in men and money to maintain. No, SAC may as well be of some use, and preserving a stalemate in Europe is, let us face it, a use.

Kissinger's answer is to pose the contradiction of saying that America's allies will be reluctant to undertake a limited war in defense of Europe but that we will be ready or able to put into effect an all-out war which would be much more destructive. The contradiction exists, but the fact on which it is based—a fear of nuclear weapons—is not

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done away with by Kissinger's formula of limited nuclear war. For limited nuclear war means it is *certain* that Europe would be the battlefield (the only battlefield); dependence on SAC—to be blunt—makes it at least possible that Europe will simply be flown over while America and Russia knock each other out.

Fallacious reasoning? Perhaps, but it gives Europe a fighting chance, whereas limited nuclear war would not. But even more important, is the way in which conventional armed forces might cut through this dilemma of NATO. This type of force would keep war damage to the minimum; therefore defense would still be possible. Since NATO would not be put in a position of being forced to start a limited nuclear war, it would be more prepared to defend itself. But, Kissinger and others will say, Europe has not provided enough conventional forces all these years; why should they now after reading this article in DISSENT? Granted, but neither will they provide the equally large (or larger) number of troops needed for limited nuclear war, as well as the much greater sum of money it would require.

But whatever Europe may, or may not do, the threat to Europe today is not from a full scale Russian invasion. The only real possibility of war in Europe today is of local incursions, by design or through mistakes, of local forces along the East German-West German border; and for that, local conventional forces are necessary, not the blunderbuss of limited nuclear war.

Where then? Where is this limited nuclear war to come? Someplace on the periphery of Asia where another Korea-type war may develop? (It is this type of war more than any other that the advocates of limited war have in mind.) Dean Acheson—Mr. Korea himself—has the answer to that:

> Thoughtful criticism of our restraint in Korea does not suggest that we should have used atomic weapons in or out of Korea . . . . I mention . . . this to show that even in so considerable a conflict as Korea the criticism of our conduct there—even that put forth by General MacArthur—contended not against the adequacy of conventional weapons but contended for the desirability of enlarging the geographical scope of the conflict.

It is precisely in these areas of Asia where limited nuclear war is least advantageous. Asian armies are the most mobile of all, and it is generally agreed that mobile armies can out-fox tactical nuclear weapons if anyone can. In Asia you drop a tactical nuclear bomb, make a big hole in the ground and look! They're back again. Would nuclear weapons have saved Indo-China? They would have *ruined* Indo-China, but would they have *saved* it from Chinese Communist control?

Yes, yes, say the advocates of limited nuclear war, but we could have knocked the Chinese Communists into the next world; the tactical nuclear bomb is our best weapon against such hordes. But does the tactical nuclear bomb provide a means of military balance against the gigantic population of China? It would be nice to think so, up

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against all that fertility as we are. But in fact, such a war provides no special security against China. It does not because *limited nuclear war against China, if it were to be successful would have to be followed up with invasion, and invasion requires conventional armed forces.* No doubt we can silence the batteries opposite Quemoy; but the bang of our sophisticated bombs would soon be followed by the primitive noise of a Chinese chain gang rebuilding the batteries. And then, after the bombing, would we start an invasion of China?

There is another enemy, however, besides Russia and China. It is that motley collection of rulers like Colonel Nasser and Brigadier Qasim. There is the distinct possibility that this type of adventurer will not only take over more of the underdeveloped countries but will assert himself against Mr. Dulles by accepting Russian aid. More serious, in certain areas they may be the preliminary to a Communist take-over. If these ungrateful wretches should threaten our power, what shall we do with them? If, for example, a full-fledged threat with Russian backing should develop against Israel how would we meet it? By limited nuclear war? At this point in the argument my moral sense begins to give a few uneasy jumps. But we must persevere to the bitter—and absurd—end (and it would be both bitter and absurd). Better a limited nuclear war than losing a yard of real estate. Well, how about it? Wouldn't Iraq or Egypt or Jordan make a lovely place to use some tactical bombs of the power of the bombs used in Hiroshima? Israel could then rest in peace—a nice long peace.

But enough. The game has become obscene.

Even worse it is disastrous. It is disastrous because to think of using limited nuclear weapons in Asia or the Middle East is to think about the wrong things. Asia faces America with a *political* problem. At the worst we may have to use conventional forces to fight another Korea in the area. But today even that type of military situation is increasingly improbable. What is *here* now is the political fact of these underdeveloped areas. To postulate the use of limited nuclear weapons as even a step towards a solution of the problems they present is simply not to be serious.

One could go on at some length to discuss the general and technical deficiencies of tactical nuclear weapons. Some of these are: They do in fact need as much or more manpower as a conventional army in order to force the opposing army to concentrate so that tactical nuclear weapons—never very subtle under the best of circumstances—can do their work. The maintenance and use of tactical nuclear weapons requires a very large and constantly in-being army. An army equipped with them in place of conventional arms assures that they must be used. It is a schoolroom exercise to make a distinction between the tactical and strategic use of such weapons (question: when is a city a tactical and when is it a strategic target? Answer: when the General in the field decides that it is one or the other.) And finally, if we assume a limited nuclear war in Europe, for example, and assume, as

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we must, that the Russians have tactical nuclear weapons, that side will win which, after each tactical nuclear army has wiped the other out, will have the biggest conventional reserves to take over the smoking real estate (there will be some *real* ruins to visit in Europe after the next war). If we have no conventional forces, that state will be Russia.

VI

To prepare for a limited nuclear war is to prepare for the war which is least likely to occur. It is to avoid the whole point of the Russian challenge. We have already pointed out that Russia has not lost a soldier since the end of World War II. And for a very good reason. Russian policy—its method of attack—is political; today it aims not at seizing military control, but political control through political means. No doubt a military vacuum would invite Russian military forces; *but a political vacuum just as surely invites Russian political forces.* Today we have such political vacuums precisely because the American government has created them by its belief that military measures provide the answer to the problems which face us, and its recent conversion to the idea that limited nuclear war will give us "peace." As long as America puts itself to sleep with such narcotics Russia will be free to inch forward in one political situation after another. America is losing the Cold War not because she has too little military strength but because she has the kind of military strength that frightens everyone whom she approaches—and because that is about all she has.

Much of what has been written on war has a rather quaint and slightly repellent air because it drives military logic to its logical conclusion. In doing so it confines itself only to a military situation, or at best, deals with foreign policy only in military terms. It is now time to reverse the process. What is our major political problem today? Having answered that we can then see what our military needs are.

The major problem facing America today is created by the underdeveloped states. How can they be kept at least neutral, that is, free? We have—*should* have—no desire to force them into our bailiwick. But their loss to Communism would be a tragedy for them as well as us—whether they know it or not, and there is no doubt about it, they are often not very bright on the question. This problem is a political problem, not a military one, and an understanding of how to fight the next war will not solve it. It can, however, prevent the growth of a belief that with the proper military policy we can forget the need for a political policy. It will do that in the following ways.

1) In the absence of adequate conventional forces, the U.S. will be forced to use limited nuclear weapons in the "gray" uncommitted areas of the world when she feels it is essential to intervene—and there is, I think, nothing wrong with intervention *qua* intervention; we intervened in Europe after 1947 and Europe today is free. Such use of limited nuclear weapons would not only be barbarous, but would negate the purpose of our intervention by raising opinion against us. It

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would also bring closer a major war. And hence we would not only hesitate until we were forced to act in panic fashion or not at all, but most of the world would choose to disassociate itself from us. A military policy of limited nuclear war in uncommitted areas *forces* other nations to be neutral: it is on their land that this war would take place.

2) Once we have provided ourselves against more Korean wars by whatever conventional forces we need, we will have completed the job of making military force impotent. We cannot do that as long as we are weak in one of the three major forms of war which exist today. Whether the military men know it or not, *the aim of military policy today must be to negate, to neutralize, and in a sense, destroy, military power.* But as long as Russia thinks that she can use a type of military force (by proxy or otherwise) for which we have no reply, she will be in a position to do so. Once the impotence of military force is achieved then America can turn its attention without its teeth chattering to the real problem—the political problems of the world.

3) For the fact is that war is increasingly unlikely today. The Russians don't fight because they have better methods. But if America develops a policy of reliance on limited nuclear war, America will continue to be a war-like nation, will continue to rely on military force and war, even after Russia has given it up. For such a war promises cheap victories and an avoidance of all-out war at the same time. Illusion though it may be, that is the illusion on which limited nuclear war really rests. Is there a problem which is a *political* problem? We will meet it with one of our new limited nuclear bombs. How simple it all is; and how bloodless (for Americans). The brutal fact that war, *any* war, is a bloody, filthy, disorganized and chancy scramble may easily be forgotten by our policy makers. It will be transformed in their simple minds to a hygienic exercise in which small groups of mobile troops looking like Boy Scouts will flush out the enemy with their portable ¼th kiloton bombs. But there would be no such suicidal idea if we realized that what faces us is the *possibility* of hard, man-consuming, conventional war as an element in the political struggles of the 1960s.

There should be no mistake about it. An excessive reliance on limited nuclear war—a reliance to the extent that Kissinger and others have advocated—will make America ignore too easily what war is like and thus tempt it too often (much to the delight of the Russians; for such wars will not be fought on their territory). America will then be able to conveniently forget the political problems which face her because she has the "answer." There would be no political problem —like the Chinese mainland opposite Quemoy—which could not be solved by blowing it up.

We have our choice: politics or war. America can dedicate itself to the solution of political problems or become a war-like and military state which is a standing danger not so much to Russia and China as to everyone else.

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DOCTOR ZHIVAGO & MODERN SENSIBILITY

Nicola Chiaromonte

(This article is a reply to one by Lionel Abel in the Fall 1958 DISSENT, *which had discussed Pasternak's* Doctor Zhivago *in the form of a letter to Nicola Chiaromonte.*—ED.)

Dear Lionel,

I think that *Doctor Zhivago* is one of the most beautiful novels written since Proust, if not the most beautiful. I don't see, in fact, what other contemporary novelist, with the possible exception of Faulkner, can be compared to Pasternak in both the scope and accomplishment of his narration.

The scope of *Doctor Zhivago* is measured by the story it tells, in terms of individual vicissitudes, of the last fifty years of Russian history. And may I point out that Russian history of the last forty years is also, in more than one sense, our history? All the questions that have been facing us in the West since 1914 are present on a truly tragic scale—the conflict between common ideals and collective necessity; the resurgence of naked force in a world that is supposedly committed to progress; the individual's helplessness in the face of it; the fate of human values; the meaning or lack of meaning of such a world; the existence or nonexistence of a simple truth by which the individual can abide and preserve his identity while remaining in accord with his fellow men and with the rhythm of universal life. These questions are all present in a concrete as well as in an intellectual form in Pasternak's novel.

As for *Doctor Zhivago's* accomplishment, I measure it from the fact that, uneven as the novel is, and stumbling as it does against the many difficulties of the task, it does not fall short of the mark. Pasternak does give us a picture of those great events, as suffered, observed, and judged by human beings, which is by no means inferior to the magnitude of the events themselves; he has created a character, Zhivago, by doing something no novelist had done before, namely, making of consciousness—not the psychological consciousness of the traditional novel, but the very dimension of consciousness—the hero of the book; and he tells a love story which is one of the most beautiful creations in modern literature. Finally, in my opinion, Pasternak deals adequately with the moral and intellectual questions raised by the events. This he does, not so much by his answers as by pointing out over and over again where the questions lie. In fact, he drives home consistently

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only one point: we should not betray the question for the sake of the answer. May I add that Pasternak shows he is a truly modern artist precisely in his refusal to give us an overall picture of events and to formulate a global answer to them? The truth that he has found, however, he communicates most scrupulously.

•

IN TRYING TO PROVE MY POINT, I shall begin with a quotation from Isaiah Berlin's essay on *Tolstoy and History:*

"What, then, is the historian's task—to describe the ultimate data of subjective experience—the personal lives lived by men—the 'thoughts, knowledge, poetry, music, love, friendship, hates, passions' of which, for Tolstoy, 'real' life is compounded, and only that? . . . This kind of artistic purism—preached in his day by Flaubert—this kind of preoccupation with the analysis and description of the experience and relationships and problems and inner lives of individuals (later advocated and practiced by Gide and the writers he influenced, both in France and England) struck him as both trivial and false."

The refusal of "artistic purism," so strong in Tolstoy, is, I think, a trait common to the great Russian novelists and poets. It was this that won them their glory. But it was also this trait that, when they first became known in Western Europe, made them look like freaks in the eyes of European (especially French) literary people—great, no doubt but still freaks. Until these "freaks" influenced European literature so much that Dostoievsky, for example, became to all practical purposes the novelist *par excellence,* not so much on account of the great human problems he debated through his characters as because he was supposed to have freed psychological imagination from the strictures of naturalistic consistency. Yet the acceptance of Russian literature by European writers and critics always tended to be kept within the limits of artistic (or technical) purism. Tolstoy, the moralist and the questioner, in particular, was considered a somewhat different person from Tolstoy the artist, and somewhat inferior to him. Passion for ideas and moral questioning was not condemned as such, of course. But that they should constitute the very intention of the work, that the author himself should be involved in the questioning, and that he should mean to involve the reader in it, was considered to lay beyond the pale of art.

This implied a peculiarly narrow conception of art which can well be called "artistic puritanism," insofar as it is fundamentally moralistic rather than aesthetic.

The question as to why the artist as a human type was saddled in the 1850s (most clearly by Flaubert) with an extreme kind of stoic morality which obliged him to be an artist and nothing else, is a complex one. The most obvious reason is that, in the face of surging philistinism the artist found himself indeed in the position of the stoic hero, alone with his inner conviction against the whole of society. The

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position was nevertheless ambiguous; it meant that as an individual the artist was bound by no rule at all, except his own sense of quality, while at the same time a well-nigh monastic rule of art existed which was self-evident as well as rigorous.

The contradiction, one might grant, was a fruitful one. But it remained a contradiction, and it is particularly apparent in the case of the novel. Because the novel, from the point of view of pure art, is a literary form that exists only insofar as it violates the rules. Its one rule is that it tell a story about the common world, and I would even say the *present* world, although the present world in the novel wears many disguises. Which story, in which way and, by which means is for the novelist to decide. But the one thing the novelist cannot do is to be a pure artist, that is, in his case, a pure poet.

In a short essay on the nature of poetry Roger Caillois has recently given a definition which I find suggestive: "Poetry was (at the origin)," writes Caillois, "everything that people wanted to preserve intact in memory. The rest was nothing but interchangeable words." In this sense the novel is obviously a hybrid art form. Since it is a mixture of true history and fable it cannot do without the "interchangeable words" that make up the context of the everyday. Moreover, in a novel such *clichés* as *"la baronne fit appeler sa voiture"* which provoked Valéry's sarcasm, may recur as often as is expedient without bothering us in the least; whereas Flaubert's *mot juste* is not a novelist's preoccupation. As for the intervention of ideas and moral questions in the novel, which the same Flaubert found so objectionable, they simply express the presence of the author in it, and his eagerness to communicate the full meaning of the story. He does not so much aim at "preserving facts intact in memory" as at sharing their meaning and changing the image of the everyday world as it is given and accepted in ordinary human intercourse. In a sense a novel is always a polemic against official history in the name of the true story of men. This is what the great Russian novelists saw with clarity, and wanted to achieve in their stories. It was not Wilde's "awful business of imparting opinions" that motivated them, but a passionate concern with common history, and the contrast between the irreversible flow of time and the uniqueness of the individual—a concern which could not be satisfied by pure representation, as Proust and Joyce were to show.

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YOU WILL NOT MIND my saying, dear Lionel, that in your remarks about *Doctor Zhivago* the influence of "artistic purism" is clearly discernible. As a consequence of it and of the moral strictness it implies, your judgment reveals a strong aversion not for Pasternak, of course, and not even for the book itself, but for the meaning it wants to convey, the kind of question it raises, and even its style. The aversion manifests itself, as is natural, in a certain injustice. It is not fair to assume that Pasternak set out to write the history of the Russian

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Revolution from 1905 to 1926 and then reduced it to a strike in a sewing establishment and to a description of guerrilla warfare. What Pasternak obviously set out to do was something quite different. He wanted to tell the story of what happened during those years to a definite group of people more or less connected with his hero. What Pasternak insists on doing (and, as far as "history" is concerned, it is what is most original in the book) is to describe and judge the revolution from afar and from below, while never attempting to survey it from above, so to speak, and to judge it wholesale. And is it really necessary to point out that as far as the approach to history is concerned, Pasternak's method is the same as Stendhal's in describing Waterloo?

It is unjust to say that Pasternak does not give us a strong and even epic image of the Russian Revolution, or that he belittles Lenin's role. I think that his picture of Moscow before and after October, 1917, is a marvelous image of a city shaken by a revolution. It not only describes the violence, hunger, cold, dread and chaos; it also communicates the essential greatness of the event.

There is a sense of truly religious awe in the thoughts of Zhivago before the revolution:

> He realized that he was a pygmy before the monstrous machine of the future; he was anxious about this future, and loved it and was secretly proud of it, and as though for the last time, as if in farewell, he avidly looked at the trees and clouds and the people walking in the streets, the great Russian city struggling through misfortune—and was ready to sacrifice himself for the general good, and could do nothing. (p. 184)

And I don't find any better adjective than "religious" to define the earnestness with which Zhivago, Tonia and their friends face what is happening. We know both what the revolution means and what kind of people they are when Pasternak shows them gathered around the table to feast on the duck Yuri had received as a present from the strange deaf-mute on the train (a scene which, by the way, is another striking image of the revolution, although an indirect one), and then all of a sudden the attention is turned to the world around:

> And so it turned out that only a life similar to the life of those around us, merging with it without a ripple, is genuine life, and that an unshared happiness is not happiness, so that duck and vodka, when they seem to be the only ones in town, are not even duck and vodka. And this was most vexing of all. (p. 175)

These are not just passing thoughts or moralistic comments. They are the very themes of the book, composing a strong counterpoint throughout the narration. The theme of virile acceptance of events, for example (an acceptance which does not exclude stern judgment or moral revolt, and in fact implies them) recurs as constantly as that of

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the impossibility of solitary happiness, nay of living fully, without merging one's life in the lives of other people. If Zhivago and Lara's love cannot last it is because they are overcome by a sense of isolation from the sea of troubles that is sweeping Russia. Whether they remain hidden or leave their refuge, they know that in the common doom, their happiness is doomed. Fate is between them in a much more real sense than King Mark's sword is between Tristan and Isolde, since it penetrates their souls. It is the awareness of it that makes of their story a love poem. Pasternak's view of history is also connected with the theme of the impossibility for the individual to separate his own life from that of his fellow men; and so is his notion of personal immortality as the life we obtain in other people's consciousness: "Man's presence in other men, that is what man's soul is," says the young Zhivago to Anna Ivanovna. Finally, Zhivago's experience of poetry as a transcendental realm of meaning to whose laws he finds himself subjected in writing a poem is a development of the same theme.

I find such moments of pure awareness as poetic as the passages about nature, so rightly admired by every reader of *Doctor Zhivago* I know, including you, I am sure.

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WHAT DO WE ASK of characters in a novel? That they appear to us as the authentic sources of their acts and thoughts. This is what we mean when we say that they "exist." The existence of a character imposes itself on us when we become interested in his ventures and are eager to know what happens to him; what happens, that is, to that pure possibility of human nature which the author has established as his.

In this sense, I feel, Yuri Zhivago, Lara Fedorovna, and (to a lesser degree) Pasha Antipov are indeed characters and they exist; not in the same way, however, as Julien Sorel, Natasha Rostov, or, let us say, Svidrigailov, exist in their respective universes. We know next to nothing of their physical appearance; and psychological motivation is almost absent. They are defined by an attitude to life, instead of by a sequence of revealing insights into their "nature," as Stendhal's or Tolstoy's characters are. Their identity, in other words, is not of a psychological order, but of a moral and intellectual one.

There is a serious reason for this. The time in which these characters live is *out of joint.* By this I am not referring only to war, revolution, the uprooting of individuals from their attachments, their expectations and their very lives—all of the stupendous wildness of the events which is the subject of the book. What I mean is, above all, the final impossibility for such characters (and for the author through them) to conceive of their own identity as a mere sequence of occasions in time—thinking of it in terms of the fundamentally continuous duration—the *durée*—that is the stuff out of which characters are made in the classical novel. What they experience instead is the shattering of this continuity in themselves as well as in the outer world. And, in

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the disruption of their private lives, the shattering of time itself. Hence, if they wish to maintain their identity, they must stake it on something more intimate than any occasion, and more impersonal than their natural selves—a pure quality of being, sustained by an intrinsic accord with universal life. It is through the quality of their consciences that Zhivago and Lara are described by Pasternak, and it is through the pathos of their solitude that they are revealed to us as original characters. When an extreme situation appears, "time's charms are all o'erthrown."

One might say that this amounts to the disappearance of character in fiction. But is it not the marvel of this disappearance that Proust described in Marcel's progress from time lost to time found again? Is Kafka's "K" a character in the same sense as Raskolnikov? In Pasternak's attempt to lay bare, within the confines of the novel, an individual consciousness that submits to events and is yet detached from them, that is reduced to pure thoughtfulness and yet remains lifelike, the Russian poet shows, among other things, that he is a truly modern writer, well aware that in the novel pure representation no longer interests us.

To sum up, the assumption implicit in Pasternak's creation of characters is that what an individual thinks of the world, not his "nature," is the cause of his acts, and shapes his fate. The external world is ruled by chance, but the relation between man and events is governed by a necessity whose source is man himself. This is an original and profound view that could easily be connected with certain tendencies in modern thought and art. And I find particularly satisfying Pasternak's attempt to express this with candor and directness in a novel which preserves the traditional form, instead of searching for new techniques. By doing this he has run into difficulties, of course. But I cannot find fault with what you call the "innocence" of his style, since it is made to convey a meaning that is far from innocent.

As for the characters themselves, I must say that Zhivago's personality is clearly established for me when the author shows him at the funeral of Anna Ivanovna:

> He felt he was on an equal footing with the universe. And he was affected by the services for Anna Ivanovna differently than he had been by the services for his mother. Then he had prayed in confusion, fear, and pain. Now he listened to the services as if they were a message addressed to him and concerning him directly. He listened intently to the words, expecting them, like any other words, to have a clear meaning. There was no religiosity in his reverence for the supreme powers of heaven and earth, which he worshipped as his progenitors. (p. 87)

To me there is a wonderful directness here in rendering the way an ardent young man can face life. Am I wrong? Should a certain straightforwardness and magnanimity be suspect to a modern intellectual? All I can say is that from that point on I felt involved in Zhiva-

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go's character, and eager to know what would happen to him, how he would manage to remain faithful to the noble pride expressed in those thoughts. He does manage, and death as an outcast on a Moscow thoroughfare is his retribution. In the meantime he has not behaved like a hero or a saint, nor have his thoughts been those of a genius. He has simply remained the man he was, under circumstances that put his personal morality, his soul, and his mind, as well, on trial. In recounting his ordeal to us, the author has wanted to show us not only his acts and his feelings, but also his reasons, his ideas, the quality of his relation to life as such, and finally, even his poetry. We know him, and we are called to judge him, not approve of him. In judging Zhivago, however, we must take into account not just his "psychology" (which in a way is absent) but his ideas about the world and about poetry. Artistic purism (and puritanism) is not an adequate criterion, for the simple reason that moral choices and ideas in a work of art raise the question of a meaning that is not purely aesthetic, and commit the reader to a debate about their intrinsic validity on their own grounds. This is what any reader of *War and Peace* or *The Possessed* does implicitly or explicitly, and this is what a reader of *Doctor Zhivago* cannot help doing. Must I add that ideas in a novel should not be taken as philosophical theses, nor abstracted from the emotional situation out of which they are shown to arise?

Only some kind of artistic purism, it seems to me, could have led you to make the remark about Zhivago's being an artist but not a man. Do you really think that being an artist is "something added" to being a man? Something that in some way goes beyond humanity, putting it in abeyance? Something that should be suspended if one wishes to be fully human? Well, Pasternak does not believe that, and neither does Zhivago. In him Pasternak wants to show the artist as a man subjected to a collective ordeal and reacting as the kind of man that poetic perception and thoughtfulness have made him. Zhivago does this at the cost of appearing inept or inhuman or both, to men who think that poetry or thought do not belong in real life, as well as to artists who have little use for humanity except as the subject matter of their art. As for him, his only privilege is being endowed with an articulate consciousness. It is not merely a privilege, however, insofar as Zhivago abides by its commands, following them as the very form of his destiny.

Hence, it may well be that in firing at a tree stump because he does not want to kill people Zhivago is behaving like a poet. But his action is neither idle nor directionless, and it is not a game. It is seriously motivated, and the motive is perfectly in keeping with the character:

> But to look on inactively while the mortal struggle raged all around was impossible, it was beyond human strength. It was not a question of loyalty to the side that held him captive or of defending his own life, but of submitting to the order of events, to the laws governing

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what went on around him. To remain an outsider was against the rules. You had to do what everyone else was doing. A battle was going on. He and his comrades were being shot at. He had to shoot back. (p. 334)

What is here involved is simply the realization of the law to which soldiers in battle are subjected. Zhivago wants to act like one of them. He is not a conscientious objector; he does not wish to be innocent. In a battle there are always soldiers who realize the absurdity of war, and they don't have to be intellectuals in order to decide to shoot at random. When his shots strike a man dead, Zhivago feels pity, not guilt. The absence of a sense of guilt, in fact, is one of the most striking features of Zhivago's character. In receiving Tonia's farewell letter, for example, he is stricken with sorrow to the point of fainting (a detail which you failed to notice), but he does not feel guilty about his love for Lara.

Sould a poet who happens to be in love make a point of keeping his poetic feelings separate from his love? This is what you seem to imply when you interpret Zhivago's impulse (after his separation from Lara) to write her memory "into an image of aching tenderness and sorrow," as meaning that he loves his poetry rather than her. To me it is natural that a true poet should have such a thought in the very fullness of his grief. To celebrate an irretrievable loss by song is one of the oldest human instincts. The funeral games for Patroclus in the *Iliad* spring from such an impulse. Writing a poem for Lara is the *last* thing Zhivago can do for her, and why it should be regarded as a substitute for sorrow I am unable to understand. So much the more so since Zhivago's grief has been forcefully expressed in the preceding pages. The scene of the lovers' separation is one of the most moving in the book. And before that we certainly have been made to feel, together with the unique quality of their bond, the doom impending on it, in the extraordinary image of their retreat in the woods, besieged by wolves.

Now I must defend Lara as a character. You say that she is purely a literary character, a mixture of Nastasia Filippovna and Natasha Rostov. I don't deny that there is something of both these women in Lara. As a matter of fact, I imagine that Pasternak, himself, if the thought had occurred to him, would not have hesitated to say that she has something of Nastasia as well as of Natasha. Pasternak is quite unselfconscious about using literature as a source of metaphor. For example, he says of a girl that she is like a character in Griboiedov; of the October coup d'état that "It has something of Pushkin's uncompromising clarity and of Tolstoy's unwavering faithfulness to the facts." (p. 195). And he can go as far as saying that a landscape is nature "as modern painting has painted it." This, after all, is something we do quite often in real life. But that Lara resembles those literary characters does not mean that she can be reduced to them. Starting from the delicate and intense scene where Zhivago suddenly sees Lara again in the public library of Iuriatin she becomes Pasternak's own creation.

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She is characterized with classical simplicity by her demeanor, by the regal dignity with which she infuses her sordid, rat-infested room, and, most of all, by her love for Zhivago and his for her. Lara is always seen through Zhivago's eyes; through them, however, she acquires a singularly objective reality. Even though all we know of her external appearance is that she has blue eyes and beautiful arms, we finally come to know the kind of woman she is—her frailty, her earnestness, her mortified nobility. In my opinion she is one of the most affecting images of womanhood in modern literature.

In a sense, however, the attempt to prove that Pasternak created "real" characters is contradictory, since, as I have already said, what he has done is rather to show what is left of characters under conditions in which the very identity of the individual is threatened, and tends to be reduced to an inconsistent sequel of occasions and acts.

There is a moment in *Doctor Zhivago* when individuals exist peacefully and can hence develop into what we are accustomed to considering "round" characters. In the first part of the book, Pasternak gives us the very essence of such a moment, surprisingly enough, in his description of passengers getting out of a train during a stop to get drinks and food at the station:

> Every motion in the world [he writes] taken separately was calculated and purposeful, but, taken together, they were spontaneously intoxicated with the general stream of life which united them all. People worked and struggled, each set in motion by the mechanism of his own cares. But the mechanisms would not have worked properly had they not been regulated and governed by a higher sense of an ultimate freedom from care. This freedom came from the feeling that all human lives were interrelated, a certainty that they flowed into each other—a happy feeling that all events took place not only on the earth, in which the dead are buried, but also in some other region which some called the Kingdom of God, others history, and still others by some other name. (pp. 12-13)

This is a wonderful insight into the essence of peace with the inner order and the trust in the future that peace implies. If one compares this with the description of another railroad trip, the one that takes Zhivago and his family from Moscow to Varykino through the great expanses of the Russian plain at the beginning of the revolution, with the disorder, the tumult, the unleashed vitality and violence that accompanies it, one grasps very clearly, I think, the transition from a world of three-dimensional characters to one in which individuals are made into translucid entities, so to speak, since psychological continuity is no longer possible. In this new world all that is left of an individual is his "odyssey," the sequence of his ventures and transformations. Only a conventional writer would stress psychological connections here, although in some degree they continue to exist.

The transformation of Pasha Antipov, the young intellectual, into Strelnikov, the Bolshevik chieftain, does not have to be explained, and

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certainly not by his realization that Lara is not in love with him. It is given as a fact, a sudden transition from the personal to the public role. To make the transition acceptable, all that is required is that it not be inconsistent. And there is in fact no contradiction between young Pasha, the son of a rebel; Strelnikov, the Bolshevik; and the defeated man who commits suicide at Zhivago's door. In order to grasp their function in the novel we don't need to know more about them than what the author tells us. What matters is the line of their destiny, their appearances and disappearances in the course of the story, and finally, their significance in the framework of Zhivago's own odyssey. And this is, ultimately, no more than the story of a man's fidelity to himself, from manly pride and self-assertion to pure awareness and acceptance of fate through endurance.

In the end nothing remains of Zhivago but his memory in the hearts of those who loved him, and a few written pages. He has not asserted himself against events or over them. He has simply lived his life. The question of whether he is simply the last tenant of a doomed world or the bearer of a new and deeper truth seems to me unimportant. "You yourself should not distinguish/Between your victory and defeat," says Pasternak in a poem recently translated into English.

"To carry out the effort of being faithful to oneself . . . to be able to remain identical with oneself as a reasonable being"—these words by Edmund Husserl seem to me to express with great simplicity the task that confronted modern man the moment he had to face the apparent collapse of all established truths, which was brought about by the realization of the fundamental relativity of factual knowledge. Among modern poets and writers Pasternak seems to me the one who has most deeply and earnestly realized both the difficulty and the necessity of such an enterprise. He has carried it out in his poems, in his novel, and in his personal conduct with a thoughtfulness that is not inferior to his great artistic gift—on the grounds of love rather than of reason, as becomes a poet. A love that succeeds in asserting itself over horror and pity (and which, in its intrepid pride, recalls what is most noble in Nietzsche's thought), is the dominant feeling in *Doctor Zhivago*. It is the love which Pasternak has said "is not a spiritual state, but the foundation on which the world rests," and which to him is "equivalent to creative art."

These are some of the reasons, dear Lionel, for which I admire *Doctor Zhivago*. I don't know what people will think of it fifty or a hundred years from now. But I am convinced that it is a work of art of great power and significance today, that is, in terms of the present artistic, intellectual and moral situation. That it is a perfect novel, I would not care to say. One of its most revealing and touching traits is, in fact, the struggle of the poet to express himself in the language of everyday experience—the struggle to use "interchangeable words" and yet say that which he wants to "preserve intact in memory." But, then again, is not this the fundamental struggle of modern art?

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The circumstances under which Miss Arendt first wrote but did not publish her article are described in her introduction. We publish it not because we agree with it—quite the contrary!—but because we believe in freedom of expression even for views that seem to us entirely mistaken. Because of Miss Arendt's intellectual stature, the importance of her topic, and the fact that an earlier opportunity to print her views had been withdrawn, we feel it is a service to allow her opinion, and the rebuttals to it, now to be aired freely.

The attention of our readers is called to the critical comments that follow Miss Arendt's article. In the next issue she will, of course, have an opportunity to reply to her critics; and within limits of space, reasoned comments from readers will be printed.—EDITORS

REFLECTIONS ON LITTLE ROCK

Hannah Arendt

Preliminary Remarks

This article was written more than a year ago upon the suggestion of one of the editors of Commentary. *It was a topical article whose publication was delayed for months because of the controversial nature of my reflections which, obviously, were at variance with the magazine's stand on matters of discrimination and segregation. Meanwhile, things had quieted down temporarily; I had hopes that my fears concerning the seriousness of the situation might prove exaggerated and no longer wished to publish this article. Recent developments have convinced me that such hopes are futile and that the routine repetition of liberal clichés may be even more dangerous than I thought a year ago. I therefore agreed to let* DISSENT *publish the article as it was written—not because I thought that a year-old topical essay could possibly exhaust the subject or even do justice to the many difficult problems involved, but in the hope that even an inadequate attempt might help to break the dangerous routine in which the discussion of these issues is being held from both sides.*

There are, however, two points which were brought to my attention after I wrote the article which I would like to mention at least. The first concerns my contention that the marriage laws in 29 of the 49 states constitute a much more flagrant breach of letter and spirit of the Constitution than segregation of schools. To this, Sidney Hook (New Leader, April 13), *replied that Negroes were "profoundly uninterested" in these laws; in their eyes, "the discriminatory ban against intermarriages and miscegenation is last in the order of priorities." I have my doubts about this, especially with respect to the educated strata in the Negro population, but it is of course perfectly true that Negro public*

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opinion and the policies of the NAACP are almost exclusively concerned with discrimination in employment, housing and education. This is understandable; oppressed minorities were never the best judges on the order of priorities in such matters and there are many instances when they preferred to fight for social opportunity rather than for basic human or political rights. But this does not make the marriage laws any more constitutional or any less shameful; the order of priorities in the question of rights is to be determined by the Constitution, and not by public opinion or by majorities.

The second point was mentioned by a friend who rightly observed that my criticism of the Supreme Court's decision did not take into account the role education plays, and has always played, in the political framework of this country. This criticism is entirely just and I would have tried to insert a discussion of this role into the article if I had not meanwhile published a few remarks on the wide-spread, uncritical acceptance of a Rousseauian ideal in education in another context, i.e. in an article in the Fall 1958 issue of Partisan Review, *entitled "The Crisis in Education." In order not to repeat myself, I left the article unchanged.*

Finally, I should like to remind the reader that I am writing as an outsider. I have never lived in the South and have even avoided occasional trips to Southern states because they would have brought me into a situation that I personally would find unbearable. Like most people of European origin I have difficulty in understanding, let alone sharing, the common prejudices of Americans in this area. Since what I wrote may shock good people and be misused by bad ones, I should like to make it clear that as a Jew I take my sympathy for the cause of the Negroes as for all oppressed or underprivileged peoples for granted and should appreciate it if the reader did likewise.

It is unfortunate and even unjust (though hardly unjustified) that the events at Little Rock should have had such an enormous echo in public opinion throughout the world and have become a major stumbling block to American foreign policy. For unlike other domestic problems which have beset this country since the end of World War II (a security hysteria, a runaway prosperity, and the concomitant transformation of an economy of abundance into a market where sheer superfluity and nonsense almost wash out the essential and the productive), and unlike such long-range difficulties as the problem of mass culture and mass education—both of which are typical of modern society in general and not only of America—the country's attitude to its Negro population is rooted in American tradition and nothing else. The color question was created by the one great crime in America's history and is soluble only within the political and historical framework of the Republic. The fact that this question has also become a major issue in world affairs is sheer coincidence as far as American history and politics are concerned; for the color problem in world politics grew out of the colonialism and imperialism of European nations—that is, the one great crime in which America was never involved. The tragedy is that the unsolved color problem within the United States

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may cost her the advantages she otherwise would rightly enjoy as a world power.

For historical and other reasons, we are in the habit of identifying the Negro question with the South, but the unsolved problems connected with Negroes living in our midst concern of course the whole country, not the South alone. Like other race questions, it has a special attraction for the mob and is particularly well fitted to serve as the point around which a mob ideology and a mob organization can crystallize. This aspect may one day even prove more explosive in the big Northern urban centers than in the more tradition-bound South, especially if the number of Negroes in Southern cities continues to decline while the Negro population of non-Southern cities increases at the same rate as in recent years. The United States is not a nation-state in the European sense and never was. The principle of its political structure is, and always has been, independent of a homogeneous population and of a common past. This is somewhat less true of the South whose population is more homogeneous and more rooted in the past than that of any other part of the country. When William Faulkner recently declared that in a conflict between the South and Washington he would utimately have to act as a citizen of Mississippi, he sounded more like a member of a European nation-state than a citizen of this Republic. But this difference between North and South, though still marked, is bound to disappear with the growing industrialization of Southern states and plays no role in some of them even today. In all parts of the country, in the East and North with its host of nationalities no less than in the more homogeneous South, the Negroes stand out because of their "visibility." They are not the only "visible minority," but they are the most visible one. In this respect, they somewhat resemble new immigrants, who invariably constitute the most "audible" of all minorities and therefore are always the most likely to arouse xenophobic sentiments. But while audibility is a temporary phenomenon, rarely persisting beyond one generation, the Negroes' visibility is unalterable and permanent. This is not a trivial matter. In the public realm, where nothing counts that cannot make itself seen and heard, visibility and audibility are of prime importance. To argue that they are merely exterior appearances is to beg the question. For it is precisely appearances that "appear" in public, and inner qualities, gifts of heart or mind, are political only to the extent that their owner wishes to expose them in public, to place them in the limelight of the market place.

The American Republic is based on the equality of all citizens, and while equality before the law has become an inalienable principle of all modern constitutional government, equality as such is of greater importance in the political life of a republic than in any other form of government. The point at stake, therefore, is not the well-being of the Negro population alone, but, at least in the long run, the survival of the Republic. Tocqueville saw over a century ago that equality of

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opportunity and condition, as well as equality of rights, constituted the basic "law" of American democracy, and he predicted that the dilemmas and perplexities inherent in the principle of equality might one day become the most dangerous challenge to the American way of life. In its all-comprehensive, typically American form, equality possesses an enormous power to equalize what by nature and origin is different —and it is only due to this power that the country has been able to retain its fundamental identity against the waves of immigrants who have always flooded its shores. But the principle of equality, even in its American form, is not omnipotent; it cannot equalize natural, physical characteristics. This limit is reached only when inequalities of economic and educational condition have been ironed out, but at that juncture a danger point, well known to students of history, invariably emerges: the more equal people have become in every respect, and the more equality permeates the whole texture of society, the more will differences be resented, the more conspicuous will those become who are visibly and by nature unlike the others.

It is therefore quite possible that the achievement of social, economic, and educational equality for the Negro may sharpen the color problem in this country instead of assuaging it. This, of course, does not have to happen, but it would be only natural if it did, and it would be very surprising if it did not. We have not yet reached the danger point, but we shall reach it in the foreseeable future, and a number of developments have already taken place which clearly point toward it. Awareness of future trouble does not commit one to advocating a reversal of the trend which happily for more than fifteen years now has been greatly in favor of the Negroes. But it does commit one to advocating that government intervention be guided by caution and moderation rather than by impatience and ill-advised measures. Since the Supreme Court decision to enforce desegregation in public schools, the general situation in the South has deteriorated. And while recent events indicate that it will not be possible to avoid Federal enforcement of Negro civil rights in the South altogether, conditions demand that such intervention be restricted to the few instances in which the law of the land and the principle of the Republic are at stake. The question therefore is where this is the case in general, and whether it is the case in public education in particular.

THE ADMINISTRATION'S Civil Rights program covers two altogether different points. It reaffirms the franchise of the Negro population, a matter of course in the North, but not at all in the South. And it also takes up the issue of segregation, which is a matter of fact in the whole country and a matter of discriminatory legislation only in Southern states. The present massive resistance throughout the South is an outcome of enforced desegregation, and not of legal enforcement of the Negroes' right to vote. The results of a public opinion poll in Virginia showing that 92% of the citizens were totally op-

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posed to school integration, that 65% were willing to forego public education under these conditions, and that 79% denied any obligation to accept the Supreme Court decision as binding, illustrates how serious the situation is. What is frightening here is not the 92% opposed to integration, for the dividing line in the South was never between those who favored and those who opposed segregation—practically speaking, no such opponents existed—but the proportion of people who prefer mob rule to law-abiding citizenship. The so-called liberals and moderates of the South are simply those who are law-abiding, and they have dwindled to a minority of 21%.

No public opinion poll was necessary to reveal this information. The events in Little Rock were quite sufficiently enlightening; and those who wish to blame the disturbances solely on the extraordinary misbehavior of Governor Faubus can set themselves right by listening to the eloquent silence of Arkansas' two liberal Senators. The sorry fact was that the town's law-abiding citizens left the streets to the mob, that neither white nor black citizens felt it their duty to see the Negro children safely to school. That is, even prior to the arrival of Federal troops, law-abiding Southerners had decided that enforcement of the law against mob rule and protection of children against adult mobsters were none of their business. In other words, the arrival of troops did little more than change passive into massive resistance.

It has been said, I think again by Mr. Faulkner, that enforced integration is no better than enforced segregation, and this is perfectly true. The only reason that the Supreme Court was able to address itself to the matter of desegregation in the first place was that segregation has been a legal, and not just a social, issue in the South for many generations. For the crucial point to remember is that it is not the social custom of segregation that is unconstitutional, but its *legal enforcement.* To abolish this legislation is of great and obvious importance and in the case of that part of the Civil Rights bill regarding the right to vote, no Southern state in fact dared to offer strong opposition. Indeed, with respect to unconstitutional legislation, the Civil Rights bill did not go far enough, for it left untouched the most outrageous law of Southern states—the law which makes mixed marriage a criminal offense. The right to marry whoever one wishes is an elementary human right compared to which "the right to attend an integrated school, the right to sit where one pleases on a bus, the right to go into any hotel or recreation area or place of amusement, regardless of one's skin or color or race" are minor indeed. Even political rights, like the right to vote, and nearly all other rights enumerated in the Constitution, are secondary to the inalienable human rights to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence; and to this category the right to home and marriage unquestionably belongs. It would have been much more important if this violation had been brought to the attention of the Supreme Court; yet had the Court ruled the anti-miscegenation laws unconsti-

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tutional, it would hardly have felt compelled to encourage, let alone enforce, mixed marriages.

However, the most startling part of the whole business was the Federal decision to start integration in, of all places, the public schools. It certainly did not require too much imagination to see that this was to burden children, black and white, with the working out of a problem which adults for generations have confessed themselves unable to solve. I think no one will find it easy to forget the photograph reproduced in newspapers and magazines throughout the country, showing a Negro girl, accompanied by a white friend of her father, walking away from school, persecuted and followed into bodily proximity by a jeering and grimacing mob of youngsters. The girl, obviously, was asked to be a hero—that is, something neither her absent father nor the equally absent representatives of the NAACP felt called upon to be. It will be hard for the white youngsters, or at least those among them who outgrow their present brutality, to live down this photograph which exposes so mercilessly their juvenile delinquency. The picture looked to me like a fantastic caricature of progressive education which, by abolishing the authority of adults, implicitly denies their responsibility for the world into which they have borne their children and refuses the duty of guiding them into it. Have we now come to the point where it is the children who are being asked to change or improve the world? And do we intend to have our political battles fought out in the school yards?

Segregation is discrimination enforced by law, and desegregation can do no more than abolish the laws enforcing discrimination; it cannot abolish discrimination and force equality upon society, but it can, and indeed must, enforce equality within the body politic. For equality not only has its origin in the body politic; its validity is clearly restricted to the political realm. Only there are we all equals. Under modern conditions, this equality has its most important embodiment in the right to vote, according to which the judgment and opinion of the most exalted citizen are on a par with the judgment and opinion of the hardly literate. Eligibility, the right to be voted into office, is also an inalienable right of every citizen; but here equality is already restricted, and though the necessity for personal distinction in an election arises out of the numerical equality, in which everybody is literally reduced to being one, it is distinction and qualities which count in the winning of votes and not sheer equality.

Yet unlike other differences (for example, professional specialization, occupational qualification, or social and intellectual distinction) the political qualities needed for winning office are so closely connected with being an equal among equals, that one may say that, far from being specialties, they are precisely those distinctions to which all voters equally aspire—not necessarily as human beings, but as citizens and political beings. Thus the qualities of officials in a democracy always

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depend upon the qualities of the electorate. Eligibility, therefore, is a necessary corollary of the right to vote; it means that everyone is given the opportunity to distinguish himself in those things in which all are equals to begin with. Strictly speaking, the franchise and eligibility for office are the only political rights, and they constitute in a modern democracy the very quintessence of citizenship. In contrast to all other rights, civil or human, they cannot be granted to resident aliens.

What equality is to the body politic—its innermost principle—discrimination is to society. Society is that curious, somewhat hybrid realm between the political and the private in which, since the beginning of the modern age, most men have spent the greater part of their lives. For each time we leave the protective four walls of our private homes and cross over the threshold into the public world, we enter first, not the political realm of equality, but the social sphere. We are driven into this sphere by the need to earn a living or attracted by the desire to follow our vocation or enticed by the pleasure of company, and once we have entered it, we become subject to the old adage of "like attracts like" which controls the whole realm of society in the innumerable variety of its groups and associations. What matters here is not personal distinction but the differences by which people belong to certain groups whose very identifiability demands that they discriminate against other groups in the same domain. In American society, people group together, and therefore discriminate against each other, along lines of profession, income, and ethnic origin, while in Europe the lines run along class origin, education, and manners. From the viewpoint of the human person, none of these discriminatory practices makes sense; but then it is doubtful whether the human person as such ever appears in the social realm. At any rate, without discrimination of some sort, society would simply cease to exist and very important possibilities of free association and group formation would disappear.

Mass society—which blurs lines of discrimination and levels group distinctions—is a danger to society as such, rather than to the integrity of the person, for personal identity has its source beyond the social realm. Conformism, however, is not a characteristic of mass society alone, but of every society insofar as only those are admitted to a given social group who conform to the general traits of difference which keep the group together. The danger of conformism in this country—a danger almost as old as the Republic—is that, because of the extraordinary heterogeneity of its population, social conformism tends to become an absolute and a substitute for national homogeneity. In any event, discrimination is as indispensable a social right as equality is a political right. The question is not how to abolish discrimination, but how to keep it confined within the social sphere, where it is legitimate, and prevent its trespassing on the political and the personal sphere, where it is destructive.

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In order to illustrate this distinction between the political and the social, I shall give two examples of discrimination, one in my opinion entirely justified and outside the scope of government intervention, the other scandalously unjustified and positively harmful to the political realm.

It is common knowledge that vacation resorts in this country are frequently "restricted" according to ethnic origin. There are many people who object to this practice; nevertheless it is only an extension of the right to free association. If as a Jew I wish to spend my vacations only in the company of Jews, I cannot see how anyone can reasonably prevent my doing so; just as I see no reason why other resorts should not cater to a clientele that wishes not to see Jews while on a holiday. There cannot be a "right to go into any hotel or recreation area or place of amusement," because many of these are in the realm of the purely social where the right to free association, and therefore to discrimination, has greater validity than the principle of equality. (This does not apply to theaters and museums, where people obviously do not congregate for the purpose of associating with each other.) The fact that the "right" to enter social places is silently granted in most countries and has become highly controversial only in American democracy is due not to the greater tolerance of other countries but in part to the homogeneity of their population and in part to their class system, which operates socially even when its economic foundations have disappeared. Homogeneity and class working together assure a "likeness" of clientele in any given place that even restriction and discrimination cannot achieve in America.

It is, however, another matter altogether when we come to "the right to sit where one pleases in a bus" or a railroad car or station, as well as the right to enter hotels and restaurants in business districts—in short, when we are dealing with services which, whether privately or publicly owned, are in fact public services that everyone needs in order to pursue his business and lead his life. Though not strictly in the political realm, such services are clearly in the public domain where all men are equal; and discrimination in Southern railroads and buses is as scandalous as discrimination in hotels and restaurants throughout the country. Obviously the situation is far worse in the South because segregation in public services is enforced by law and plainly visible to all. It is unfortunate indeed that the first steps toward clearing up the segregation situation in the South after so many decades of complete neglect did not begin with its most inhuman and its most conspicuous aspects.

The third realm, finally, in which we move and live together with other people—the realm of privacy—is ruled neither by equality nor by discrimination, but by exclusiveness. Here we choose those with whom we wish to spend our lives, personal friends and those we love; and our choice is guided not by likeness or qualities shared by a group of people—it is not guided, indeed, by any objective standards or rules—

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but strikes, inexplicably and unerringly, at one person in his uniqueness, his unlikeness to all other people we know. The rules of uniqueness and exclusiveness are, and always will be, in conflict with the standards of society precisely because social discrimination violates the principle, and lacks validity for the conduct, of private life. Thus every mixed marriage constitutes a challenge to society and means that the partners to such a marriage have so far preferred personal happiness to social adjustment that they are willing to bear the burden of discrimination. This is and must remain their private business. The scandal begins only when their challenge to society and prevailing customs, to which every citizen has a right, is interpreted as a criminal offense so that by stepping outside the social realm they find themselves in conflict with the law as well. Social standards are not legal standards and if legislature follows social prejudice, society has become tyrannical.

For reasons too complicated to discuss here, the power of society in our time is greater than it ever was before, and not many people are left who know the rules of and live a private life. But this provides the body politic with no excuse for forgetting the rights of privacy, for failing to understand that the rights of privacy are grossly violated whenever legislation begins to enforce social discrimination. While the government has no right to interfere with the prejudices and discriminatory practices of society, it has not only the right but the duty to make sure that these practices are not legally enforced.

Just as the government has to ensure that social discrimination never curtails political equality, it must also safeguard the rights of every person to do as he pleases within the four walls of his own home. The moment social discrimination is legally enforced, it becomes persecution, and of this crime many Southern states have been guilty. The moment social discrimination is legally abolished, the freedom of society is violated, and the danger is that thoughtless handling of the civil rights issue by the Federal government will result in such a violation. The government can legitimately take no steps against social discrimination because government can act only in the name of equality—a principle which does not obtain in the social sphere. The only public force that can fight social prejudice is the churches, and they can do so in the name of the uniqueness of the person, for it is on the principle of the uniqueness of souls that religion (and especially the Christian faith) is based. The churches are indeed the only communal and public place where appearances do not count, and if discrimination creeps into the houses of worship, this is an infallible sign of their religious failing. They then have become social and are no longer religious institutions.

ANOTHER ISSUE INVOLVED in the present conflict between Washington and the South is the matter of states' rights. For some time it has been customary among liberals to maintain that no such issue exists at all but is only a ready-made subterfuge of Southern reactionaries

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who have nothing in their hands except "abstruse arguments and constitutional history." In my opinion, this is a dangerous error. In contradistinction to the classical principle of the European nation-state that power, like sovereignty, is indivisible, the power structure of this country rests on the principle of division of power and on the conviction that the body politic as a whole is strengthened by the division of power. To be sure, this principle is embodied in the system of checks and balances between the three branches of government; but it is no less rooted in the government's Federal structure which demands that there also be a balance and a mutual check between Federal power and the powers of the forty-eight states. If it is true (and I am convinced it is) that unlike force, power generates more power when it is divided, then it follows that every attempt of the Federal government to deprive the states of some of their legislative sovereignty can be justified only on grounds of legal argument and constitutional history. Such arguments are not abstruse; they are based on a principle which indeed was uppermost in the minds of the founders of the Republic.

All this has nothing to do with being a liberal or a conservative, although it may be that where the nature of power is at stake, liberal judgment with its long and honorable history of deep distrust of power in any form can be less trusted than on other questions. Liberals fail to understand that the nature of power is such that the power potential of the Union as a whole will suffer if the regional foundations on which this power rests are undermined. The point is that force can, indeed must, be centralized in order to be effective, but power cannot and must not. If the various sources from which it springs are dried up, the whole structure becomes impotent. And states' rights in this country are among the most authentic sources of power, not only for the promotion of regional interests and diversity, but for the Republic as a whole.

THE TROUBLE with the decision to force the issue of desegregation in the field of public education rather than in some other field in the campaign for Negro rights has been that this decision unwittingly touched upon an area in which every one of the different rights and principles we have discussed is involved. It is perfectly true, as Southerners have repeatedly pointed out, that the Constitution is silent on education and that legally as well as traditionally, public education lies in the domain of state legislation. The counter-argument that all public schools today are Federally supported is weak, for Federal subvention is intended in these instances to match and supplement local contributions and does not transform the schools into Federal institutions, like the Federal District courts. It would be very unwise indeed if the Federal government—which now must come to the assistance of more and more enterprises that once were the sole responsibility of the states—were to use its financial support as a means of

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whipping the states into agreement with positions they would otherwise be slow or altogether unwilling to adopt.

The same overlapping of rights and interests becomes apparent when we examine the issue of education in the light of the three realms of human life—the political, the social, and the private. Children are first of all part of family and home, and this means that they are, or should be, brought up in that atmosphere of idiosyncratic exclusiveness which alone makes a home a home, strong and secure enough to shield its young against the demands of the social and the responsibilities of the political realm. The right of parents to bring up their children as they see fit is a right of privacy, belonging to home and family. Ever since the introduction of compulsory education, this right has been challenged and restricted, but not abolished, by the right of the body politic to prepare children to fulfill their future duties as citizens. The stake of the government in the matter is undeniable —as is the right of the parents. The possibility of private education provides no way out of the dilemma, because it would make the safeguarding of certain private rights dependent upon economic status and consequently underprivilege those who are forced to send their children to public schools.

Parents' rights over their children are legally restricted by compulsory education and nothing else. The state has the unchallengeable right to prescribe minimum requirements for future citizenship and beyond that to further and support the teaching of subjects and professions which are felt to be desirable and necessary to the nation as a whole. All this involves, however, only the content of the child's education, not the context of association and social life which invariably develops out of his attendance at school; otherwise one would have to challenge the right of private schools to exist. For the child himself, school is the first place away from home where he establishes contact with the public world that surrounds him and his family. This public world is not political but social, and the school is to the child what a job is to an adult. The only difference is that the element of free choice which, in a free society, exists at least in principle in the choosing of jobs and the associations connected with them, is not yet at the disposal of the child but rests with his parents.

To force parents to send their children to an integrated school against their will means to deprive them of rights which clearly belong to them in all free societies—the private right over their children and the social right to free association. As for the children, forced integration means a very serious conflict between home and school, between their private and their social life, and while such conflicts are common in adult life, children cannot be expected to handle them and therefore should not be exposed to them. It has often been remarked that man is never so much of a conformer—that is, a purely social being—as in childhood. The reason is that every child instinctively seeks authorities to guide it into the world in which he is still a stranger, in

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which he cannot orient himself by his own judgment. To the extent that parents and teachers fail him as authorities, the child will conform more strongly to his own group, and under certain conditions the peer group will become his supreme authority. The result can only be a rise of mob and gang rule, as the news photograph we mentioned above so eloquently demonstrate. The conflict between a segregated home and a desegregated school, between family prejudice and school demands, abolishes at one stroke both the teachers' and the parents' authority, replacing it with the rule of public opinion among children who have neither the ability nor the right to establish a public opinion of their own.

Because the many different factors involved in public education can quickly be set to work at cross purposes, government intervention, even at its best, will always be rather controversial. Hence it seems highly questionable whether it was wise to begin enforcement of civil rights in a domain where no basic human and no basic political right is at stake, and where other rights—social and private—whose protection is no less vital, can so easily be hurt.

POLITICS AND THE REALMS OF BEING

David Spitz

Politics, as everyone knows, is the art of drawing distinctions. It involves, to be sure, the pursuit and use—as well as the misuse—of power; but we seek that power for the potential good, not the evil, that its possession affords. We do not, therefore, legislate on all things. Nor do we seek always to control the same things, irrespective of place and circumstance. Nor, again, do we endeavor to act blindly even in pursuit of the "right" things at the right time. As rational men, we try to employ our power wisely; we distinguish, we *discriminate,* between its beneficent and baneful applications.

So much can be said for any sensible theory of just or limited political power; and it is often said impressively. But the articulation of such general principles is the beginning, not the end, of political wisdom. For in this form, the principles are no more than guides to action; they tell us little or nothing of the substantive merits of any particular issue. It is the virtue of Hannah Arendt's reflections on segregation that they seek both to enunciate "right" general principles and to apply those principles in a "right" resolution of the most pressing and important domestic issue of our time. In these respects her argument moves on a level of discourse that raises significant theoretical as well as factual issues. Unfortunately, however, her notion of what constitutes a valid political principle, along with her recommended

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course of action, testifies more to her sense of misguided courage than it does to her power of insight.

I

Consider, first, what I understand to be her central principle: that a meaningful distinction must be drawn and maintained between the political, the social, and the private life; and that it is not the business of political power to invade the non-political—i.e., the social and the private—realms of being. This, of course, is closely akin to the argument of John Stuart Mill in his celebrated essay, *On Liberty*. There Mill sought to defend the claims of individual liberty by drawing a line between self-regarding and other-regarding acts, between those things, that is to say, which affect only the individual and those things which affect society. With respect to self-regarding acts, Mill argued, society is properly unconcerned; neither the state nor voluntary associations have a right to intervene in what are purely private affairs.

But this distinction, so plausible and appealing on its face, collapses as soon as we attempt to specify those acts which affect *only* the individual. Clearly there are none. Even education and marriage, which Miss Arendt, along with Mill, offers as illustrations of such self-regarding acts, prove on the most cursory examination to be issues of social concern. Societies have always established rules and imposed sanctions to govern sexual conduct and the promulgation and dissolution of marriages; and it would be curious, indeed, were Miss Arendt to argue (as I believe the logic of her position would require her to argue) that incest and the sexual relationship described in Vladimir Nabokov's *Lolita,* for example, are purely private matters. No doubt she could show that incest, at least, was not denied to the immediate descendants of Adam and Eve, or to Lot and his daughters; but I doubt that such an appeal to Scripture would carry much conviction. So, too, for education. Surely Miss Arendt cannot deny that education is the most social, as it is the most socializing, of human activities. And if she admits that the community has a legitimate stake in the intellectual development of its citizens, on what ground can she maintain that the give-and-take among students, the exchange of ideas and attitudes and interests that is central to such associations, is not relevant to this concern? Even Mill, who would not have the state *provide* a good education for its children, insisted that it is the obligation of the state to *require* that a good education be provided for every child.

It is clearly impossible to build a fence that can rationally divide human behavior into two compartments—one labeled social, the other individual. For human acts are not separable on such terms; always they belong to, because they directly or indirectly affect, *both* the individual and society. It is, in fact, not the action but the situation in which the action takes place that gives an act its true meaning. A man who is drunk at home presents an altogether different problem from a man who is drunk while driving an automobile or while (as Mill suggests) on sentry duty. Not the act of drunkenness, then, but the situation in which that drunkenness occurs, is crucial. If this is so, liberty cannot be taken by itself and defended on the naive ground that certain parts of a man's life do not affect, and are therefore properly outside the control of, society. We can argue for liberty only on the ground

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that certain liberties are essential to the well-being of society. Liberty is always social; and often, too, a particular liberty (e.g., my liberty to join a labor union) is in conflict with another (e.g., my employer's liberty to dismiss me from my job for having exercised that freedom). The problem of freedom, then, requires at the outset a reduction of liberty to a system of specific liberties and restraints, the latter entering to restrict those liberties which might otherwise impair the existence or free functioning of the liberties that are prized. Things are left free not because they don't affect society, but because society deems it socially advantageous for men in certain circumstances to be unrestrained.

Miss Arendt's attempt to proliferate Mill's artificial and false division by providing for three spheres of action seems to me only to compound Mill's difficulty. It is relatively easy, to be sure, to distinguish the state as a political association from voluntary groups that are non-governmental in character. It is also easy to derive as a corollary from this distinction certain liberties which the state must respect if such voluntary associations are to survive—e.g., the liberties of speech and of political association requisite to the existence of political parties, or the liberty of religious worship necessary to the life of churches and synagogues. But all such associations, and all such liberties are social. There is no such thing as society constituting a "somewhat hybrid realm between the political and the private." The political and the private are not distinct and separate entities; nor do they exist apart from society; they are intrinsically and inextricably a part of society. Society is the web of all human relationships; the political and the private are at most distinguishable, but not separable, strands within the greater fabric.

Unless, then, we are to appeal to a standard external to society itself—to God or to nature, for example (and Miss Arendt makes it clear that she does not mean to make such an appeal; despite her repeated references to "human rights," her appeal is to the Constitution, which is a socially established standard)—the applications of political power can only be socially determined. And what, in such terms, a democratic society giveth, such a society can (so long as it respects its own democratic principles) take away.

II

Scarcely less crucial to Miss Arendt's argument is her quite superficial notion of federalism, from which she derives her peculiar defense of states' rights. Miss Arendt contends, in terms that would gladden the heart of a John C. Calhoun, that federalism is a principle designed to divide rather than to unite peoples. This, of course, is partly true; for the genius of a federal system is that it brings together people who seek also in some respects to retain their differences. But federalism is also a principle that strives to unite people; it creates before everything else a state that is *national* rather than parochial in character, that represents the common rather than the dividing interests of its citizens; and what is common to them all, what constitutes their bond of unity, is the complex of values that is spelled out in the Constitution. It is these values that articulate the *meaning* of the federation; and among these values, in the American scheme of things, is the

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principle of equality no less than that of liberty. What is at issue, then, is not whether there shall be a federal or a unitary state—not whether an allegedly covetous (even imperialistic) nationalism shall destroy the virginal independence of our suddenly prim and scrupulous states—but whether we can resolve peacefully and rapidly a conflict of values within the idea of American federalism itself. We must choose between equality, a key value of the federation, and liberty, specifically the liberty to deny some citizens equality of educational opportunity.

Miss Arendt's reverent invocation of the South's ever-convenient communal ghost, states' rights, is in these terms an evasion of the issue. Her argument might, perhaps, have some relevance if she could show that our federal system rests on a fairly clear-cut division between two sets of geographical interests—one embodied in the national community and its government, the other represented by the constituent state or states and their respective communities. Then a conflict between them would pit two homogeneous groups against each other, with the triumph of the larger group quite possibly constituting that tyranny of the majority which the framers of the Constitution, and later Calhoun, so greatly feared and sought to forestall. But in the present situation the lines of division are altogether different. Both groups—national and state—are internally divided, and peculiarly so. For the majority within the national community is, on the issue of desegregation at least, united with minorities within the constituent communities; while the majority within the constituent states finds adherents only among a national minority. Thus, the conflict is not properly represented as one of nation versus states, and the issue is not that of preventing a tyranny of the majority. The conflict is rather one between national majority and national minority, *and* between local majority and local minority, but in that odd concatenation of forces which unites the majority in one place with the minority in another. In such circumstances, for the national majority to abstain from coercing the national minority is to permit the latter, in the form of a local majority, to coerce a local minority. For the national majority to coerce the national minority is to prevent a local majority from coercing a local minority. In both cases the rule of a majority is involved; it is only a question of which majority is to prevail. In both cases the tyranny of the majority is seemingly involved; but whether the dominant majority is actually tyrannical or not turns on whether it acts in accord with the principles of the Constitution or contrary to them. And on this question, whether we recognize the binding force of judicial interpretation or look to the logic of the democratic principle itself, the national majority is clearly in the right.

If we are not, then, to sacrifice a real social and constitutional interest to a fictional geographic interest, we must ignore the nonsense that is generally written and spoken in defense of states' rights. (It is interesting to note, parenthetically, that those who are most ardent in defense of states' rights rarely exhibit a similar tenderness toward local and individual rights; for while the leaders of the Southern states do not want the national government to interfere in their activities, they do not themselves hesitate to interfere in the activities of local communities. It was, after all, not the community of Little Rock but the state government, primarily in the person of

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Governor Faubus, which sought, initially at least, to oppose desegregation in the public schools. And it is primarily the leaders of the state governments —e.g., Governor Almond and Senator Byrd of Virginia, Governor Griffin and Senator Russell of Georgia—who are most vociferous in opposing such desegregation, even where their view on this matter runs counter to the wishes of a significant, if not a major, portion of the white citizens of localities within their states.)

III

We return, accordingly, to the real issue in the struggle before us: the choice between two constitutional values—liberty and equality. And here, once again, we are plagued at the outset by Miss Arendt's perverse use of both these terms. When she talks of equality, she talks primarily of equality of condition, and hardly at all of equality of educational opportunity. But these are clearly different; and by reversing the order of things, indeed, by dragging in the idea of equality of condition at all, Miss Arendt distorts and obfuscates the issue. No one, after all, seriously contends that what is pursued is absolute equality in all things—in talent, in wealth, in status, in power. In all societies differences, and hence inequalities, of some kind must always exist. What is sought is a rational basis for such differences. What is sought is that measure of equality of opportunity that will allow men, by starting the race on equal terms, to discover and to display their true worth. In the democratic tradition, men are afforded an equal opportunity in order that they may show in what respects they are truly unequal. Anything less than this is an argument for artificial, and therefore false, inequality. To invoke Tocqueville and other gods in support of her diatribe against absolute equality (i.e., equality of condition) is to misrepresent the issue at stake.

Miss Arendt also misrepresents what is involved in the immediate situation. No one argues that the democratic state (national or constituent) should compel its white citizens to treat its Negro citizens equally in all relationships at all times—to dine and dance and intermarry with them, for example—any more than it should compel any group of white citizens to treat other groups of white citizens in that way. The argument is that *the state should not itself treat white and Negro citizens unequally;* and, it must be added, that the state should not use its coercive powers to punish those of its white citizens who voluntarily wish to treat their Negro fellow-citizens equally. The argument is for the state, insofar as it distributes its own services, to be a neutral rather than a partisan power, to treat both sides fairly—i.e., equally —and not itself to be a discriminatory agent. The argument, further, is that where access to *public* facilities is concerned, the state should not abet that part of its citizenry which seeks to limit or to deny such access to others. The argument, finally, is that the state should not penalize those of its citizens who prefer—in what Miss Arendt would call the private and social realms—to deal with other citizens in a non-discriminatory way.

From this standpoint, desegregation in the public schools and in other public facilities does no more than remove the state as a discriminatory power. It does not compel parents (white or Negro) to send their children to schools where they will be required to associate with children they (or their parents)

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do not like. It does not, as Miss Arendt thinks, enforce integration. Parents are still free to send their children to private schools, whether denominational or military or otherwise. Parents are still free to discriminate as well in other ways. What desegregation requires is that *the state* shall not discriminate; that the state shall not prevent white and Negro students from associating with one another; that the state shall not compel white and Negro parents to send their children only to segregated schools. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Is this provision observed when a state makes it a crime for Negroes and whites to sit together in public conveyances, or to play together in public playgrounds, or to attend even private schools together, *when those Negroes and whites themselves want to do so?* Is it observed when a state makes it a crime for local school boards, in line with community sentiment, to operate their schools on a desegregated basis? Is the law neutral when it thus forestalls local or private action that seeks *not* to discriminate? (It is surely an odd notion of freedom, not to speak of human values, that Miss Arendt entertains when she argues in effect that the freedom to discriminate is more important than the freedom not to discriminate.) Is the law neutral when it places a double burden on those who seek desegregation, in that it forces such people both to win community support and to bring about a change in the law itself, whereas those who argue for continued segregation can pose as patriotic supporters of the law and have law both as physical coercion and as moral sanction on their side?

To answer these questions in the only way that democratic theory and constitutional principle permit, is to make clear that what desegregation requires is not the abolition of social discrimination but the abolition of legal enforcement of social discrimination, of discrimination by law. And this, I venture to suggest, is to ask no more than what Miss Arendt herself demands —the application rather than the abrogation of the Constitution. Surely Miss Arendt does not mean to plead for the continued punishment in the South of those Negroes who ask not that the Constitution be overthrown but that it should be enforced.

A WORD MUST BE ADDED on Miss Arendt's specious idea of freedom. In the literal or Hobbesian—and I would add proper—sense, liberty is the absence of chains, the absence of restraints on those things that a man wants, is able, and has the means at hand, to do. But liberty so conceived is precisely what no society can tolerate; for it is the very meaning of social order that some liberties shall be constrained in the service of other values—whether these be particular liberties that might otherwise be suppressed or the maintenance of order itself. No society permits its citizens the freedoms to steal, to maim, or to destroy other men through slander or physical violence. Hence, no man or group can claim an absolute freedom to do whatever he or it wants to do. And in the present situation, no democratic society can give legal sanction to those liberties which, if unrestrained, would enable some men (our white Southern citizens) effectively to suppress the constitutional liberties and rights of other (Negro) citizens.

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Liberty, that is to say, is not to be regarded as a given and permanent whole out of which, with each utterance, the law extracts a vital piece. Liberty is a complex and ever-changing system of liberties and restraints, in which law by restraining some men who would restrain others, guarantees to those others the enjoyment of certain prized freedoms. Law is often, in one sense perhaps always, a restraint. But it is a shallow view of law which neglects to add that law is often a restraint on a restraint. And it is on this latter function of the law that the issue of desegregation turns, complicated, alas, by the fact that two sets of laws are here involved. In the silence of the national law, the constituent state is free to enact laws that restrain Negroes from enjoying their constitutional rights and liberties, and that restrain even private citizens from *not* discriminating against them. And where this is actually done, as it is done in our Southern states today, national laws are required if some among our citizens are not to be thus arbitrarily and unconstitutionally deprived of their democratic rights and liberties.

Miss Arendt's contempt for something she calls "the mob," her solicitude for "natural inequality," her concern for the values of diversity, lead her (incredibly) to advance an argument that sanctions the liberty to deny constitutional liberties, the liberty of whites to deny constitutional liberties to Negroes. But it is a strange conception of the mob that identifies it in the North with the protection of democratic rights, and in the South with the suppression of those rights. It is a strange plea for natural inequality that ignores the realities of human existence in the South, realities that make it impossible to judge whether the inequalities that actually exist are the result of natural differences or of artificial privileges. Indeed, the fact that artificial privileges are so grimly maintained lends force to the suspicion that those who maintain them do so out of fear; for to remove those artificial barriers might well demonstrate that men who are now at the top are there because of those artificial barriers and not for reasons of intrinsic superiority. And it is a most strange concern for diversity that leads, in effect, to a position that defends the continuation of a near caste-like system, one that institutionalizes differences between races but precludes or renders extraordinarily difficult the possibility of differences across races.

What Miss Arendt seems to miss here is that equality of opportunity, far from assuring equality of condition, is the indispensable principle for eliciting true inequality of condition. It may be true, as she contends, that the greater the degree of equality, the greater the resentment of difference. But if this is true at all (which I doubt), it can only be so in that non-existent world where democratic equality is defined as absolute equality of condition. However, this is precisely the sense in which Americans (and democrats generally) have always refused to define it. Where equality is properly viewed as equality of citizenship and of opportunity, and where the liberties necessary to such equalities—e.g., liberties of speech and of political association—are assured, difference is respected rather than denied. Miss Arendt might well consider in this connection the somewhat ridiculous spectacle of a Frank Lloyd Wright who berates "the mob" for its alleged innate inability to recognize and respect distinction at the very moment that it honors him and his achievements.

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IV

Of Miss Arendt's other points, two—her insistence that racial problems are not restricted to the states of the American South and her indictment of Southern parents who force their children onto a battleground created and maintained but not always manned by the adults—are too obvious, and obviously correct, to require more than repetition here. But a third point merits some attention. This is her view that Southern laws against miscegenation and not laws denying equal access to schools and other public facilities are the first order of business.

I would agree without cavil that laws prohibiting the intermarriage of peoples of different racial stocks are evil, and outrageously so. I do not know by what standard one can say that such laws constitute a greater or a lesser evil than many other laws which humiliate and debase people on the pretense that they are intrinsically inferior beings. But suppose we grant, for the sake of her argument, that in the hierarchy of human values anti-miscegenation laws are of primary, and segregation laws are of secondary, importance. What is the *political* relevance of this ranking of issues?

I believe the answer is, none. For one thing, it is no vindication of an evil to say that it is not as great as another. For another, in the political as distinct from the philosophical arena, it is the wiser act of statesmanship to address oneself to the realm of the possible. And surely what is today possible, and what is today sought *first* by those who are oppressed, is not the right to be accepted as a brother-in-law but as a brother.

Miss Arendt dismisses this desire by cavalierly observing that "oppressed minorities were never the best judges on the order of priorities in such matters." She insists that "the order of priorities in the question of rights is to be determined by the Constitution, and not by public opinion or by majorities." Now, as one who has had occasionally to read the Constitution, I am not aware of any provision in that document concerning marriage, and certainly none that proclaims as a paramount right the freedom to marry whom one pleases. If, then, there is an order of priority in rights, it must come from a source other than the Constitution, in this case from Miss Arendt herself. Then if we concern ourselves, as I think we must, with the order of *political* priorities, the issue is between the judgment of public opinion or of majorities (in this case of the Negro people) and that of Miss Arendt.

Now, I think it is not unfair to say that Miss Arendt is convinced that she knows better than the Negro people what is good for them. In this as in her other writings, Miss Arendt has always sought to dissociate herself from the masses of the people. She is an aristocrat, not a democrat, at heart. She is also, as she admits, an outsider, in the sense that as a European she finds herself unable even *to understand* "the common prejudices of Americans in this area." Nevertheless, she does not question the superiority of her own practical judgment to the judgment of those who are themselves involved. Nor does she pause to reflect that her acknowledged inability to understand may have the effect of misleading her terribly here.

For politics, once again, is the art of drawing distinctions. And in the attempt to resolve political (including racial) conflicts, we must carefully dis-

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tinguish what it is possible to obtain *now,* and what sources of public support we can marshal. To fight *now,* as a matter of first principle, for the repeal of anti-miscegenation laws is, I believe, to give strength to the very contention that is most frequently, and by all accounts most tellingly, employed by those who resist the repeal of segregation laws—namely, the contention that this is but a device to promote sexual intercourse among the races. White men even in the North who agree to work together with Negroes in factories and in offices still resist attempts by the latter to move into white residential neighborhoods; and if we are to bring Southern white citizens to accept what they regard as a more far-reaching personal association growing out of desegregation in the public schools, it will be, in part, because they accept the argument that intimate sexual relations between the races are no necessary consequence of this. There is, consequently, no surer way to prevent acceptance of the principle of equal educational opportunity for the Negro in the South than to push the issue of miscegenation into the forefront at this time.

The Negroes, if not Miss Arendt, know this. Quite properly, therefore, they concentrate on those ends that are politically attainable. And since, for the vast bulk of the Negro people, intermarriage with whites (intrinsically important though this as a right may be) is just about the last of their pressing concerns, the achievement of an immediate important gain is preferable by far to the loss even of that possibility in the vain pursuit of Miss Arendt's Holy Grail.

V

In her preliminary remarks, Miss Arendt avows her sympathy for the Negro and her abhorrence of racial discrimination. In all that I have said, I do not mean to be taken as implying any skepticism of this claim. I criticize her basic position, her arguments, and the consequences to which these lead; I do not for a moment question her motives or intention.

In one respect, too, I would add my voice to Miss Arendt's plea. There are dangers in excessive governmental control. There is the possibility that through rash action we may disrupt the bonds of community, the grounds of consensus, that make possible the perpetuation of the Union. Hence, some caution, some moderation, must be employed in the resolution of this, as of every, great issue.

But there are dangers, too, in not doing enough. There is the possibility that while we delay, private groups and state government will continue so to subvert those same bonds of community as to destroy the Union from within. I think it is time for us to recognize that a good portion of the American South has in fact seceded from the Union; indeed, by choosing to close some of their public schools to all students rather than admit students of another race, they have made clear their intention to secede not merely from the country but from civilization itself. Despite the nearly 100 years since the waging of the Civil War, many of the articulate spokesmen of the South have not progressed very far in their political thinking and their social attitudes: they have not advanced in their humanity. They seek to remain primitives,

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and if they are given their way they may well drown the country in that torrent of barbarism which is a continuing affront to democracy and to mankind. In this respect the South is America's greatest and most dangerous liability. It is also a liability to the world. If we are to overcome this liability, we will require not merely the good will of gentle people but an unrelenting pursuit in all the realms of man's being—political, economic, intellectual—for the implementation of constitutional rights for all our citizens. We must move, no doubt, as the Supreme Court urged, with all deliberate speed. But what is frightening, in the years since *Brown v. Board of Education,* let alone the century since the Civil War, is that in seeking to be deliberate we have made very little speed.

More than 125 years ago, Alexis de Tocqueville concluded the first volume of his *Democracy in America* by predicting that the great problem of the American future would be the reconciliation of the races. It does no honor to the American to reflect that were a Tocqueville to write this book today, he would have to conclude with a near-identical observation. Miss Arendt is wise to remind us of the gravity and complexity of the problem. But her understanding of that problem, and her suggested course of action, seem neither relevant nor opportune.

PIE IN THE SKY...

Melvin Tumin

At first one thinks, this is a horrible joke. Could such an article have been written by Hannah Arendt, the author of the book on totalitarianism? So one then looks for the obvious clues one has missed, the clues which will reveal the convoluted level of irony on which the argument was deliberately put. But those clues are not there. And finally one is led unmistakably to the conclusion that the argument is meant just as it is stated, with all its metaphysical mumbo jumbo, all its disregard for basic facts of sociology and history. It is all there, incredibly arguing that further desegregation of the schools can only cause trouble, most of all to Negroes. Why? Because, says Arendt,

> the more equal people have become in every respect, and the more equality permeates the whole texture of society, the more will differences [all differences? any differences?] be resented, the more conspicuous will those become who are visibly and by nature unlike the others.

There it is. The more equal people become, the less equal, because the remaining inequalities, no matter how small, take on much more psychological meaning than ever before. The nightmare world of Orwell's Animal Farm has been brought into being. And this, Arendt assures us, is not some ghoulish fantasy, but rather, a condition which is "well known to students

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of history." Nor is it only a matter of small likelihood. It is rather, our author assures us, a danger point which invariably emerges.

How likely is it that this danger will materialize? Let Arendt tell us herself:

> It is therefore quite possible that the achievement of social, economic and educational equality for the Negro may sharpen the color problem in this country instead of assuaging it. This of course does not *have* to happen [Gott sei Dank] *but it would be only natural if it did, and it would be very surprising if it did not.* [My emphasis: MT]

What then should we do? The conclusion would seem obvious. Let all of us who care the least bit about what happens to Negroes and to our country, let us all immediately declare a moratorium on any action which might produce further equality. Indeed, if the logic of the argument were to prevail, we should all immediately work to reverse the trends of the last two decades, and get back quickly to some condition of more widespread inequality so that we keep as far away from that ominous and highly probable danger as possible.

But no, Miss Arendt will not come along with us on this retroactive historical journey. Instead, either out of timidity before her own ideas, or out of a reflective recoil from the sense of what she has advocated, we are told that any further government intervention ought to be guided by "caution and moderation rather than by impatience and ill-advised measures." After all those hurricane warnings, all those ominous massings of portentous black clouds, out comes this tremulous and timorous pipsqueak of a conclusion.

WHAT IS ALL THIS, anyway? Why only caution our government to be well-advised and patient? Is it because by some new Arendt-type logic, it is better to reach crises slowly and patiently rather than quickly and impatiently? But why reach them at all? Why not simply reverse the "happy" trend of the last fifteen years? And by what token can Arendt possibly hold the equalization of the past years to be a happy trend?

Miss Arendt appears simply to have run out of nerve. For there are no two ways about it. If equality produces these disastrous events, then there is nothing to be done but to call an immediate halt to desegregation of any type, restore law and order, and denounce as enemies both of the Negro, and of the country as a whole, all those misguided persons who persist in bringing a crisis upon us by their advocacy of equality.

Yet the puzzle remains. Why the utterly incongruous conclusion? Could it be that Miss Arendt had a moment of revelation, during which there appeared to her the truth of what scientific research has shown over and over in the past twenty years, namely, that Negroes and Whites manage best to live in peace with each other and with respect for each other when they view each other as peers, and at relatively high levels of status?

But one has to doubt that Miss Arendt could have such a revelation. For this would require some sympathetic concord between one's intuition-receiving apparatus, and the wave frequency on which such research revelations are broadcast. And for these vibrations, of evidence and proof, Miss Arendt reveals no affinity whatsoever.

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The puzzle remains, and will have to remain, unsolved. Just credit Miss Arendt with a self-destroying contradiction in the central portion of her argument, and let the matter go at that.

But the question nags. How could she have written this? Granted her moral convictions, about which she assures us. Granted her sympathy with the Negro. Granted her self-imposed special responsibilities in virtue of being a Jew.

What of her *intellectual* version of the Negro as a human being? The moment this question is brought out into the open, certain phrases, which slipped by one's attention, now demand that they be read and re-read with care. Phrases such as "natural, physical characteristics," "those who are visibly and by nature unlike the other," and "what by nature and origin is different." All of these refer to the Negro. They are the qualities with which the equalization process must deal. Can these be eradicated?

On one page:

> In its all-comprehensive typically American form, equality possesses an enormous power to equalize what by nature and origin is different.

Four lines later:

> But the principle of equality, even in its American form, is not omnipotent; it cannot equalize natural, physical characteristics.

Six lines later:

> . . . The more conspicuous will those become who are visibly and by nature unlike the others.

Miss Arendt is obviously of three minds on the subject of the differences between Negroes and Whites. Nor is her tri-valence trivial. For we see clearly the reasons for the shift in attitude. In the first instance, it is American equality which needs to be exaggerated and burlesqued, because it is American. But then America has to be put in its place. Because there is an Arendt-type force which even America can't beat, the force of her conviction and that, I must add, of many Southerners, that the differences between Negroes and Whites are ineradicable.

Which differences? As some Southern Whites view the matter, the ineradicable differences are in character, intelligence, morality, ambition, responsibility, passion, etc. Moreover, these are tied to the same genes which give the *stereotypal* Negro his kinky hair, pitch black skin, dolichocephalic skull, and everted lips. The Negro is what he is because he is Negro and nothing we can do can ever change that. So goes the hard-bitten Southern type of argument.

Surely Miss Arendt can't mean the same thing, at least not all of the same things. But why then remind us time and time again that there are some things that even American-style equality can't equalize? Does she mean only that the visible black skin color can't be altered? *But that's not true either.* A little touch of miscegenation or of that intermarriage of which Miss Arendt is such an ardent champion, will take care of the visible differences too.

But assuming no miscegenation and no marriage between Whites and

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Negroes. Then, today's visible, superficial differences persist. Granted. Does this mean that these unavoidably persist as pegs on which social discriminations are hung? Minimal respect for the facts calls for us to consider the contrary cases of Hawaii, Brazil, Mexico, France and Puerto Rico. There, differences are more ubiquitous, sometimes more startling: that is, physical differences. But where are the unavoidable correlatives in bitter social relations?

The best with which we can credit Miss Arendt in this context is ignorance.

What, then, of her theory of rights and her priorities of morality? Again, we quote Miss Arendt:

> The right to marry whomever one wishes is an elementary human right compared to which the 'right to attend an integrated school, the right to sit where one pleases on a bus, the right to go into any hotel or recreation area or place of amusement, regardless of one's skin color or race' are minor indeed. Even political rights, like the right to vote, and nearly all other rights [why only nearly all others? why not all others? which ones not?] enumerated in the Constitution, are secondary to the inalienable human rights to 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness' proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence; and to this category the right to home and marriage unquestionably belongs.

More still:

> . . . Oppressed minorities were never the best judges on the order of priorities in such matters, and there are many instances when they preferred to fight for social opportunity rather than for basic human or political rights.

Poor, unenlightened Negroes, for whom Miss A. feels such sympathy! How misguided of them to press for equality of opportunity on jobs, housing, health, voting, and all these other trivia, instead of wising up to their own best interests and demanding the repeal of the laws against intermarriage! And how doubly unenlightened and misguided are Negroes in those states where there are no laws against intermarriage! For here with the road wide open and no legal barriers, they have refused to take advantage of this glorious opportunity. The NAACP clearly has an immediate and urgent responsibility to call meetings of Negroes all over the United States so that Miss Arendt could explain to them why they ought to stop fighting for equality, in general, and why, if they are going to work on anything, it ought to be on intermarriage. That would really be a masterful piece of adult education.

And how curiously Miss A. reads the newspapers and diagnoses the trends! Now, we are told, parents are foisting on to children the problem of desegregation, a problem they have "for generations . . . confessed themselves unable to solve."

But every decent reporter who has visited the South and talked with school children reports that the children are far more ready and able than their parents to work side by side with Negroes, and share their common school facilities. This is precisely the basic source of optimism in the whole picture! What Miss A. finds to be a cruel dumping of a problem on tender children turns out to be instead a process which even segregationists recog-

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nize, and hence fight bitterly, namely, that school children can get on together much better than their parents, and that if their parents let them alone, they will work out ways of working and living together in the schools. Above all, the authorities must help, at a minimum, by not inviting crude and naked violence to come in off the streets and take over the school rooms and hallways.

Miss A. trembles at the idea that if the schools are desegregated and the homes segregated then, at one stroke, the authority of both the teachers and parents is abolished, replacing it with "the role of public opinion among children who have neither the ability nor the right to establish a public opinion of their own." (See Dwight Macdonald's pieces on teen-age public opinion in November 22 and 29 *New Yorker!)*

But every known system of education in the world, if it is worth a penny of the money spent on it, promotes conflict between home and school. For if the schools were no more than the loci of moral catechisms repeated in unison with those recited in the home, where and how would any society in the world ever have gotten off the ground on which it originally was founded? Where is the evidence that ever since the existence of the school systems, the authority of parents and teachers have been abolished at one fell swoop because they have been at odds with each other? Where are all the hundreds of millions of little mob gangsters of whom Miss A. speaks so threateningly, and all of them, miraculously, caught in that one photograph of one ugly, sick White girl from Little Rock?

IT IS STRANGE, too, that Miss A. should use public opinion polls to inform herself regarding Southern attitudes. But not strange that in so doing she should use among the worst polls and misinterpret them through exaggeration. We are told by Miss A. that the results of a public opinion poll in Virginia showed that 79 per cent of the persons denied an obligation to accept the Supreme Court decision as binding. *From this she concludes that 79 per cent of the people of Virginia believe in mob rule!* Her words: "the proportion of people who prefer mob rule to law-abiding citizenship. The so-called liberals and moderates of the South are simply those who are law-abiding, and they have dwindled to a minority of 21 per cent."

How does one possibly equate the statement that one does not feel an obligation to accept the Supreme Court rule as binding with the statement that one prefers mob rule to law abidingness? Is Miss A. totally unaware of the fact that a large majority of persons in the South would no more engage in mob rule than would she? It would be hard to find more severe criticism and rejection of the Supreme Court's decision than Miss A. herself expresses. Are we to infer from that that she prefers mob rule to law abidingness?

And may I immodestly refer Miss A. to my own study of desegregation in North Carolina, where about the same per cent of the people as in Virginia advocated a constitutional reform or amendment to reduce the power of the Supreme Court, but less than 25 per cent said they would be willing to use force if necessary to keep the schools segregated?

This misunderstanding and exaggeration of the findings of public opinion polls is carried on in true Arendt style in the next paragraph. For there

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we are told that even prior to the arrival of Federal troops, "law-abiding Southerners had decided that enforcement of the law against mob rule and protection of children against adult mobsters *were none of their business.* In other words, the arrival of troops did no more than change passive into massive resistance."

Miss A. obviously knows little or nothing about what actually happened in Little Rock and cares even less truly to understand the troublesome events. For a woman who has experienced fascism as thoroughly and as bitterly as Miss A., the failure to understand the impotence of respectable middle class people in the face of naked violence in the streets is simply unforgivable.

Moreover, does Miss A. know anything about the pain and the shame which apparently thousands of decent people in Little Rock felt at the violence committed against the Negroes and schools? Does she know anything of the courageous fight which numerous people in Little Rock, in Norfolk and points South and East have waged, against the most bitter of hostilities? How appalling indeed of Miss A. to ignore the most courageous people in the nation—excepting, always, the Negro school children of Little Rock—in the interest of shoring up her decrepit metaphysics with even more decrepit non-facts.

JUST WHAT, after all, does Miss A. mean to tell us? Surely we are not expected to take her distinctions between the public and private domains of life seriously, at least not when they lead her where she has gone with them. Surely not when they produce a remark such as "While the Government has no right to interfere with the prejudices and discriminatory practices of society, it has not only the right but the duty to make sure that these practices are not legally enforced." For what can this mean? Suppose a Negro is refused lodging in a hotel or food in a restaurant. Suppose he refuses to leave when told to. Suppose a policeman is called, and the Negro is ejected and beaten—or just ejected, just plain thrown out by a policeman. How then shall the government see to it that it does not "interfere with the prejudices and discriminatory practices of society" and at the same time exercise its right and "duty to make sure that these practices are not legally enforced?" How does one work that bit of magic? No, then, we cannot take Miss A.'s conception of the separate terrains and dominions of society seriously. They lead to conclusions which simply defy elementary logic and human decency.

What, then, is she up to? Does she merely want to warn us that injudicious exercise of government power, at the wrong time, and some nine months too late, and with no previous preparation of the groundwork is not likely to be very effective and may even make the problem worse? For that we don't need all the rest. We too can read the newspapers.

If not that warning, then what? That, as in education, tradition and authority have been eliminated and hence we are having all the troubles we now confront? Not that surely. For here, Miss A. would have to agree, tradition and authority *make* the problems.

Surely this cannot be an article on educational theory. For then we would have to take stock of such comments as "The only public force that

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can fight social prejudice is the churches," or, another statement, to the effect that the states' rights to prescribe minimum requirements for future citizenship involve

> only the content of the child's education, not the context of association and social life which invariably develops out of his attendance at school, otherwise one would have to challenge the right of the private schools to exist.

Or, again:

> To force parents to send children to an integrated school against their will means to deprive them of rights which clearly belong to them in all free societies—the private right over the children and the social right to free association.

But doesn't Miss A., obviously a great partisan of private schools, know that parents may send their children to private schools if they wish? They don't have to send them to integrated public schools. And if they can't afford private schools? Ah, how sad indeed. For what then, one wishes to whisper, what then of Negro children and *their* parents and *their* rights? Where in the fabric of Miss A.'s minimum government do these rights get respected and protested?

No, the article is about none of these. Or at least Miss A. would do well to deny that she meant these to be the main theses. What the article really wishes to say is said succinctly, clearly and unmistakably, finally, in the last sentence. There we read:

> Hence it seems highly questionable whether it was wise to begin enforcement of civil rights in a domain (e.g., public education) where no basic human and no political right is at stake, and where other rights—social and private —whose protection is no less vital, can so easily be hurt.

This is what Miss Arendt means. Sad, dreadful, incredible, but there it is. We are back, full circle, at that point where self-anointed Pastors of the Spirit, now in secular disguise, feel it their moral obligation to tell us peasants, the crude and ignorant and untutored ones, that all this earthly struggle is in vain; that it is eternal salvation and damnation we must worry about, and not what happens to us here, in this brief moment of earthly existence.

Pie in the sky when we die? That's a lie!

Shining Progress in China Dept.

"The youth newspaper Chungkuo Tsingnien Pao of Oct. 1 reported that workers in a Peiping warehouse had [agreed to drop piece work for a fixed wage lowering their pay] after a protracted debate during which they had come to realize that to labor only for money, food and clothing was too narrow-minded and selfish...

"The paper said that the Peiping warehousemen had agreed to a much lower fixed wage than they had previously received and had abandoned the bourgeois concept of legal rights characterized by haggling for less work but more pay."—*New York Times,* November 12, 1958.

The "bourgeois concept," that is, which has been the basis of every free labor organization in modern society.

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Below we bring together three brief notices of valuable studies of American society. Because these books have been done as academic studies, they have not received as much attention as they should. We hope that these pieces will persuade some of our readers to turn to these books which offer important material for an intelligent and critical understanding of American life today. In our next issue, Maurice Stein will discuss another work of this kind, Vidich and Bensman's Small Town in Mass Society.—ED.

THE PROFESSOR AS COMMODITY

Lewis Coser

In the nineteenth century the academic man was shielded, at least in part, from the general transformation of labor into a commodity. In our own time, as professors Caplow and McGee demonstrate in their valuable and informative study,* the academician tends increasingly to be treated as a commodity sold on the market—not this alone, to be sure, but still a commodity sold after much haggling and with impressive ceremonial and ritual accomplishments, though not necessarily in accordance with its use value.

The change is a striking one. Academicians of the past would have been repelled by the very title of this book, but few today would even understand the reasons for such a response. Much more than ever in the past, if we may trust the evidence accumulated by Caplow and McGee, the academy has become a marketplace in which the motives of pecuniary emulation (to use Veblen's apt phrase) are often as dominant as in other American institutions.

"There is very little point," write Caplow and McGee, "in trying to determine how good the man *really* is [when a professor is being considered for appointment] . . . What is important is what others in the discipline think of him, since that is, in large part, how good he *is*. Prestige . . . is not a direct measure of productivity but a composite of subjective opinion."

The exchange value of the professor is established not through on-the-job performance, through his contributions to the educational life of the university. What matters is not the way a man teaches, but his reputation among the cliques that determine marketability of particular individuals within a particular academic discipline.

Publication and research—I am still summarizing the conclusions of our

* *The Academic Marketplace,* by Theodore Caplow and Reece J. McGee. Basic Books. New York. 1958. 262 pp. $4.95.

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authors—are of the essence here, not teaching. Hence the paradox that "although in most occupations men are judged by how well they perform their normal duties, the academic man is judged almost exclusively by his performance in a kind of part-time voluntary job which he creates for himself . . . It is only a slight exaggeration to say that academic success is likely to come to the man who has learned to neglect his assigned duties in order to have more time and energy to pursue his private professional interests."

MUCH OF WHAT I have summarized so far seems clearly in accord with what we all know about contemporary academic life; but some of it is a little overdrawn. Caplow and McGee go astray, for example, in their counterposing of teaching and research. The university, as distinct from the college, has traditionally been considered an institution where research as well as teaching are to be part of the scholar's task. Writing and research are not merely "private professional interests" (to use the phrase of Caplow and McGee) but an integral part, at least in terms of formal claims, of university life. For the university is, or should be, a center of learning as well as of teaching.

It is a mistake, therefore, to apply standards appropriate to colleges in a study where the sampling of institutions investigated by the authors comes primarily from major universities. To say this, of course, is not to deny the fact that there has recently been a severe overemphasis upon publishing; in fact, an overemphasis that has become a kind of academic disease. And this, surely, is one reason for the fact that much being published today by American professors is written not because of a genuine concern with an intellectual or scholarly problem but because of the need to further academic careers.

In most occupations a person's devotion and loyalty to the institution in which he serves is likely to bring him prestige and esteem. This is not so in major American universities. Too deep an involvement with the institution in which he teaches is likely to alienate a man from his professional discipline and its decisive coteries. A career within one institution is likely to impede future mobility, hence to decrease the market value of the academician. A commodity needs to circulate in order to accrue in exchange value. The successful man must constantly be on display in the market place; he must publish or he will perish. Prestige is measured, in part, by the number of citations one receives from the authors, yet the number of citations is in part a consequence of high prestige—and such prestige is likely to come to those who are constantly in the eyes of their colleagues on the national marketplace.

The authors studied the procedures for terminations and replacements of faculty members in the liberal arts, in nine major private and public universities, and they interviewed department chairmen and members of departments in all the ranks. They found that in the hiring process, given the gap between officially stated qualifications and criteria of evaluation actually applied, all sorts of extraneous, often quite whimsical reasons, finally decide the outcome. They came upon some wondrous explanations: "He played the recorder. That was the reason we hired him," says one respondent. Interviewer: "Because he played the recorder?" "Yes, we thought that

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would be nice." Or: "He started in the Eighteenth century and was working backwards. There were some others in the same period, but their direction of thought was forward, not back, and they'll run into the modern period where everyone has plenty of people." Or: "He had to have a good background.... Good social person, nice person, happily married. Those last two are important; you let some shit in, or someone with marital problems, Christ knows what will happen..."

Personality has high market value in the academy. A personable man with many publications and the right affiliations is well nigh irresistible as a market leader. Teaching experience, difficult to assess in any case, is given most limited consideration; the number of publications rather than the quality, as well as the departments in which the applicant was trained and in which he has subsequently taught, are decisive. Brilliance, if unaccompanied by the accepted evidence of his usefulness in increasing the prestige of the department, can become a threat to his colleagues: "By suggesting that prestige without production is possible, he introduces alien criteria."

MUCH OF WHAT this volume documents in precise detail Veblen already knew some fifty years ago when he wrote in *The Higher Learning in America:* "Common notoriety is the due test of eminence which the competitive university must apply in the selection of its notables... it is, of course, the standing of the incumbents in point of common notoriety that must chiefly be had in view in any strict valuation of them for purposes of academic prestige."

In this respect things have hardly changed. But Veblen could still ascribe the vices of the academy to the domination of businessmen over universities and their staff of scholars. This book documents something much more perturbing: the self-rationalization, the self-commercialization of the academic man. The orgmen are sometimes condescendingly studied by the academicians, but in the meantime their standards have invaded the academy.

The authors have accomplished their assigned task in a superb manner—we have been able to mention here only a very few of their startling findings—yet, as Jacques Barzun remarks in his foreword, they have been unwilling to discuss the cultural conditions in which the academy functions today, and they have thereby kept themselves from assuming the role and responsibility of the critic. The book has a strenuously academic quality in that it adheres most scrupulously to the criteria of academic compartmentalizaiton. By some self-denying ordinance the authors have avoided any critical comments about the cultural and institutional context.

In his classic description of alienation Marx wrote:

"In what does this alienation of labor consist? First that the work is *external* to the worker, that it is not part of his nature, that consequently he does not fulfill himself in his work but denies himself, has a feeling of misery not of well-being, does not develop freely a physical and mental energy, but is physically exhausted and mentally debased. The worker therefore feels at home only during his leisure, whereas at work he feels homeless."

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This applied to the factory worker in Marx's time, it did not apply to the scholar. The authors have shown that by now the process of alienation has penetrated even those spiritual sanctuaries in which spontaneous and joyful productivity, though not it alone, was valued. That they don't ask themselves what consequences this is likely to have for the general state of our mental life seems as disturbing as—indeed a symptom of—the phenomena they describe. To close a survey of this nature with some innocuous recommendations about more orderly assignments of teaching loads, regularized procedures for promotion and the like, reveals a failure of the critical intelligence as well as of the moral imagination.

GORILLAS... AND REAL HE-MEN

Murray Hausknecht

Our society prides itself on the fact that the concentration camp remains a thing apart, a distinctive feature of totalitarian society. We have prisons, of course, but the prisoner is usually protected from starvation, unrestrained brutality, and pitiless economic explotation. But while the prison is not deliberately organized to destroy the prisoner's sense of humanity, simply by being a place in which men are denied their liberty it comes uncomfortably close to achieving the same ends as the concentration camp.

Professor Gresham Sykes of Princeton University makes clear in a recent study of an American prison that focusing on the recent gains in raising the material conditions of prisoners is to miss the critical experience of imprisonment.* For even if the prisoner is more or less adequately fed and housed he still exists in a state of deprivation. Some of the deprivations are obvious: The largest cells in the New Jersey State Prison are 15 feet long, 7½ feet wide, and 10 feet high. A prison is a one sex society, but the crucial consequence is not so much the sheer biological frustration or the guilt that results from succumbing to the numerous perversions that are a common feature of prison life. A heterosexual relationship is usually necessary for maintaining one's self image; in prison, writes Sykes, "the inmate's self image is in danger of becoming . . . fractured, a monochrome without the hues of reality." It is in terms of the damage to the individual's identity that the deprivations are significant.

A PRISON is a bureaucracy designed for total control of the inmate's life. It is somewhat worse than other bureaucracies in that all power, in formal terms, lies with the guards, and the prison administration is strongly motivated to maintain total control in or-

* *The Society of Captives: A Study of a Maximum Security Prison*, by Gresham M. Sykes. Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, N.J. 1958. $3.75.

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der to prevent escapes which inevitably bring public censure for "inefficiency." Maintenance of custody is so important that the goal of "rehabilitation," supposedly a prime function of the prison, is not only subordinated to it but serves as a rationalization for the strictest bureaucratic regimentation of the prisoner.

For example, the warden of the New Jersey prison which formed the main basis of Sykes' valuable study, states that strict enforcement of the rules is more important for rehabilitation than the traditional means of education, psychological treatment, etc., because adherence to these regulations inevitably helps the individual to direct his behavior into socially approved channels. Under this kind of regime the individual's image of himself as an adult is jeopardized by the attempt to control his every action as if he were a child.

But while the modern parent explains his rules to the child, the prisoner is deprived of even this comfort: Explanations of rules "are often deliberately withheld as a matter of calculated policy. Providing explanations carries an implication that those who are ruled have a right to know," and this supposition would endanger the guards' belief in the legitimacy of their own power. Yet, like other bureaucracies, the formal presuppositions are contradicted by reality. The prison as a social system, Sykes shows, can maintain internal order only so long as power is shared with the inmate community.

THERE ARE two main ways in which the inmates adapt to the deprivations. The first is essentially "individualistic," and consists of a range of roles. These, in the prison argot, include the "rat," an informer; the "gorillas" and "merchants," who apply to their fellow prisoners the tactics of the hoodlum and racketeer; the "wolves" and "punks," the homosexuals and their victims; the "ball buster," who attempts to maintain his human dignity through individual revolt and intransigence. The "ball buster" is disapproved of by the prisoners since he tends to provoke the guards into repressive measures against everyone.

The second adaptation takes as its ideal the "real man," the individual who "endures" by maintaining his identity through fortitude and icy self-control. The "real man" is oriented to cooperation with the other prisoners, and, therefore, tends to promote group solidarity. This, in turn, gives each prisoner a measure of support in the fight to maintain his ego. But, reports Sykes, this ideal serves to support the prison *status quo*. From the point of view of the guards, the "real man" is "cooperative," since, unlike the "ball buster" his hostility is not overtly expressed; does not create disorder by preying upon his fellows; and is an advocate of the benefits of "getting along by playing it cool."

THIS GROUP, therefore, tends to be favored by the guards, and a system arises of institutionalized evasions of the formal rules. In effect, there is an informal compact between guards and prisoners: the guards ignore violations of certain regulations in return for the prisoners' cooperation in maintaining order. This "corruption" of the guards eventually grows to the point where both guards *and* prisoners are running the prison. Thus, at a loss of dignity, the prisoners gain a measure of autonomy.

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But this uneasy truce can continue only as long as the reality can be ignored. Eventually it must be acknowledged—a disgruntled guard talks to a newspaperman; an attempted escape frightens the administration—and the system is "tightened up" once more by a reimposition of the formal bureaucratic discipline. Inmate leaders who advocate "cooperation" lose their influence; with their loss of influence group solidarity dissolves; it becomes increasingly difficult to withstand the "gorillas" and the "wolves"; individuals become more vulnerable to the "pains of imprisonment"—in short, tensions mount and the stage is set for a prison riot.

As Sykes describes them, prison riots are violent and destructive. Yet they also seem a last despairing way in which the prisoner, living under conditions which deny his humanity, attempts to communicate to the rest of the society what one articulate "ball buster" shouted to his guards: " 'I'm a man, to you, to you, to you, and to the warden out there in Front House and to everyone in this institution and in this world, I'm a man.' "

THE COST OF MENTAL CARE

Rose Laub Coser

"A Society that can afford atomic bombs can afford some good psychiatry," say the authors in their conclusions to this book,* after documenting in impressive detail that at present American society provides scandalously poor psychiatric care to the majority of lower-class patients.

This collaborative work by a sociologist and a psychiatrist is of great import for students of mental illness as well as for students of society. Highly competent in its scientific method, it is both brilliant and courageous in the analysis of data. The authors report on the relation between mental illness and class position on the basis of a large-scale research on the social structure of a community, the psychiatric patients of this community, the institutions where they are cared for and the psychiatrists treating them.

It is, of course, hardly news that because of prohibitive costs lower-class patients do not receive the same amount and quality of medical care as upper-class patients. But what is more important is that even where lower-class patients do spend the same amount of money, they receive less care, and a different type of care, than the upper-class patients.

The problems raised by this study are: (a) Is there greater susceptibility to mental illness in the lower class? (b) Are patients in different classes given different types of treatment? (c) Do lower-class patients receive a different type of treatment regardless of their ability to pay?

* *Social Class and Mental Illness,* by August B. Hollingshead & Fredrick C. Redlich. New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1958, 442 pp., $7.50.

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On the basis of a division of the New Haven population into 5 classes —according to criteria of residence, occupation and education—it was found that, while the rate of mental illness for classes I and II, i.e., for the two upper classes, is 556 per 100,000 of the population, it is 642 in class IV and as high as 1,659 in class V, the lowest class.

This significant class difference in the prevalence of mental illness leaves one to wonder whether low-class patients fall ill (or are defined, by their relatives and ther community, as being mentally ill) in significantly greater number than upper-class patients, or whether they are kept ill for longer periods of time? In other words, the differential rates might indicate a higher incidence of illness among the poor, or they might suggest that the latter are being kept in care for many years, thus allowing an increase in number over the years for lack of remission of symptoms. This question can best be answered after comparing the proportion of patients in each class who are admitted to hospitals with the proportion of patients who reside in them. The rate of first admissions as well as the rate for readmissions, it turns out, shows some, but not a high or consistent correlation with class positions. However, there is a significantly larger proportion of lower-class patients hospitalized than one would expect on the basis of admissions and readmissions from that class. How can this be accounted for?

The relatively high rate of readmissions of upper-class patients is due in part to the fact that lower-class patients are likely to be kept in mental hospitals more continuously while upper-class schizophrenics go in and out of treatment more frequently.

Related to this, and more important, is the fact that lower-class patients get a different type of psychiatric treatment. A large number of them go to large state hospitals where they are kept in custody rather than treated, while upper-class patients are more likely to enjoy the services of private practitioners and private, well-staffed clinics. A high proportion of lower-class patients simply rot.

But what is more surprising still is the fact that lower-class patients are given a different type of treatment regardless of their ability to pay. This is shown by the treatment accorded them in private hospitals, where they pay for this treatment, as well as in clinics, where both upper- and lower-class patients pay only nominal fees.

In private hospitals, approximately 93 per cent of the class I patients receive analytic psychotherapy, but only 19 per cent of class IV's. The class IV patients are treated predominantly by electro-convulsive therapy. Analytic psychotherapy is a slow, time-consuming form of treatment, but it is believed to be effective in cases where the therapist is well trained and where it is applicable and acceptable to the patient. A psychiatrist can treat only about 12 patients at a time over a given period of time, seeing each of them several times a week; whereas electro-convulsive therapy is rapid and inexpensive: one psychiatrist may treat 40 to 50 patients. But electro-convulsive therapy, the authors point out, is a controversial form of therapy to be used only for a narrow range of illness. They conclude, *"The contrast between who is prescribed which therapy, both from the perspective of class position and the costs to the hospital, are too great to be ignored."*

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IT MAY BE SAID that the type of care a patient is prescribed in a private hospital is related to his ability to pay. Paradoxical as it may seem, however, the contrary is true. Perhaps the most shocking finding of this book is that the higher the class position of a patient, the more likely it is that he will receive a discount from the hospital bill. Fifty-seven per cent of class I patients receive discounts in private mental hospitals, as against 25 per cent of class II patients, 21 per cent of class III patients and only 7 per cent of the class IV patients. Class V patients are not to be found in private mental hospitals. Needless to say, upper-class patients can enjoy the privileges of private hospitalization much longer than lower-class patients. The lower the class a patient belongs to the less time he spends in a private hospital. Moreover, class I patients begin to receive discounts after the first week and often from the hour of their admission, because many class I patients are not charged for the examination at admission (often for reasons of professional courtesy, etc.), while lower ranking patients are charged routinely for admission procedures. The class II and III patients do not begin to receive discounts until their families are sorely pinched by the financial cost of the illness. The class IV patient who receives a discount does not have it applied to his bill until his family has insisted upon it. Thus, 30 per cent of the upper-class bills are discounted, and the percentage decreases with the decrease in class position, with only 2 per cent of the class IV bills being discounted. Thus, in dollars and cents, it means that the mean payment per day is $23.76 for class I patients, $29.66 for class II, $29.88 for class III and as high as $31.11 for class IV patients. It appears that, while many private hospitals are oriented toward class I patients so far as physical set-up and staffing is concerned, they are maintained, in good part, by the high-paying, low-cost class III and class IV patients. The authors say: *"Private hospitals are designed for the 'carriage trade' but they are supported by the 'shock box.'"*

IF SUCH is the situation in private hospitals, how about clinics which are especially designed to provide psychiatric treatment for those who cannot afford private practice or private hospitals?

In a large clinic in a community hospital the class status of the patients determined the professional level of the therapist who treated him. Class III patients there are treated by fully trained staff psychiatrists; resident trainees select class III and IV patients; and class V patients are treated by undergraduate medical students or social workers. This is especially significant in view of the fact that clinic patients do not pay for treatment, or merely pay a nominal fee.

In addition to the differential selection of psychiatrists by rank according to a patient's class position, there is also a difference in the type of treatment given. In spite of the equality of cost in all clinics in the city in which the study was made, the class position of the patients is related in significant ways to the types of therapy they are given. Seventy-one per cent of class II patients are given analytic psychotherapy, as compared with 33.3 per cent, 17 per cent and 6 per cent respectively in classes III, IV and V. No patients of the upper class are given shock therapy or sedation; as

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one descends the class scale, shock therapy is given to 4.2 per cent of class III patients, 7.3 of class IV and as many as 31.2 of class V patients. Since the prescribed treatment in clinics is not connected with economic factors as it is in private practice, the authors infer that the type of therapy given to a clinic patient is related more to social factors than to economic costs.

ATTENTION HAS already been called to the fact that psychotherapy is much more costly than organic types of treatment. Thus arises the paradox that clinics, though they are especially set up for help to the indigent, spend more money on upper-class than on lower-class patients: the clinics' net mean estimated expenditure on class II patients is almost twice as large as it is for class III patients. While the net treatment cost per class II patient is $390, the cost is only $204 per class III patient, and goes down to as little as $93 per class IV and $48 per class V patient.

Thus, in places where the fees are low, lower-class patients are not given as much opportunity as upper-class patients to profit from the recent advance in psychoanalytic or analytically oriented therapy, due to their social status. On the other hand, their economic status prevents them from seeking this type of therapy with private practitioners. Hollingshead and Redlich write:

"The folklore of medical practice foster the belief that a considerable portion of patients are carried free by practitioners. This belief may be true in the general practice of medicine, but it needs to be modified before it fits the facts of private psychiatric practice. Only nine patients were carried free by private practitioners, and no psychiatrist carried more than one free patient. These free patients were given only periodic treatment and for short periods. The psychiatrists involved reported that they 'gave the patient a little free time' when he dropped into the office 'from time to time.' These free patients are carried by directive-organic psychiatrists who give them supportive therapy. *Not a single psychoanalyst or analytically oriented private practitioner is treating a patient free, although a few patients are treated at slightly reduced fees.*" (emphasis ours).

When they say next time that ours is an equalitarian and classless society, ask if there is a psychiatrist in the house.

Which Paragraph Do You Read?

"None of Marx's conclusions has been vitiated, let alone refuted, by subsequent events. History never stands still, and capitalism has obviously undergone a number of important changes. But the more it changes, the more it remains the same . . ."

"Yet . . . the proletariat in the advanced capitalist countries has not developed in the way anticipated by Marx. Bad as its condition has been, it was able to rise above the 'inescapable, unvarnishable, imperative misery' which was observed by Marx, and which he expected would be accentuated with the passage of time."—From two consecutive paragraphs in "On the Nature of Marxism" by Paul A. Baran in the *Monthly Review*, November 1958.

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COMMUNICATIONS

The Mindless Typewriter

Murray Hausknecht

If Dwight Macdonald's "America!—America!" [DISSENT, Fall 1958] were read by the European audience for whom it was intended, would it satisfy their curiosity about this strange land? What European needs to be told that there is a "cult of youth" in America? What European is not aware that Tuscany has an "orderly social structure" in which each person is "differentiated by status and function," and that in the United States respect for others depends upon a *force majeure*? What European does not know that American automobiles are abominations, symbols of a vulgarity that pervades our entire life? From Alexis de Tocqueville to Simone de Beauvoir this has been the raw material out of which the European has woven his image of America. Certainly, to *American* ears this is so familiar a refrain that it has ceased to have even shock value.

The repetition of the known and trite need not be a fatal journalistic defect if it is presented in a way that allows for new perceptions, or if it forms the background for an interpretative statement. But Macdonald's essay does not even have this saving grace. He tells us, for example, that "progressive education and Freudian theories" have caused parents "to lose confidence in their right to rule." Assuming this last statement to be true—and it has a certain glitter about it which automatically leads to doubts—the stated causes are no more than cultural cliches. One can pick up practically any issue of *Life* and find the devil masquerading as John Dewey or Sigmund Freud.

This same glibness is evident when Macdonald compares Europe and America. European societies tend to be "orderly social structures" with each person "differentiated by status and function." Our own society is a "jungle" in which each individual "makes his own culture, his own morality." But Macdonald does concede that as this is taking place, "our individual saints and savants don't compare unfavorably with those abroad—but its all on his lonesome."

One possible interpretation of all this is that in America persons are not differentiated by status and function. This is patently ridiculous, since there is no society in which this does not occur. If it is only force which controls social relationships here, then we are experiencing a "war of all against all." While ours is not as "orderly" a society as more rigid class societies of Europe, it is still not a Hobbesian jungle. To say that individuals

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create their own culture and morality is literally meaningless: What culture is created by our Faulkners and Oppenheimers by their lonesome? (I am a little uncertain as to who might appear on Macdonald's calendar of American saints.) However, the statement itself represents a fantastic misunderstanding of the crux of the problem. The "I got mine screw you, Jack" attitude is a *cultural* phenomenon in the technical sense of the term; it is in itself a morality. If we take Macdonald seriously, then the problem this morality poses is a problem of individual psychology rather than one involving the social structure. Macdonald's inability to think in social terms, despite his use of the sociologist's jargon, is not a major crime, but it makes his report politically and ideologically irrelevant by obscuring the fact that something is basically wrong with the *social structure* as well as the individuals this structure produces.

THIS IS journalism at its worst, because it relies wholly on a "sensibility" only tenuously related to "sense." It is a journalism which tends to reject anything which would force the journalist to thing in terms of a consistent intellectual framework. Macdonald, for example, in the course of his polemic against Harold Rosenberg in the same DISSENT, derides "statistical tables and other instruments of academic torture." To grasp the essential puerility of this attitude it is enough to recall that a work like *Das Kapital* is a result of many hours of poring over statistical tables. As a result of this orientation we find Macdonald attributing the "decline of a ruling class" to an ideology, and, therefore, parent-youth conflict explained solely as a result of the influence of progressive education and Freudianism. Similarly, when faced with the problem of the behavior of American prisoners in Korea Macdonald has no more meaningful concepts to use than "floating collectivism." A journalist who allied "sensibility" with "sense" would be more alert to the implications of the official Army line which stresses the "softness" of Americans (shades of Hitler and the "decadence" of American society!) just as he would be painfully aware, as Macdonald seemingly is not, of the implications of emphasizing such ideas as "persons differentiated by status and function" and "orderly social structure" when comparing Europe and America.

The reliance on an intellectually uncontrolled impressionistic observation of society and culture can be characterized as a type of mindlessness. Since this mindlessness is the salient feature of most bad journalism it makes Macdonald with his "downbeat" version of American society a blood brother of the *Life* editorial writer who is busy celebrating the same society. This is a paradox only if we think that the important issue is which version is the "correct" one. The paradox disappears when one realizes that both fail to recognize the fact that American society poses a problem in meaning which demands something more than the cultural cliche and mere impressionistic reporting. Any adequate description and interpretation demands the application of reason as well as sensibility. By stopping short of rational analysis the journalist becomes merely a trickster who gives us the illusion that he has engaged in social criticism, but who, in reality, has only distracted our atten-

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tion by conducting us either through the best of all possible worlds or a chamber of horrors.

Dwight Macdonald replies:

Since I was giving my impressions of this country after being away a while, I wrote impressionistically. I wasn't writing *Das Kapital* and not even an article for DISSENT, where things are usually ordered with the sobriety Mr. Hausknecht seems to prefer. The piece, as stated, was written as a New York Letter for a London magazine. Of course I agree that "something is basically wrong with the social structure" and, in fact, had thought I'd said just that in my observations on the absence of a sense of community. Nor do I see why a report becomes "politically and ideologically irrelevant" (what frightening jargon!) because it is descriptive rather than analytical.

I'm sorry that Mr. Hausknecht fails to practice what he preaches. I should have liked to have his intellectually controlled, untrite, unglib analysis of the American social structure. I should even have been grateful for some hint as to whether he agrees with my own impressions. At the end he triumphantly paints himself into a corner by proving that, though my view of America is the opposite of that of the editors of *Life,* it's really just the same because we are both irrational tricksters. Does he think the truth lies halfway between us? Or does it exist on some fourth-dimensional plane inaccessible to us both? He might at least have given a hint. I'm also curious about his remark that I should have, in summarizing the Army psychiatrists' report on the Korean war prisoners, been "more alert to the implications of the official Army line which stresses the 'softness' of Americans (shades of Hitler and the 'decadence' of American society!)." Does he mean that the appalling facts in the report somehow become irrelevant because of the alleged propagandistic intent? If so, he is wrong; a fact is a fact let the source be the Devil himself. Or does he mean the Army psychiatrists' report is a fake? I must confess I hadn't thought of that possibility, but if Mr. Hausknecht has some evidence to this effect, it is a pity he didn't give it.

Mr. Hausknecht writes, apropos my sneer at "statistical tables and other instruments of academic torture": "To grasp the essential puerility of this attitude, it is enough to recall that a work like *Das Kapital* is a result of many hours of poring over statistical tables." But *is* it enough? Should one not add that, beside the poring and the tables, there was a superb brain at work? And is not the absence of brain-work, superb or not, just what one misses in the proliferation of statistical data in American sociology today? They give us plenty of tables but damned little to eat on them.

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BOOKS

Where Do We Go From Here?

THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY, by John Kenneth Galbraith. Boston, Houghton Mifflin. 1958. 368 pp. $5.00.

J. K. Galbraith, the well-known Harvard professor, has worked out a plan for a socialist society. I don't mean to frighten him or some of his faithful readers. (I don't think he frightens easily.) But the simple fact is that this witty economist has set forth a series of proposals that spell out the sort of society that socialists have been talking about for years. And despite some drawbacks of detail, he has done so thoughtfully, with discernment of the complexities involved, and in a way that commands attention.

While Galbraith has approached his pleasant task in the most logical of fashions, beginning first with the theoretical framework of received economics (he uses the dry and somewhat acerb term "conventional wisdom" to describe traditionalist views) and then relentlessly pursuing their implications, we might do well to start with his conclusions. The outstanding fact in our society, he says, is that we possess the unquestioned ability to produce whatever it is that we care to produce. This being the case, we should be able to meet all our needs, both private as well as public.

The real situation, and it is difficult to quarrel with him, is that our productive system has reached a point of doubtful return. It has become a well-stuffed cornucopia that pours out an apparently endless flow of goods, all ostensibly seeking to satisfy the craving of the contemporary American to gorge himself on a bewildering array of commodities. These goods, privately produced and sold, create the image of an affluent society. Yet, in reality, we are much less prosperous than we think. When it comes to public services the amount of deprivation is almost depressing. Schools are old and overcrowded; there is a lack of parks and playgrounds; cities cannot clean their streets; and the ghastly exhaust of the monsters that pass for cars pollutes the skies. The author wonders aloud whether the desire for a non-toxic supply of air would suggest a "revolutionary dalliance with Socialism."

Colleges and mental hospitals, says Galbraith, may have been overcrowded and underprovided in recent years, but the Gross National Product and retail sales, especially of television sets and other gadgets, have not ceased rising. A family will go for a picnic in the country in a preposterously overpowered automobile through badly paved streets, past billboards and blighted neighborhoods, to lunch "on exquisitely packaged food from a portable icebox by a polluted stream...

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Just before dozing off on an air mattress, beneath a nylon tent, amid the stench of decaying refuse, they may reflect vaguely on the curious unevenness of their blessings."

Galbraith argues persuasively that this weird disparity stems from a lack of social balance. We live in an interdependent economy in which private commodities and public services are essentially complementary. More automobiles demand not only more gasoline but some place in our crowded cities to put them. In the past, says Galbraith, it was not uncommon for cities to provide horse rails for vehicles seeking to pause. Modern civilization, however, has not yet found a place for Detroit's insolent chariots. We cannot escape the patent fact that the consumption of private goods normally calls for some facilitating or protective measure by government. If these public services are not provided, civic strangulation is the result. Essentially, what we need is a balance between private goods and the supply of public services. If only to support this idea, Galbraith's book deserves the wide audience it has won, for without expansion of the public economy the very future of society is threatened. The present situation in some of our larger cities grimly testifies to what may happen to all.

Similarly, says Galbraith, there must be a proper balance between investment in capital and investment in humans. If big league baseball, with its farm club system, has learned to do this, why not the larger society? Only with Sputnik I did our educational plant begin to be seriously looked at. We start worrying about brains only when we get ready to blow them out.

GALBRAITH TRACES the roots of this frightening disparity to the ideology of unremitting production implicit in the thinking of the early Classical economists. Adam Smith and David Ricardo and the gloomy Parson Malthus all thought that poverty and inequality would always be mankind's lot. They saw a limited national income and a conflict of classes over its distribution. Marx too saw this as the central problem, but unlike the others he did not expect the system to survive. Somehow it did, and perhaps part of the reason may be traced to the new technology and its affluent flow of goods.

The criticism of the older economists that Galbraith offers does not, however, take account of the optimistic strain which may be found in classical theory. It could be that Ricardo and his friends appear to have been more accurate than Marx only because there was imbedded in the classical economics a tradition of hope and harmony which gave everyone an "uncertain reassurance" that everything in the end simply had to turn out well. Whenever riches do flow, the economic harmonies of Jean-Baptiste Say and Frederic Bastiat comfort us that this is the best of all possible worlds. There is, however, a flaw in this sort of thinking that dissenting economists have always used to clobber the Classicists with. This is the simple fact that income generated by the productive system does not always move in ways that absorb the whole product. And this failing Galbraith seems curiously to underestimate. It is the same weakness that both Marx and Keynes saw in such silly propositions as Say's Law which exclaimed that every supply created its own demand. But Galbraith sees the economy stumbling only when it has already produced a surfeit of

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goods, so that all that happens is a bit of irritating unemployment. The hint that the only ones to be hurt are factory workers is a point worth pondering: do we now have an economy in which only blue collar workers suffer from depressions?

Galbraith also contends that genuine inequality no longer exists. Here, unfortunately, he has taken up the myth of the rich, happy and powerful worker, a myth that now flourishes in the best places. But somewhere along the line the meaning of a median income of $3,100 per annum for all working men (or somewhat over $4,000 for families) has escaped Professor Galbraith. The counterpart of this myth is the one that says America's poor are now mainly confined to misfits, agricultural workers and economic cripples. Galbraith buys this one too. That's talking, of course, about *half* the working men (or half the families).

The Federal Reserve Bulletin of Sept. 1958 had some interesting things to say on these questions in its report on a University of Michigan Survey of Consumer Finance. The median income for consumer spending units in 1956 was reported to have been $4,250; in 1957 this figure was $4,350. But corrected for changes in the cost of living, the latter becomes approximately $4,200, so that in terms of purchasing power families appear to have lost a little ground. One may rightly ask whether this is a good price to pay for affluence. The report tells us in its bland matter-of-fact way that "many spending units attained a higher income status because the wife or some other member worked to supplement the earnings of the head." By now about one-third of all spending units have two or more wage earners, as compared with but one-fifth a decade earlier. In the poorer income units, we are told also, "many incomes were probably supplemented by income in kind, such as meals and lodging provided servants, and food grown and consumed in farms." Unfortunately, nothing was said of that peculiar income-in-kind enjoyed by the upper strata—the expense account.

It is true that consumers have $630 billion in financial assets, but their character and distribution offer no particular reason for the kind of pride we find in the pages of *Nation's Business* or *Time*. Corporate stock represented 40 per cent of the total: there's ample evidence to show that virtually all of this is held by Mills' power élite. Another 20 per cent is represented by government and private bonds, mortgage holdings and life insurance policies. Thus, liquid assets—money, savings bonds, savings accounts and the like—totalled a little over $250 billion. The Michigan group concluded that most of the liquid holdings were only of "moderate" size: less than half were $500 or more, while only about one-tenth reported liquid assets of $5,000 or more. The fact is that holdings of liquid assets are directly related to the size of income. And income is still distributed in fairly lopsided fashion.

BUT I DON'T WISH to quarrel too often with Galbraith, for much of what he says is so genuinely apt that he even has Wall St. journalists reading his book. What he has done is to take the notion that economic insecurity is essential for progress and efficiency and place it on the intellectual junk heap. Security, he says, is within reach with our kind of affluence. Our vast output makes the conventional wisdom's image of the slothful workingman useless. Why should we not cultivate the art of getting more for doing

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less: our economy is well able to achieve this high aim. In fact, it has already accomplished this objective, for "apart from the universities" we are told, "where its practice has the standing of a scholarly rite, the art of genteel and elaborately concealed idleness," sometimes known as feather-bedding, has already reached high development in the executive reaches of the corporation.

The main point is that production is so great that we can afford a certain amount of slackness. The conventional wisdom insists, however, that production must be ceaseless, for wants are insatiable and there isn't anything you cannot sell to a consumer if you only make him desire it. The comments that Galbraith has to offer on the theory of consumer demand ought to be read carefully by a good many economists still enamored of the apparatus of psychic value and marginal utility. It might get them to wonder just a little about what he calls the imperatives of consumer demand and the vested interest in output. And his description of the way in which administered prices add to the inflationary spiral demonstrates that labor economists are not all mad when they criticize the pricing practices of corporations.

One wishes, however, that the underlying conceptions of the public-private dichotomy were more clearly set out. Cost and pricing techniques are quite different for each sector. Maximum net gain is the rule for autos and frozen foods, steel and apparel. Theoretically, this is not the way to set prices for the services of bridges, health facilities or education. If the latter create costs which are greater than yield (where a charge is made) then the deficit should be covered from general tax income. This, at least, seems to be the main argument of welfare economists and socialists. Now, if this by some strange political accident becomes a general way of doing things in the public realm, we would then be getting closer to a socialized economy.

But we find that more and more the pricing devices of the private producer are enforced on public services. Maximum net gain is made to apply to everything: turnpikes make real profits and bridges have toll fees enough to rebuild them over several times. Wherever possible the cost burden of public service is shifted to the direct user without regard to his ability to carry it. If this keeps up, they may even put turnstiles around the Boston Common.

Basically, Galbraith is posing the same dichotomy that was described by John Stuart Mill. The problem of production has been solved, while distribution leaves something to be desired. But the kind of distribution he speaks of clearly means an expansion of welfare: he would like more and better education and the use of resources to lessen hunger and discontent. He would break the connection between production and income, so that if unemployment came about he would hold effective demand high with unemployment insurance close to the full wage. In the words of the *Wall St. Journal,* this makes him a controversial economist. But then anyone who has ever questioned the "conventional wisdom" has been controversial.

Galbraith has given us a book which despite some lapses (there is a serious underestimation of *world* poverty and its impact on us) is one to make us think. If only for this we ought to be grateful.

BEN B. SELIGMAN

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But Is It Marxist?

SOVIET MARXISM: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS, by Herbert Marcuse
Columbia University Press, New York 1958. 267 pp. $4.50

That a philosopher should commit this or that inconsistency because of this or that accommodation is conceivable. He himself may realize this. But what he does not realize is the possibility that this apparent accommodation has its innermost roots in an insufficiency or insufficient formulation of his principle. Had a philosopher thus accommodated himself, his pupils would have had to explain that what for him had the form of exoteric consciousness came from his inner essential consciousness.

KARL MARX

History written from the viewpoint of victorious politicians and generals always carries the onus of apology: apology for the present rulers who are the heirs of these victors. Consequently, the critic Walter Benjamin saw the duty of the historical materialist as "*...die Geschichte gegen den Strich zu buersten*"—to brush history against the grain. This does not entail—as in liberal history books—parading the defeated alongside the victorious, or the muted truth together with the truth which has had its day. It is rather the demand made of the historian to see his subject from the viewpoint of the defeated.

No view *per se* is "good" or "bad," "justified" or "unjustified." Its measure cannot but be the degree of inner coherency with which it answers the questions put to it by Man in search of orientation. The limits of inner coherency are *socio-historical* insofar as the given historical period defines its highest possible degree and *individual* in as much as the consequences of the inquiry may run counter to its methodological premises.

HERBERT MARCUSE, author of several valuable studies such as *Reason and Revolution* and *Eros and Civilization*, an unsurpassed guidepost of dialectical criticism, here in his latest study, *Soviet Marxism*, using what he calls the method of "immanent critique" is compelled to take a path opposite from the one proposed above. In presenting and assembling the basic elements of Soviet Marxism, Marcuse gives the reader the impression that there has been one straight line of development from 1917 until our day. We learn nothing of deviations, faction struggles etc., nor do we hear about the "Left Opposition" or the "Right Opposition." Trotsky's name is mentioned twice *en passant;* about the debate over E. Varga's controversial book, *Changes in the Economy of Capitalism Resulting from the Second World War*, we hear only the extent to which his theories were rejected or accepted; the views of the philologist Marr are mentioned only to be rejected, etc. The impression of an unbroken line of development is further strengthened by the author's sweeping announcement that "There is theoretical continuity from the early Marxian notion of the Proletariat as the objectified truth of capitalist society to the Soviet Marxist concept of *partinost* (partisanship)" (p. 9), and "throughout all changes to

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which Soviet ethical theories have been subjected since the Bolshevik Revolution, they have been governed by one unifying principle, namely, the formulation and evaluation of ethical standards in accordance with the objectives of the Soviet state." (p. 197) This image of continuity which, for professional anti-Bolshevism or Stalinism, was the result of vested political interest becomes here a methodological premise which, as we shall see, will be qualified by Marcuse in the unfolding of his discussion.

Granted that the "immanent critique" which "starts from the theoretical premises of Soviet Marxism, develops their ideological and sociological consequences, and reexamines the premises in the light of these consequences" (p. 1), can exlude any references to such deviations and faction struggles; but it is rather doubtful that a study which "employs the conceptual instruments of . . . Marxism" (p. 1) can get by with this.

We do not wish to discuss the merits of the determinist view of history. But the reader should be reminded that Marx always took social classes and their leaders as his point of departure. For Marx, history was not "a person apart," using men for its purposes, but the struggle of men "pursuing their purposes." In Marcuse's book we look in vain for any social classes in pursuit of their purposes.

Marcuse's thesis is as follows: socialist society was to be built coexistent with rather than subsequent to capitalist society (but he assures us that his uses of the term "socialist" does not imply that Soviet society actually is socialist, but simply assumes that such was the original intention). (ff. p. 8) Since the proletariat of the advanced western countries failed to act as a revolutionary class, Stalinist industrialization had to take place in a hostile environment. Hence, priority for heavy industry and repressive totalitarian centralization. The development of the Soviet state promoted the transformation of "classical" capitalism into state capitalism in the West, thus coming closer and closer to the "general cartel" whose ultra-imperialist planning would replace capitalist anarchy. Thus the very success of Stalinist policy brings it to the impasse where it sustains stability in the imperialist orbit; a stability which cannot be altered except by the "relaxation" of the Soviet camp's intransigent strategy. Therefore, liberalization of the Soviet state must be the inherent tendency once competitive strength has been attained.

Originality—even a certain beauty—cannot be denied in such a construction, but we would like to take some exceptions to it: Marcuse refers repeatedly to the failure of the proletariat to act as a revolutionary class. Now, this fact cannot be denied, particularly since acceptance of Stalinist leadership by a large part of the proletariat is proof of this fact (something, incidentally, not mentioned by Marcuse). But what permits us to assume that Stalinist policy had the least intention of developing any genuinely revolutionary movement? Where has Stalinist "guidance" not sabotaged the socialist revolution? China during the 1920's? Germany? Or perhaps in Spain during the Civil War?

According to Marcuse the relative stabilization of capitalism in the West is responsible for Lenin's theory of the vanguard; the Soviet state having now integrated the "general cartel,"

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liberalization of the former will disintegrate the latter. "The class struggle becomes a fight for space and populations and the social issues become a function of political issues." (p. 96) "The class struggle is... transubstantiated into an international political struggle." (p. 97) Marcuse thus sees a definitive shift in the subject of history. Parenthetically, we may ask what happens to the proletariat under such conditions? The cornerstone of Marxian theory is the revolutionary role of the proletariat; if the proletariat should prove to be incapable of assuming its role in history Marxian theory would become obsolete. Socialists, to be sure, would still defend the interests of the oppressed, the exploited, the mutilated, defeated and silenced, but the historical Marxist perspective would lose its meaning. Marx's first concern was not narrowly political, but certainly social and philosophical as well. As every reader of Marcuse's *Reason and Revolution* knows, the liberation of the proletarian according to Marx is not simply for his own sake, but for the sake of Man and Philosophy. Man's dream of freedom becomes realized in this liberation; he himself shall take his destiny in his own hands and shall cease to be the object of forces transcending his powers.

We suggest that because he cannot ascribe any revolutionary role to the proletariat, the notion of the proletariat has changed for Marcuse. As a result, we do not find in his study any social classes in pursuit of their purposes; Marxism's institutional determinism is preserved, and the working out of Man's problems is assigned to history where Reason and the "Cunning of Reason" has again become the moving force of history. The consequence of Marcuse's procedure surely runs counter to its methodological premise of employing Marxism's conceptual instruments and leads us back to Hegelian metaphysics. Furthermore, it is responsible for the inner contradictions of Marcuse's exposition.

WHAT IS the relation between Leninism and Stalinism? According to the author, "...during the Revolution, it became apparent to what degree Lenin had succeeded in basing his strategy on the actual class interests and aspirations of the workers and peasants... Then, from 1923 on, the decisions of the leadership have been increasingly dissociated from the class interests of the proletariat." (p. 149) Is there a break between Leninism and Stalinism, asks Marcuse, and then answers: "If the dialectical law of the turn from quantity into quality was ever applicable, it was in this transition from Leninism (after the October Revolution) to Stalinism." (p. 74) It could hardly have been better said. However, since at this point the author does not provide a direct quote in his reference to the turn from quantity, to quality, the reviewer has to remind the reader that, according to Hegel, "the new Something is indifferent to its predecessor . . . It has therefore appeared not out of the former, but, immediately, out of itself, that is, out of the internal specifying unity which has not yet entered into existence."* In the same chapter Hegel gives the following example: "It is a more or a less which suffices to transgress the limit of levity, whereby something quite different, namely, crime, appears; and thus right passes into wrong, and virtue into vice." If such is the nature

* (*Cf.*, Hegel, *Science of Logic*, Book I, Part 3, chapter 2).

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of the relation between Leninism and Stalinism, it certainly runs counter to the continuity alleged to exist by Marcuse in the first part of his book.

What "immediately appeared out of itself" was the bureaucracy. Not so for Marcuse. For him, during the period of primitive Stalinism the bureaucracy developed and the capitalist environment gave both subjective and objective justification to the repression: "The height of Stalinist terror coincided with the consolidation of the Hitler regime." (p. 75) Whereas now, after achievement of competitive strength by the "Communist orbit," Marcuse believes that the repressive economic and political relations upon which the bureaucracy was founded contradict the more general interests of the Soviet state. International capitalist development brought about the Stalinist state; liberalization of this state will now bring about the disintegration of capitalist stabilization.

To be sure, "quantity shall not turn again into quality unless the economic benefits have themselves become political ones, that is to say, have led to the control of production by the 'immediate producers.'" (p. 181) The post-Stalinist welfare state of tomorrow shall remain the direct heir of yesterday's Stalinist state. In the meantime, the "permanent revolution" continues to be directed from above. Stalin's *ad hoc* theories, says Marcuse, were but unclear reflections of the effective containment of the revolutionary force within the capitalist world. The "united front" policy is but an expression of this fact. The weakness of the revolutionary potential makes necessary a "second respite" which utilizes the inter-imperialist contradictions as well as the contradictions between the imperialist nations and their colonies for the purpose of ushering in a new state in the development of Soviet society; namely, the transition from socialism to communism. According to Marcuse, this transition is necessary because otherwise the Soviet State would be forced to sustain the stabilization of the advanced western countries; also, in order to break the deadlock in favor of the proletariat by spreading "Socialism by contagion" (p. 100); finally, because of its own ideological commitments since, without such a transition, "Soviet Marxism could not even claim to be Marxism." (p. 160)

Thus—like Goethe's Mephisto—Stalin and the bureaucracy may well have said about themselves that they are "part of that power which always wills the bad, and always works the good". Or they could have presented themselves as the instruments of Historical Reason. To quote Marcuse, "The forces and circumstances which led to the abuse and violation of the ideal appear as more objective than those of mere power politics—objective to such an extent that they may be easily represented as the working of Historical Reason." (p. 202) Evidently, such an interpretation in which the struggle of Man is arrogated by history will find it difficult to recognize *any* revolutions. A case in point would be Marcuse's treatment of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956:

> It was...de-Stalinization which stimulated the events in Poland and Hungary. The Soviet leadership reacted in accordance with the underlying policy conception... regardless of the sincere subjective intentions of the national leadership and their followers among the working classes and the intelligentsia. [pp. 173-174]

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If the reviewer may briefly go beyond the limits set, the reader should be reminded that the Hungarian events of 1956 can only be described in terms of social revolution. It was precisely *not* the "sincere subjective intentions" of the leaders and their followers that enacted this revolution, but rather the revolution was carried out by great masses of the population whose leaders were carried along by the movement *because* of their "sincere subjective intentions." The Hungarian people copied the October Revolution of 1917, including both its organizational units and its slogans, as exemplification of Marxian theory, that every revolution tends to imitate its predecessor. To translate such a social movement into political terms of power relations and influence is to make social reality incomprehensible.

WE ARE NOT SUGGESTING that Marcuse is uncritical of the consequences of Stalinist policy. If, for instance, he suggests that the dialectic was not arbitrarily stopped by Soviet Marxism, but, since Russia is a post-capitalist state, the dialectic came to rest (as predicted by Marx and Hegel), Marcuse hastens to add, "What is involved is not so much a revision of dialectic as the claim of socialism for a non-socialist society. Dialectic itself is used for substantiating this claim." (p.154) But this critique is added *a posteriori* to the main argument and since the *a posteriori* does not become the *a priori* the whole study falls apart because of its own contradictions. Even the author's critique becomes absorbed in his appraisal of Soviet Marxism's historical situation. "...the absurdity of Soviet Marxism," he writes, "has an objective ground: it reflects the absurdity of a historical situation in which the realization of the Marxian promises appeared—only to be delayed again—and in which the new productive forces are again used as instruments for productive repression." (p. 89)

Marxism's promise was the liberation of Man for the impending future. Once this promise of an immediate future is translated into a "transcendental" one and its subject, individual Man, is hypostatized into the abstraction "Mankind," this promise is betrayed. Whether the reader accepts the official argument of Soviet ethics that: "Final human fulfillment and gratification are not oriented on the 'inner self' or the hereafter, but on the 'next stage' of the actual development of society. And the truth of this conception is to be, not a matter of faith, but a matter of scientific analysis and reason—of necessity" (p. 218), or whether we accept Marcuse's opposing interpretation that, "The the end recedes, the means becomes everything; and the sum of total of means is 'the movement' itself. It absorbs and adorns itself with the values of the goal, whose realization 'the movement' itself delays" (p. 242)—whichever of these two conceptions one accepts the "end" justifies repressive reality, as Marcus concedes. But, according to the author, beyond that it becomes effective through its own momentum. Since there is such a high degree of externalization of Soviet ethical values this permits only a low degree of internalization. Repression from above does not become internalized. At the same time, "As long as this international situation [of coexistence—L. S.] prevails, technological rationality tends to militate against the restrictive political rationality and to drive the latter toward the liberali-

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zation of the established base." (p. 257).

ACCORDING to Marcuse, ideological, technical-economic and political pressure all tend in the direction of relaxation of repression and toward the liberalization of the Soviet State. But, if Marcuse's appraisal of Soviet Marxism's development and its trend were to be realized and socialist or communist democracy were to be introduced not as an administrative measure but as a result of "pressure from below" (which, under the existing conditions, would amount to a revolution), then, such a society, being the fulfillment of Marxism's aspirations, might be indifferent to the hiatus between this promise and its fulfillment. Until, however, such a realization does take place, any attempt to present the betrayal of the promise as the means of its fulfillment only serves to justify the repressive reality. In context, Soviet Marxism may even be considered as a degree of consciousness (the lowest possible degree, to be sure) of a section of the proletariat, a proletariat held by *raison d'état* of the Soviet state in a condition of *rigor mortis,* But even if we accept such an interpretation of Soviet Marxism, constant reference to its sources in Marx and Hegel will not elucidate its meaning. Either there is a continuity between Leninism and Stalinism or there is a break. Either the Marxian promise was betrayed or it was not. But notions of a broken-continuum or faithful-betrayal tend more to obscure social reality than to enlighten it.

Yet it should be made clear that whatever weakness there is in Marcuse's study should not be laid only at his door. Marxism has claimed to be the theory of the revolutionary working class movement. It was either connected with such a movement or it was at least convinced that the subject of history was to take its destiny into its own hands in the impending future. The absence of the former and the lack of the latter perspective have caused Marxism's extreme poverty over the past thirty-five years.

Once the future becomes "transcendental" and the role of the revolutionary class is subsumed in the power relations of the two conflicting forces —the camp of "imperialism" versus the Soviet states and the "external proletariat"—the historical perspective of Marxism becomes implicitly utopian. Progress is caused by the interdependence and interaction of these two sides upon each other. Marxian perspective is replaced by Hegelian interpretation. Did not Marcuse himself most eloquently criticize just such an interpretation?

> Hegel, he wrote in *Reason and Revolution* [p. 246], was "led to a harmonistic interpretation of history, according to which the crossing to a *new* historical form is at the same time a progress to a *higher* historical form—a preposterous interpretation, because all the victims of oppression and injustice are witness against it, as are all the vain sufferings and sacrifices of history. The interpretation is the more preposterous because it denies the critical implications of the dialectic. . . ."

July, 1958. L. STERN

"GOOD OMEN...Pocket Books say that last month it received an order for 100 copies of 'How to Win Friends and Influence People' from Central High School in Little Rock."—*Publisher's Weekly,* No. 3, 1958.

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fields, and during the recession of 1954 it fell to 78 per cent. This year output will be no more than 75 per cent of capacity, probably about 73 per cent. Ignoring the potential homes, roads, schools, and foreign aid such stagnation represents, the existence of this surplus industrial capacity will sooner or later be reflected in lower capital spending by business, and consequently higher unemployment. Maintenance of the spending power of unemployed workers through unemployment insurance under such circumstances will not increase capital expenditures in the medium-run so long as existing productive facilities can meet the demand. And, because of the more than adequate industrial capacity, capital spending, which declined from $37 billion in 1957 to $30 billion this year and probably $31 billion in 1959, will go primarily for modernization rather than expanded capacity. As the unions in the auto, electrical, and chemical industries know, such modernization usually means declining labor forces, lay-offs, and unemployment.

The remarkable growth in productive capacity in basic industries since 1951 reflects the amortization policies practiced by the Office of Defense Mobilization since the Korean conflict to build the economy to the point where it could supply both guns *and* butter. This policy, which has allowed rapid five-year tax write-offs for much business capital spending, was instrumental in sustaining the immediate post-World War II prosperity fed by the backlog of accumulated consumer wartime savings and business profits. Prior to the completion of this expansion program any slack in defense production was generally absorbed by unsatisfied consumer demands. Today we are capable of maintaining very high civilian and military production, and any reduction in either field will simply mean idle plants and workers. This, in fact, is an important new development in the economy, and its consequences can only be negative from the viewpoint of maintaining full employment. Adding to the somewhat diminished role of the military sector of the economy is the fact that the growing importance of missiles will seriously reduce the number of workers required in military production by stressing the need for fewer, better-paid technicians rather than large groups of workers. A missile costing one million dollars requires 30 per cent fewer man-hours to build than an airplane at the same price. Unless the total military budget increases substantially, the "salutary" effect of arms expenditures in maintaining employment and production will decline as the character of armaments is altered.

It has been pointed out, with considerable validity, that any reduction in manufacturing employment will be compensated for by the continued rapid post-war increase of employment in trade, service, and especially finance and government. The growth of employment in finance and government may continue, but the current practice of introducing computers and electronic machines in banks, Internal Revenue and Social Security offices, and even Post Offices, will seriously reduce the rate of employment growth in these fields, if not absolute employment. The expansion of employment

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in the service and trade fields has one major and unanticipated liability—low wages, and therefore an increasing number of lower income families. In October 1956, for example, 50 per cent of all retail workers earned less than $1.25 an hour, and 26 per cent earned less than $1.

Disquieting, too, for the economy is the inadequacy of the so-called built-in-stabilizers in counteracting declining labor income. As Daniel Creamer, under the auspices of the National Bureau of Economic Research, has shown in his important study of income in the 1948-49 recession, unemployment compensation and automatic tax reductions offset only one-quarter of the loss in disposable income. Considering the fact that average unemployment compensation payments amount to only one-third of the average factory worker's weekly income, that over one-third of the nation's workers are not even covered under the plan, and that many workers have run out of payments, it is unlikely that the offset of the income lost in this recession has been much greater than that of 1949. Relief and other transfer payments have added somewhat to the lost income, but most of it has gone to the low-income aged, handicapped, and others generally unable to purchase new durable goods. Perhaps most disturbing of all is that the confidence of all too many in the efficacy of these stabilizers has dampened the general willingness to consider more decisive economic measures.

Given the decline in manufacturing employment, the growing unused capacity in the economy, and the seriously limited value of built-in stabilizers in compensating for lost income, the prospect for rapidly expanding mass consumption to create employment must ultimately depend on changes in the share of income received by lower income classes. The most persistent economic problem, at least since 1945, has been the continued inequality of income and purchasing power. In 1957, as in 1948, the top tenth of the spending units received at least 30 per cent of the personal income and had an average income about 25 times greater than the lowest income tenth and twice as great as the second highest income tenth. In 1956, the most recent data available, the top half of the American spending units purchased 88 per cent of the new cars, and centralized most of the consumption power, in all fields, on which future employment will be dependent. This continued inequality in income makes it improbable that purchasing power among the lower income half of the nation, the group which needs it most, might expand sufficiently to maintain full employment through full consumption in an ever more efficient technology.

The economy is in these important respects weaker today than it has been since the end of the war. Failure to solve any of the causes of post-war recessions by redistributing relative consumption among lower income groups and expanding public works and foreign aid has only undermined the economy's ability to meet new problems presented by the declining importance of military production, the growing industrial capacity, and the substantial ineffectiveness of built-in stabilizers as they are presently organized. Even if the present recession does not last beyond this year, the recovery will most likely be very temporary and the next economic decline will be substantially more serious.

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Miscellany

The Pope... and the Papers

Henry Pachter

WHAT SHALL we call the new Pope when he dies? That will be something of a problem, since the recently-deceased Pius XII was so regularly hailed as "the greatest" in the American press. Harry Truman at least tried to qualify it: *"The greatest statesman in the Vatican in 200 years"* he obituarized—which takes us back to the undistinguished Benedicts and Clements of the 18th century but leaves out the great social Pope, Leo XIII, who undid some of the damage done by Pius IX—that infamous reactionary from whom the late Pacelli Pius XII took is name. However, let's not quibble; I suppose "greatest in 200 years" or "one of the greatest" are phrases which the stream of semi-consciousness produces in a good politician at the drop of a dead.

Phrases, however obbligato, obligate; so the editorialists had to find out why Pius XII was great. By unanimous stream of semi-consciousness, again, the word "modern" invites itself. Had not Pius XII gone so far as to use a typewriter, a telephone, an airplane and an elevator? (And though we were not told so explicitly, we suppose a flush toilet, too.) Moreover, he had cautiously approved hypnosis and psychoanalysis (catching up with the Jesuits), permitted the use of English in administering the Last Rites (bowing, of course, not to the expiator's need to understand but to the American clergy's ignorance of Latin), and allowed the mass to be shifted from morning to evening hours.

Next to being modern, Pius XII's most conspicuous qualification seems to have been his anti-Communism. Quoting from one paper for many, "the church is communism's... most powerful ideological opponent. To its flourishing condition Pius XII contributed enormously and in all likelihood will rank in history as one of the greatest" (New York *Daily News*). That at least has the virtue of placing Pacelli in the political context where he belongs; but the writer might have done a little further research so that the precise nature of Pius XII's contribution might be known. Did not the Church, at the time when Pacelli was its Secretary of State, sanction the authoritarian Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime in Austria and the bloody suppression of the Vienna socialists in February 1934? Has he not, in his own pontificate, suppressed all Christian-socialist movements which sprang up after the war, such as the Dominican socialists and the "working priests" in France?

ITEM: *"The socially-minded Christian Democratic movements and the progress toward a united Europe both owe much to his intelligent and tactful support"* (New York *Post;* similarly, New York *Herald-Tribune*). These "socially-minded Christian Democrats," of course, are Adenauer, Schuman and de Gasperi. Pius XII receives due credit for "encouraging" and promoting them "whenever they emerged in the natural course of events" (the "leftist" columnist, William Shannon); the trouble is that these right-wing leaders did not "emerge in the natural course of events" but had to be helped to win out against the more liberal wing in the Catholic parties whose leaders, indeed, had "emerged in the natural course of events."

This practice of shunting aside was not new to Pius XII. As Nuncio Pacelli in Munich, he helped organize the separatistic, monarchistic Bavarian People's Party (which by a hair's breadth escaped being Hitler's ally in the beer hall putsch). Promoted to the post of Berlin, Pacelli helped reshape the Catholic Center Party, replacing in its leadership the trade unionist, Stegerwald, by the monarchist reactionaries, Prelate Kaas and (later) Bruening, the gravediggers of the Weimar Republic. Likewise in Italy, as Secretary of State, Pacelli dissolved the Catholic "Popolari" party under Don Sturzo's liberal leadership—the price the Church paid for the concordat Mussolini did not keep; but the day after the concordat had been signed, Mussolini submitted to the King the elevation to princely honors of the Pacelli family. Of all this, not a word in the American press; instead—

—ITEM: *"He strove to keep the Church clear from involvement with fascist re-*

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gimes" (Shannon again). The truth is that, while Pacelli was the power behind his throne, Pius XI blessed Mussolini's arms in the Ethiopian war, concluded a concordat with Hitler, and also blessed the "volunteers" that went to fight against the Spanish Republic, including the Basque liberal-Catholic government.

ITEM: *"He was coolly correct in his dealings with Franco"* (Shannon). The truth is that one of his first acts as Pope was to send a special apostolic blessing to Franco. The ultra-orthodox Spanish hierarchy, though, did get into trouble with the Falange, and the concordats with the Axis failed to work out. Here, for the liberals, was an opportunity to praise while suppressing the blame. Their honey-drooling pundit, the great Max Lerner was so eager to set the tone that his eulogy appeared on the newsstands before the Pope was dead. *"Through... rigidity Great Powers of every kind have gone down in the past. The remarkable fact about the Papacy is that it has not. And the 20 years of Pius XII's tenure of the Holy See are an indication of why it has not. He had to cope with the Fascist dictators..."* A neat trick—if little good can be said of the man, talk about the greatness of the institution.

But let's look at Pius XII's "flexibility": he forbade widows to remarry, he instigated mob violence against a couple who had married outside the Church, he declared it a dogma for every believer that the Church is the body and soul of Christ—a doctrine which excludes individualism and mystic religiosity among the faithful, and forces them to surrender their will to the Church itself rather than to the spirit of Christ. In backward countries he quietly encouraged the revival of relic worship.

Pius XII seems in general to have been concerned more with bodies than with souls. One of the dogmas he proclaimed was that of the bodily ascension of the Virgin into Heaven. He also informed some close associates that visions of strange bodies had been granted to him—angels, Christ and the Virgin. This remarkable announcement ought to have been a newsman's feast, but only the New York *World-Telegram* congratulated itself—tongue in cheek—on having lived with the first Pope to receive such visitations.

It was left to Adlai Stevenson to come up with the sickliest piece of verbiage: *"All of mankind feels, with the oneness he helped give it, an overpowering loss at this saintly man's being gone. A great light has been dimmed now—yet can never, for it was so great, go out."*

All of which may prove nothing but the undisputed fact that Catholics also vote and advertise. But if nothing "controversial" is fit to print, must the hollow space be filled with even hollower words?

Honorable exception: Mr. Murray Kempton alone among Rome correspondents reported that the American cardinals were unpopular at the conclave and that the election of John XXIII may signify some change in policy in the Vatican.

A Distance of Centuries

George Eckstein

A NEW TYPE of political leader has developed in the last few decades. He is a figure both fascinating and ominous, at times attractive for his raw vigor and at other times frightening in his distance from modern assumptions. We can gain some insight into this new type by glancing at the life and work of Milovan Djilas, as it has been sketched out in his autobiography, *Land Without Justice*.

His native land, Montenegro, probably the most backward part of Yugoslavia, was at the time of his birth in 1911 an independent mountain princedom. He grew up in a society which was basically tribal in its organization, with the king little more than the chieftain of the most powerful tribe; with bloody vendettas between clans continuing from generation to generation; with Robin Hood outlaws roaming the mountain fastnesses. Thanks to the constant wars and political upheavals between 1910 and 1930, these feuds, brigands and partisans sometimes adopted a political coloring, but this seemed little more than an accidental veneer over the underlying tribal bond or enmity. A proud, independent people living in a remote barren mountain coun-

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try with few roads and no mineral resources, poor peasants producing at most for a regional market, a thin class of small merchans in the larger towns, a bureaucracy (including army and police) too large for the poor country to maintain, but—and this is important—with the beginnings of an educational system that created an articulate educated or half-educated youth.

The fabric of this society was brute force in its most naked form: clan feuds; lynching expeditions against villages or tribes; police torture; the outlaw-partisan hunted or hunting in the hills. Its equally primitive solidarity was that of the family, the clan, the tribe, the national minority; not the more sophisticated one of the trade union or the rural cooperative. It is a society and an economy close to nature, and subject to its whims: soil, weather, animals are things you live with closely, and which have deep and direct influence on your life.

II

There are a good many such countries in the world today, there are many potential Djilases who have had to jump into the 20th century right out of the absolutism of the 16th, without passing through the Enlightenment of the 18th and the gradual development of science and industry of the 19th century.

Perhaps John Foster Dulles is not the only one in the Western World who is unable to grasp the full significance of the social and national movements of our day, and to comprehend the sources on which they feed. Those of us whose thinking has been shaped by Marxist social theories and the experience of leftist movements, may have a better notion of the *social* forces set in motion since World War I, but how well do we really grasp the nature of the *nationalist* tide that has taken hold of millions from Casablanca to Celebes? The usual notion of "reaction against imperialism" or "revolt against feudalism" is too pat. Not that there isn't a lot of truth to it, but it does not go to the heart of the matter. I don't think it is an accident that in none of these countries—Burma perhaps excepted—has the traditional socialist movement played a dominant or significant role.

Let us not forget: Western socialism is ideologically a descendant of liberalism (whose static logic it tried to transcend in a dynamic dialectic, but from whom it retained its optimistic belief in ultimate progress). This socialism was shaped in the experience of Western industrial capitalism—a well organized society with fairly orderly channels in which social forces normally could find expression: parliament, political parties, trade unions, press, literature. This society is supported by universal education and a highly organized industrial system which dispose its participants toward rational if also unimaginative behavior. The Western socialist movements by and large mirrored these experiences, and by and large they proved helpless—ideologically as well as practically—when with World War I and its aftermath of dissolved values, revolutions and dislocations of power, altogether new forces appeared on the social scene.

We have learned a bit since then; we have graduated into the 20th century. And yet, honestly, do we really comprehend the fever that has attacked the Arab world, the wave that threatens to engulf the Bourguibas, our intellectual kin, and is producing men like Nasser, a new and different type of political leader? For that matter, how well do we really understand a Khrushchev? No question of a "Russial soul" here: the Mensheviks, a Trotsky, a Bukharin—we have no difficulties in understanding them, they speak (or rather spoke . . .) our language.

III

I submit that one of the basic reasons for our failure of comprehension is that these new men and these movements have been shaped by an entirely different social environment: in predominantly agricultural countries, with or without feudal landlords, but in any case with a desperately poor peasantry, largely illiterate and hence subject to different forms of communication and reasoning (the spoken word always being much more suggestive, more inflammatory than the written one). In their work and their daily existence they are much more dependent on irrational factors—the weather; irresponsible and often irresponsive political powers, domestic or foreign; subtropical or tropical climate in many instances, in others the vastness or barrenness of the land

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where—without adequate technical equipment—man feels helpless and exposed.

In all these respects the Soviet Union after 40 years of communist industrialization is not or no longer in the same category as the underdeveloped lands of Asia and Africa. But undoubtedly, too, Communism as it has developed in Russia, is in its structure and its emotional sources closer than the West to the life experience of these new nations, exactly in the measure as it has shed its Marxist origins. Communism has become for many in these new nations the symbol for the achievement of industrialization by a poor agricultural country on a nationalist basis. Where rational accounting is unknown, the failures are overlooked and the cost in human terms is not measured. The big question is whether it will yet be possible to connect the underlying drive for human values—justice, a decent living, independence—with the human and material resources of the West in a manner acceptable to these new nations.

But it would be a self-deception to suppose this any easy task, or a task that can be handled merely by generous programs of economic aid and generous quantities of good will—necessary as both of these are. We are paying the price for the long history of Western imperialism, exploitation and neglect. And we are facing the question of whether it is possible for men separated by a distance of centuries to communicate with each other; whether it is possible to have a fraternal dialogue with people whose very categories of speech are radically different from your own.

On Civil Disobedience

Allan R. Brick

INCREASED agitation this year by those devoted to pacifism or to racial equality often resulted in civil disturbance. Planned demonstrations sometimes were, and frequently bordered upon, violations of local or federal laws. More common still was the jarring of mass proprieties. At their best, the agitators had foreseen what sort of no-man's land they would enter, and charted the consequences of possible friction with group standards. Ideally, they had predicted all the ramifications for inner morality and outer effectiveness.

Those who went on peace walks, those who joined groups of Negroes to sit in Southern restaurants committed the minimum affronts. Although within their rights as citizens, they still faced community displeasure and sometimes arrest under local interpretations of the law. The maximum violations were achieved by those who had purposefully set out to break ordinances which they thought involved, or implemented, injustice.

Such a one is Ken Calkins, who took action in Cheyenne, Wyoming, to oppose construction of the first ICBM launching base in America. After trying by conversation and leaflets to persuade workers to leave their jobs, Calkins and a few companions sat down in a roadway to block construction equipment being moved to the site. Time after time the resisters were carried or dragged from the road by the truck drivers—sometimes considerately and sometimes with kicks. Their obstruction ended abruptly with arrest for all and hospitalization for Calkins, who was run over by a truck which a foreman had ordered to keep moving.

Calkins acted as a member of the Peacemakers, a small band who struggle against their country's military establishments. Following the most extreme methods of Gandhi and what they believe to be the ideas set forth by Thoreau in "On Civil Disobedience," they practice and advise non-registration for the draft and nonpayment of taxes to the war-making state. Probably they would recognize their most vital text for civil disobedience in Thoreau's solution for unjust laws: "If the injustice is part of the necessary friction of the machine of government, let it go. . . . If the injustice has a spring, or a pulley, or a rope, or a crank, exclusively for itself, then perhaps you may consider whether the remedy will not be worse than the evil; but if it is of such a nature that it requires you to be the agent of injustice to another, then, I say, break the law. Let your life be a counter friction to stop the machine." Certainly, counter friction was never more literally applied than by Calkins.

HIS ACCOMPLISHMENT deserves to be compared with the voyage which the United

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States Government forbade the ketch "Golden Rule" to make into the Pacific nuclear-test area. But the chief brilliance of Albert Bigelow's feat lay in his actually being within legal rights and thereby forcing the Government to create a post facto law (of doubtful legality) after embarcation. Theoretically speaking, a pilot or naval gunman might have been ordered to blow the "Golden Rule" out of the water; actually, it was foreseeable that the Coast Guard would keep herding the ship into Honolulu and its "middle-aged" (N.Y. *Times*) sailors into jail.

Calkins' action is more comparable to Gandhi's *satyagraha* demonstrations, in which scores of nonviolently disobedient Hindus—many of them beaten and shot to death by more or less weakening soldiers—practiced essentially *un*pacifist moral coercion with miraculous practical results. But though comparable in method Calkins' deed was chiefly poetic and its results metaphysical. In contrast, Gandhi's campaign was profoundly hard-headed. It was specific warfare fought to release the Indian people from intolerable enslavement, freedom its foreseeable goal.

In Gandhi s case as in Bigelow's the purpose—indeed the necessity—of the action is clear. Not so in the case of Calkins. What did he want or expect? Certainly there was no chance of the men stopping work, of this or any other projected missile base not being built. Was sensational publicity his only desire? In any case of symbolic action "how it looks" (*i.e.*, to the public) comes very close to being how it ultimately *is*. Unfortunately, this action doesn't "look" good enough. What is salient here is Calkins' imposition of moral violence upon the construction workers—his attempt to force them into agreement by means of their fear of running him over and then by means of their guilt because one of them had intentionally done so. Such coercion should play no part in enabling a worker to reflect freely upon the horror he is helping to erect; it is no proper component of the issues which Peacemakers should lay before his mind.

And yet how free is a mind conditioned by that American education which C. Wright Mills calls "a routine training in nationalist loyalties," and then by the years of miliatry service? Perhaps moral violence is necessary to break through habitual allegiances. Perhaps shock therapy, though regrettable, is required.

Although Calkins impulsive sit-down lacked the ingenious foresight and fell short of the impeccable morality of Bigelow's voyage, it should nonetheless be cited as the work of a fledgling prophet. This Peacemaker's cry in the wilderness is all the more human for being hysterical and neurotic. Its faint resonance is natural to an age whose only seers are whaled-up madmen who have been jettisoned by sane sailors of the battleship of state.

PASTERNAK continued from page 2

an outlook that leaves out of account one essential: the impulse to fraternity and freedom that first led Pasternak to write his book.

Such reasoning offers a facile justification for the Khrushchev regime because it descends to its level of operations. If the Nobel Prize was indeed a provocation, might it not have been met and indeed repulsed simply by publishing the book in Russia and allowing Pasternak to go to Stockholm and then unharmed back to his home? That, one would think, is the point honest men ought to make.

As FOR OURSELVES, we do not claim Pasternak as an ideological comrade—except in the general sense that we feel a kinship with anyone who is today genuinely committed to freedom. Pasternak does not belong to our tradition of thought, and the differences of outlook and opinion between himself and us are both numerous and significant. But his book is written with a purity of feeling that makes even its fundamental opinions seem incidental to the yearning for freedom which so many Russians, like Pasternak, must feel. And that is why we extend a hand of comradeship and a word of solidarity to him: because we too believe in freedom. I. H.

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LETTERS

Who's Affluent?

Editors:

Have you read Galbraith's *Affluent Society?* I don't know what your plans are for dealing with it in DISSENT, [see p. 84] but I do know that it strikes me as a piece of wrong-headed smugness which deserves the truth: that it is a bad book. We may be told by the expert egg-heads of the Labor Party, John Strachey and C. A. R. Crosland, that it is the bible of our times; but I see no reason why we should participate in their obvious joy in finding an *Apologia* for Snobs.

Why is it such a bad book? Because it is wrong. It is wrong for many reasons, but for one above all. America is *not* an affluent society. This simple fact, which was overlooked by Galbraith, destroys the book and makes it quite useless except as a conversation piece. America is not an affluent society simply on the basis of the facts which even Galbraith has to admit. On page 86 he shows that in 1950 four-fifths of the families in America had an income (after taxes) of $4690 or less; three-fifths had an income of $3440 or less. Is that affluency? is three-fifths—well over a majority, note—of the families of America living on $3440, affluency? Now, of course, Galbraith would come back with his clever prose, and quibble by saying that prices were lower in 1950 than now, etc., etc. No good. Why didn't he discuss the question in his book? It is astounding that (a) he never defines what he means by affluency, and (b) never asks whether America is in *fact* affluent. And this is a scholar's book? Well, well.

Further figures: according to Kahl, *American Class Structure,* the median cash income of American families in 1953 was under $4000. Over a majority of Americans were living "adequately," therefore, or less than "adequately;" the word "adequate" as defined by Kahl means living "from month to month [with] no savings."

Would you like to know why Galbraith avoids asking those obvious questions? Because not only would he make the unpleasant discovery that American society was not affluent, but worse—much worse—he would have to realize that the crucial problem of American economic life is the distribution of income. He would have come up against the brute fact of inequality. Better, therefore, to cover the whole thing up with bunkum about affluency; for then—the whole issue of inequality cannot possibly arise.

A brilliant book in its way. By postulating the incorrect idea that Americans have plenty of money Galbraith can then put forward the thesis that the absence of public amenities in America is the result simply of some incorrect thinking. The fact that America gets what its class structure demands is conveniently avoided.

It is painful to see such a bad book going the rounds. For it will do what it sets out to do, namely, justify every little bourgeois who has made his private pile in recent years. But the fact is that what Galbraith is talking about is not an affluent society, but the existence of *affluency* within a society. A far, far different thing. It would have taken some tough-minded analysis to have shown the upper bourgeois to its face why they have too much money while others do not have enough. Much easier to say that since everyone has enough those who have a great deal have no need to worry or even wonder about the others. No wonder the book is selling well.

Perhaps Galbraith's book is not worth much space; in a few years it will be thrown on the trash heap with all those books in the 1920's which had the same message of good cheer for the wealthy few. But there is one terrible failure in the book which ought to be emphasized. Perhaps when Galbraith talks about affluency he means the affluency of America as compared to other states. That certainly is true. But—and this is the sickening thing—Galbraith is not even aware of the problem that interpretation raises, the great problem which America is failing so miserably to recognize. It is the problem of how to establish an economic system for getting our wealth into the hands of the underdeveloped states. A fact for Mr. Galbraith: in 1939, 49% of the world's population lived on 2200 calories or less a day; in the post-war period it has increased to 66%. With world misery increasing and

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certain to continue to increase, Galbraith can tell us that we produce too much wealth.

I see that I have lost my temper. With good reason.

BILL NEWMAN

What Part Cynicism

Editors:

I feel that in your Fall 1959 issue two of your writers have given an incorrect picture of American foreign policy. Dwight Macdonald states that the U. S. was forced to be imperialist, that "never has a world power taken up the insignia of *imperium* so reluctantly." Richard Lowenthal argues that spheres of influence arrangements were a matter of realistic politics in the postwar world because "Great Powers" historically have acted this way and because the West would have abrogated its duties by not doing so. The acts of the West in endeavoring to draw up these "spheres of influence" with Russia were, says Mr. Lowenthal, "proof of realistic foresight rather than a morally reprehensible cynicism." The problem between the West and Russia arose over the question of just what "influence" in other countries meant, he argues.

It is my contention that the Western politicians very well understood what Russia was after in the countries in which she was acknowledged to have "predominant influence" and that the United States set out in deliberate fashion to remain the most powerful nation in the postwar world and to extend her power through agreements made at Yalta and elsewhere. The plan fell through because America misconstrued the extent of Russian aims and the degree to which she could be placated by American concessions and FDR's personal charm; but that is another matter.

Regarding America's "reluctant" *imperium*, it seems quite obvious from the wartime and postwar documents that the U. S. made deliberate plans to insure her superior position in the world. The United States saw that she could be *primus inter pares* only if the alliance of the three major powers was maintained in the postwar world. As Admiral Leahy says in a letter to the then Secretary of State Stettinius, part of which was included in one of the Yalta briefing papers:

> ...it is apparent that any future world conflict in the foreseeable future will find Britain and Russia in opposite camps...In a conflict between these two powers the disparity in the military strengths that they could dispose upon that continent would, under present conditions, be far too great to be overcome by our intervention on the side of Britain. [Quoted in Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, pp. 107-108.]

He also refers to the possibility of "post-war disunity of the three great powers...with all of the possibility of the ultimate impact upon the military position of the United States which such a disaster would entail." Elsewhere in the Yalta documents, one sees that FDR is forced to give up designs on Britain's hold on Hong Kong in order to line Britain up with the U. S. and Russia on Poland.

Rather than labor the point about American "reluctant" imperialism, let us look at what the documents and memoirs tell us about just how much the West misunderstood the meaning of "influence" to the Russians and how cynical the Western leaders were in their agreements. If anyone in the State Department had even a passing acquaintance with the reports Harriman sent from Moscow about Russia's behavior in Poland [*ibid.*, pp. 451-452], there was little chance for incorrectly interpreting Russia's aims there. More to the point, however, is a letter from Hickerson to the Secretary of State:

> We have a pretty clear idea of the Soviet objectives in Eastern Europe. We know the terms of their settlement with Finland. We know that the three Baltic States have been re-incorporated into the Soviet Union and that nothing which we can do can alter this. It is not a question of whether we like it; I personally don't like it although I recognize that the Soviet Government has arguments on its side. The point is it has been done and nothing which it

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> is within the power of the United States Government to do can undo it. We know that the Russians will insist on the annexation of a substantal portion of East Prussia and a boundary with Poland roughly in accordance with the Curzon line. The Soviet Union has already re-incorporated Bessarabia into its territory. The Soviet Union may insist on minor adjustments in its boundaries with Rumania....
>
> ...There are certain things in connection with the foregoing proposals which are repugnant to me personally, but I am prepared to urge their adoption to obtain the cooperation of the Soviet Union in winning the war and organizing the peace. [Quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 94-95.]

And the O. S. S. report, *Post-War Poland—Economic and Political Outlook,* dated March 9, 1945, and classified "confidential" until May, 1950, clearly foresaw the future domination of Poland by Russia and advocated a Russian policy for Poland. The report also provides two possible methods of economic advancement for Poland:

> A rigorous dictatorship would be...the most likely political framework of an economic policy involving changes as radical as may be necessary to lead Poland out of its pre-war stagnaton. Such a dictatorship would, under normal conditions, result only from social upheaval and civil war. However, probable upheaval following the liberation of Poland may create conditions in which political changes unimaginable before will become a matter of course. The socal revolution in Poland, instead of being fought in the streets of Warsaw and Lodz, may be decided in the chancelleries of Moscow, London, and Washington. [U. S. Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch. *Post-War Poland—Economic and Political Outlook.* R&A No. 2311. Washington: March 9, 1945, p. 9.]

The other possible method of Polish economic development outlined in this report foresees greater American influence—foreign loans. American interest in any influence in an area turns out to be in large part economic. For instance, in the Yalta Briefing Book Paper entitled "Reconstruction of Poland and the Balkans: American Interests and Soviet Attitude," it is clearly stated that the U. S. will not oppose Russian domination of these areas provided that "some degree of equal opportunity in trade, investment, and access to sources of information is preserved." [Quoted in Department of State, *op. cit.,* p. 235.]

Let us hear Leahy on Poland:

> Personally, I did not believe the dominating Soviet influence could be excluded from Poland, but I did think it was possible to give to the reorganized Polish Government an *external appearance* of independence. [Quoted in William D. Leahy. *I Was There.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1950, p. 352; emphasis added. *Cf.* also James Vincent Forrestal. *The Forrestal Diaries.* New York: Viking Press, 1951, p. 51.]

Roosevelt also had a pretty good idea of what was happening to Poland at the time. [*Cf.* Leahy, *op cit.,* pp. 315-316.] Churchill wrote Stalin in April, 1945,

> With regard to your reference to Greece,... I recognize the consideration which you gave me when we had to intervene with heavy armed forces to quell the E.A.M.-E.L.A.S. attack upon the centre of government in Athens. We have given repeated instructions that your interest in Rumania and Bulgaria is to be recognized as predominant. [Quoted in Winston Spencer Churchill's *Triumph and Tragedy.* Boston: Houghton Miffin Co., 1953, p. 495.]

At Malta,

> Eden wondered whether the Russians might give assurances to Great Britain and the United States of really free elections in Poland. He realized, he added, that this would be asking "rather a lot." [Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. *Roosevelt and the Russians.* Garden city, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1949, p. 64.]

And Mr. Lowenthal was certainly whistling in the dark when he referred to the Stalin-Churchill percentage division of spoils as lighthearted. Churchill certainly made it sound in earnest.

I leave it to the reader to judge how much the Western policies partook of "realism" and how much of cynicism.

REUEL S. AMDUR

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With Heads Unbowed

Editors:

The editors have indicated that there is not enough space in DISSENT to publish many important articles. They have also indicated what a difficult task it is to select from the many important ones.

The fact that Dwight Macdonald was given eleven (11) pages in the Autumn issue for an impressionistic orgy ["America! America!"] indicates the editors are inconsistent and therefore human. There was no need to prove it.

Was this article "just one of those things that happen" or does it indicate a change in the intent of DISSENT? For Macdonald's article seems to me to be out of context. An article based on pure impression wrenched from the complexities of analysis is meaningless. Such a meaningless effort would have been a meaningful historic event had it appeared in a large metropolitan daily or a large circulation slick . . .

For DISSENT's valuable context the Macdonald article was worthless. Just another grab from a bag he has been working out of for some time now; it matters little if it is the bottom of the old bag or a new velvet one.

What does matter is, have DISSENT's editors decided to take the easy way out when it comes to America? The splendid issue DISSENT had on America indicates "NO." The Mailer, Marquart articles introduced enough new material and analysis that wants development.

Nothing available but impressionism?

Wyandotte, Michigan TOM COX

[Let us assure reader Cox that, by choice or fate, the editors of DISSENT will never take the easy way out on *anything*. Those of us responsible for printing the Macdonald article (they shall remain anonymous, if only for reasons of safety) still contend, and stoutly too, that it was lively and stimulating enough to warrant publication.—Ed.]

Kitsch and Culture

Editors:

It seems to me that there is some inconsistency and confusion in the form that the defense of high culture takes in DISSENT. Harold Rosenberg's reply to Dwight MacDonald in the Autumn, 1959 number is a case in point, for Rosenberg's cultural radicalism, in all its certainty that kitsch triumphs and inevitably must triumph and in its willingness to bring more and more under this rubric, exhibits the uneasiness and dangers of that position when it becomes the only possible radicalism left. Or, which is to say the same thing, when culture is felt to be accessible to the radical's imagination in a way that politics no longer is.

That culture has become politicalized is attested to in the *Mass Culture* volume. Why, then, should Rosenberg announce that it is time a halt were called to analysis of mass culture by intellectuals? Defense of high culture, now that it has become a political gesture, would logically entail such analysis. And, what's more, one of the assumptions of DISSENT is that before democratic socialism can be reconstituted, made into at the very least a possibility, American culture (and particularly mass culture) must be examined in all of its conditions.

Such a situation is obviously not the best for a radical intellectual; he would like, I assume, to do more than dissent, and to do more than dissent from kitsch culture. Consequently he should, I suggest, view what he is doing with more irony than does Rosenberg, who apparently would rush to the defense of any art that seemed to promise the making of a *new* avant garde on the premise that it is the fate of any given and established one to be diluted and debased by the mills of mass culture. One would want, I think, to defend and admire an avant garde on grounds other than the necessity of seeing to it that high culture keep a step ahead of its always imminent vulgarization.

Rosenberg's anxious search for a *newer* avant garde and his dissatisfaction that the *old* one should be accepted even in Hollywood may have a model in the suburbs, where the quest for novelty is also undertaken out of anxiety and dissatisfaction, though within no tradition. Now that it has become necessary to write sociology of mass culture *as if* it were politics, I suggest that radical intellectuals bear this burden, if not less uneasily and nervously, at least more frankly and humanely.

Columbus, Ohio JACK BEHAR

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A Definition of Socialism

Editors:

DISSENT bases its purpose on socialist traditions and ideals.

In view of the widespread confusion attached to the meaning of socialism, it might be well for the readers of DISSENT to discuss in its columns what they understand by "socialism."

The concepts of socialism spread over quite a range. It includes Hitler's "National Socialism," Churchill's "Tory Socialism," the "creeping socialism" of the New and Fair Deals; it also includes the "socialism" of many of the new nationalist movements in Africa and Asia as expressed by Nasser, Nehru, Nkrumah and others; there is the Soviet concept of "socialism" as the early stage of "communism"; then there is the "socialism" of the Labor and Social-Democratic governments; the "socialism" of scientific Marxists and so on. It has been said that "we are all socialists now."

To start the ball rolling, I understand socialism to mean the following:

Socialism has three aspects. First it appears as a science, then develops into a movement and finally emerges as a social system.

As a science it explains social evolution, in general, and capitalism, in particular. It is an examination of the material conditions of existence (the interrelated social and economic forces) in a process of growth which gives rise to social changes. This materialist science rose in the earlier half of the 19th Century due to the developments of the time. As a science, it encompasses the materialist conception of history, the law of value and the class struggle.

As a movement it appears on the scene in response to the drives of social necessity. Essentially, the movement arouses members of the working class and others to become socialists so that the majority become conscious of their interests and institute socialism. The socialist revolution is, inherently, majority conscious and political, i.e., democratic.

Finally, it is a system of society. It may be concisely described as a social relationship where the interests of every member of society and society as a whole are in harmony; where everyone cooperates by giving according to his abilities and receiving according to his needs. It is a moneyless, wageless, classless society.

STATEMENT REQUIRED BY THE ACT OF AUGUST 24, 1912, AS AMENDED BY THE ACTS OF MARCH 3, 1933, AND JULY 2, 1946 (Title 39, United States Code, Section 233) SHOWING THE CIRCULATION OF DISSENT, published quarterly at New York, N.Y., for Oct. 1, 1958.

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STANLEY PLASTRIK
Business Manager

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 8th day of September, 1958.

[SEAL] BENJAMIN ELSHITZ
Notary Public

(Commission Expires March 30, 1959)

From the above it follows that a socialist is one who recognizes that capitalism is not capable of eliminating its inherent problems of poverty, wars and crises; that capitalism can no longer be reformed or administered in the interest of the working class or of society; and that socialism is possible and practical today. The only thing standing in the way of socialism is the lack of socialists, i.e., those who understand the significance of socialism.

I. RAB

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